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I. INTRODUCTION
In the last decade, more than 50,000 children have been placed for adoption
with unrelated families in the United States, and half of these children were
adopted when infants.' For the past half-century, the adoption statutes of Great
Britain and all American jurisdictions have enveloped the adoption process with
secrecy that precludes the adopted child during minority from having an ongoing
relationship with the family of origin. Encouraged by counselors, many adopting
parents wove a web of deceit, masquerading as the child's birth parents or, if the
fact of adoption were admitted, telling lies or feigning lack of information about
the birth or the biological parents, despite the child's inevitable questions. All
current adoption laws profess a child-centered public policy, typically requiring the
court to consider "the best interest of the child."3 Today the wisdom of the well-
intentioned "shielding" policy is challenged by many adoption specialists in the
name of the child.
In the words of British psychologist H.J. Sants, children who were adopted
early in their lives characteristically experience "genealogical bewilderment."4 All
adopted children are curious about their family of birth; many search for more
information about their parents and other biological relatives, even seek reunions,
although they have developed strong bonds with their adopting parents.
Proponents of"open" or "cooperative" adoptions urge that the degree of openness
of the adoption arrangements should be left to the negotiation between the parties
to the agreement and their counsellors, following ordinary contract principles, and
that such arrangements serve the best interest of the child.' Just as forcefully,
opponents argue that the continuation of the mandatory secrecy policy is essential
to the adopted child's security and adjustment-the child's best interest.' In this
debate, scant attention has been paid to the difficult problem of the enforceability
of such agreements as the needs of the child inevitably change. In modem cases
reviewing post-adoption contact agreements, courts similarly make sweeping
1. Marianne Berry et a ., Preparation. Support, and Satisfaction ofAdoptive Families in Agency
and Independent Adoptions, 13 Child & Adolescent Soc. Work J. 157, 157 (1996) [hereinafter Berry
(1996)]. For a discussion of the difficulty in securing accurate statistics for American Adoptions, see
Kathy S. Stolley, Statistics on Adoption in the United States, The Future of Children, Spring 1993, at
26.
2. Indeed, secrecy in adoptions is an international problem. The United Nations Convention on
the Rights ofthe Child, ratified by 140 countries including Great Britain and the United States, endorses
"respect for a child's biological heritage and access to that heritage." Mary Martin Mason, Global
Trends in Adoption: What the Future Holds, Adoptive Families 9 (Mar./Apr. 1996).
3. E.g., Uniform Adoption Act, 9 U.L.A. § 3-703(a) (1994): "The court shall grant a petition
for adoption if it determines that the adoption will be in the best interest of the minor" and other
requirements are met.
4. Genealogical Bewilderment in Children with Substitute Parents, 37 Brit. J. Med. Psychol.
113(1964).
5. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Watson, The Case for Open Adoption, 46 Pub. Welfare 24 (1988).
6. See, e.g., Arienne D. Kraflet al., Some Theoretical Considerations on ConfidentialAdoptions
III: The Adopted Child, 2 Child & Adolescent Soc. Work 1399 (1985); see infra note 182.
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assertions that such agreements violate or serve the "best interest of the child"
policy without articulating the vital link between the wall of secrecy and the child's
welfare.
For some private adoption agencies, as many as three out of every four
adoptions now include some form of openness.' As one commentator has
observed, "Presently, open adoption is a firestorm on the West Coast, a prairie fire
in Texas and the Midwest, and a spotty practice on the East Coast."' In the vast
majority of states, the legal effect of post-adoption contact agreements is uncertain
and unsettled. Only sixteen states now explicitly authorize post-adoption visitation
agreements (and waivers of secrecy) in non-relative adoptions, at least in some
situations, either by statute9 or by jurisprudence."0 Even these approving
jurisdictions simply often find that such contracts do not violate public policy and
are performable. For example, the Alaska statute states simply that "[njothing in
this chapter prohibits an adoption that allows visitation between the adopted person
and that person's natural parents or other relatives."" Such an authorization fails
to address the critical issue of the enforceability of post-adoption contact
agreements, that is, the use of the powers of public courts to order compliance with
contractual terms when one party balks.
The traditional adoption statute, with broad language requiring a severance of
the legal relationship between birth parent and child, has been interpreted by most
courts to disallow private agreements for post-adoption contact. Yet, even in
jurisdictions that have clearly rejected cooperative adoptions, reputable, licensed
7. Mardell Groth et al., An Agency Moves Toward Open Adoption of Infants, 66 Child Welfare
247 (1987), reporting on the practices of the Child Service and Family Counseling Center in Atlanta.
In her massive study of adopting parents who received children in California adoptive placements from
July, 1988 to June, 1989, Berry found that most were open, although in varying degrees. Furthermore,
53% of all adoptive families planned to have some form of contact in the future. See Marianne Berry,
The Practice of Open Adoption: Findings from a Study of 1396 Adoptive Families, 13 Children &
Youth Servs. Rev. 379, 384 (1991) [hereinafter Berry (1991)].
8. Mason, supra note 2, at 10.
9. Eleven state statutes broadly authorize visitation agreements between the natural parent and
the infant adopted by a non-relative. Alaska Stat. § 25.23.130(c) (Michie 1991); Cal. Fain. Code §
8714.7 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 259.58 (West 1992 & Supp. 1998); Mont. Code
Ann. § 42-5-301 (1999); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-5-35 (Michie 1995); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3107.60-
3107.65 (West 1996); Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.305(2) (1993); S.D. Codified Laws 25-6-17 (Michie 1998);
R.l. Gen. Laws § 15-7-14.4 (1996 & Supp. 1997); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.33.295(I) (West Supp.
1995); and W. Va. Code § 48.4-12(e) (1996 & Supp. 1997). Three other states authorize open
adoptions but in limited situations. Indiana's statute requires that the child be at least two years old at
the time of the agreement and have a significant emotional attachment to the natural parent; therefore,
it is inapplicable to infant adoptions. Ind. Code Ann. § 19-16(a) (West 1999). The statutes of both
Nebraska and New York apply only to children in public foster care who have previously left their birth
families through a voluntary or involuntary process. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-162 to 165 (1993); N.Y. Soc.
Serv. Law § 383-c (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1995). Maryland further limits its authorization of
visitation rights in non-relative adoptions only when the adopting parent is the child's foster parent and
the child has been out of the custody of the biological parents for at least three years. Md. Code Ann.,
Fain. Law § 5-312 (1995).
tO. Michaud v. Wawruck, 551 A.2d 738 (Conn. 1988); Adoption of Minor, 291 N.E.2d 729
(Mass. 1973).
11. Alaska Stat. § 25.23.130 (2)(c) (Michie 1991).
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adoption agencies continue to offer openness options, reflecting their own
professional endorsement of the concept and honoring the requests of their
clients. 2 Obviously, the continuance of such practices, despite the courts'
disapproval, undermines the law's moral force and creates considerable insecurity
for contracting parties and the child.
In the recent public debate of the Uniform Adoption Act, two powerful
national groups split on the wisdom of open adoptions. The American Child
Welfare League was in favor of such arrangements, whereas the National Council
for Adoption was opposed. Faced with this intraprofessional dispute, the drafters
deleted provisions that authorized enforcement of court-approved open adoption
arrangements.' While such silence may well have been a concession essential for
promulgation and eventual enactment by states, the drafters did little to quell the
current irresolution on such a significant issue for adoption practice.
In this article, we will examine the issue of openness in the context of infant
adoptions by non-relatives. By "infant adoption" we mean adoptions of very young
children, from birth to around two years of age, whose bonding with their primary
caretakers may be disrupted without a strong likelihood of severe, long-lasting
damage. 4 Such cases present the clearest clash of competing public policies
12. Although the Louisiana appellate courts have clearly rejected open adoptions, Hill v.
Moorman, 525 So. 2d 681 (La. App. I st Cir. 1988) and Dugas v. Dugas, 614 So. 2d 228 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1993), nonetheless, many state licensed agencies continue to draft such contracts. According to
one agency director, they operate on the assumption that any agreement is only a moral obligation and
will not be enforceable: "Birth mothers know that adoptive parents have the power to cut off contact."
Richard T. Caffarel, Open Adoptions, presentation at Eliminating the Ghosts of Adoption Conference,
New Orleans, La. (Dec. 14, 1995). Before the enactment of an authorizing statute, there was a similar
gap between practice and the law in Indiana:
[We] dealt with many such cases, witnessing promises between adopting parents and birth
parents with no legal guarantees. Several judges would not sanction or order the agreements
for postadoption contact, declaring that they were in no way binding. Other judges defined
the agreements as not illegal but "extra-legal." Most judges refused to take note of these
promises, and offered no legal recourse if the agreements were violated.
James Kenny et al., Cooperative Adoption: One Solution to Foster Care Drijt, Adoptalk 6 (Winter
1995).
13. The Comments to the initially circulated version of Section 1-105, which describes the legal
relationship between the adopted child and his biological parent after adoption, state:
Nothing in the Act precludes an agreement by an adoptive parent to allow an adopted child
to visit or communicate with another individual, including an adoptee's former parent,
stepparent, relative, or foster parent. Nonetheless, except in the context of an adoption by
a stepparent (when visitation agreements are enforceable], the Act is silent on whether or not
a post-adoption visitation agreement is enforceable. The Act does explicitly provide that the
existence of such an agreement has no effect on the fundamental consequence of an
adoption, which is to terminate the parental relationship between the child and the former
parents and to create the relationship of parent and child in all respects between the adoptive
parents and the adopted child.
14. In fact, any choice of an age-related marker is arbitrary and subject to individual variances.
Social science research on infant bonding and attachment suggests that attachments to specific
individual caretakers begin at about six months and develop gradually over the first year of life. See
Ruth G. McRoy et al., Openness in Adoption: New Practices, New Issues 33-35 (1988). There is
consensus that the longer and more intimate the relationship between the child and his or her initial
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regarding adoption and thus, are the most difficult to resolve." In Part II, we will
analyze the historical record for the sources of parental authority to place a child
for adoption and the initial justifications for secrecy. In Part III, we will discuss
the forces that produced changes in American adoption practice, the shift in the
adoption paradigm toward greater contractual flexibility. In Part IV, we will
analyze the jurisprudence with a special emphasis on the enforceability of post-
adoption contact agreements. In Part V, we will examine the child's "best interest"
in light of current social science research regarding the effects of post-adoption
contact for all parties to such agreements. We will conclude that cooperative
adoption agreements should be authorized, but the practice should be carefully
limited to ensure that they are knowingly and voluntarily made. We will present
our recommendations for a model statute in the concluding Part VI.
II. THE SOURCES OF PARENTAL POWER AND ITS LIMITATIONS
The first American statute to authorize adoption was not enacted until 1851,1
and the first statutes regulating adoption and sealing records appeared much later,
well after the turn of the century. However, in colonial times, the absence of
adoption statutes did not prevent parents from selecting and privately contracting
with surrogate caretakers for their children's benefit. Indeed the roots of adoption,
the authority of biological parents to contract with others for the assumption of
some or all of the caretaking responsibilities for and associational rights with their
children,"7 thread deep into the common law and the parental rights doctrine. The
caretaker, the greater the likelihood of difficulty for the child if separation becomes necessary. See John
Bowlby, Attachment and Loss (1969; 1973; 1980); Laura Beck, Child Development, especially 388-431
(3d ed. 1994). However, predicting the long-range implications of a permanent separation of a
particular child is a very complex task, depending upon the security and exclusivity of the initial
relationship, the nature of the replacement relationship, the continuity of similar caretakers and
caretaking environments, and the child's own temperament. David M. Brodzinsky, Long-Term
Outcomes in Adoption, The Future of Children, Spring 1993, at 153.
15. In intrafamily adoptions and adoptions of older children who have developed relationships
with biological family members, as a practical matter, secrecy may be impossible to maintain and very
different dynamics are involved. Other authors have explored those types of adoptions. See Carol
Amadio and Stuart Deutsch, Open Adoption: Allowing Children to "'Stay in Touch' With Blood
Relatives, 22 J. Fain. L. 59 (1983-84); Judy Nathan, Visitation Afler Adoption: In the Best Interests
of the Child, 59 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 633 (1984); Candace Zierdt, Make New Parents But Keep the Old, 69
N.D. L Rev. 497 (1993); and Annette Ruth Appell, Blending Families Through Adoption:
Implications for Collaborative Adoption Law and Practice, 75 B.U. L Rev. 997 (1995) [hereinafter
Appell (1995)] and The Move Toward Legally Sanctioned Cooperative Adoption: Can It Survive the
Uniform Adoption Act?, 30 Fain. L.Q. 483 (1996).
16. As Presser points out, whether Mississippi or Massachusetts was the first state to enact an
adoption statute depends on what is meant by "adoption statute." In 1846, Mississippi enacted a law
requiring the public recordation of private and otherwise unsupervised adoption agreements. Five years
later, Massachusetts enacted the first modem adoption statute by providing a process for judicial
confirmation that any proposed adoption was in the child's best interest. Stephen B. Presser, The
Historical Background of the American Law of Adoption, I I J. Fam. L. 443 nn. I ll and 112, 466
(1971).
17. The parent-child relationship produces both property and personal rights and responsibilities.
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parental rights doctrine creates .the possibility that children can be
relinquished permanently by their birth parents to other would-be parents. Before
an adoption can be decreed, the court must find that the biological parents' rights
have been voluntarily surrendered or that cause exists to terminate such rights
involuntarily. "
Less well documented is the twentieth century regulation of adoption,
especially the sources of the policy of secrecy in adoptions.'9 The eventual sealing
of adoption records made the exercise of any continued contact between the
biological parents and their child exceedingly difficult, if not impossible. Was the
impermeable wall between the child's birth family and adopting family erected to
protect the adopting family, the birth family, or the child, or to accomplish some
other social good? Modem courts tend to assume that mandatory secrecy
provisions are so deeply entrenched in the law that the entire structure of
adoption would be jeopardized if they were removed. Consequently,
discerning the pedigree of forced confidentiality policies might motivate their re-
examination.
For an analysis of the bundle of"parenting" rights orpersonal rights, see James B. Boskey, The Swamps
of Home: A Reconstruction of the Parent-Child Relationship, 26 U. Tol. L. Rev. 805 (1995).
18. In this article, we are exclusively concerned with the consensual adoption. However, the
involuntary severance of parental rights by court decree is another means of freeing children for
adoption. The termination of parental rights statutes of all jurisdictions require a demonstration of some
substantial parental dereliction, such as abandonment or extreme cruelty, or profound parental
incapacity. See, e.g., La. Ch.C. Tit. X. Parental rights are protected by the constitution when the state
attempts to disrupt the relationship between a biological parent and his child, Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645, 92 S. Ct. 1208 (1972), or when state law fails to honor the parental rights doctrine. As the
Supreme Court reiterated in Quilloin Y. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 98 S. Ct. 549, an adoption case decided
in 1978:
We have little doubt that the Due Process Clause would be offended, "[i]f a State were to
attempt to force the breakup of a natural family, over the objections of the parents and their
children, without some showing of [parental] unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so
was thought to be in the children's best interest," Smith v. Organization of Foster Families,
431 U.S. 816, 862-863, 97 S. Ct. 2094, 2119 (1977).
This result was anticipated in an early adoption case, Schlitz v. Roenitz, 86 Wis. 31 (1893), in which
the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated that the adoption order deprived the father of"his most sacred
natural rights in respect to his child." Id. at 40.
19. Several excellent articles trace the development of adoption from ancient times forward to the
early development of the American law ofadoption. See Presser, supra note 16; Leo Albert Huard, The
Law of Adoption: Ancient and Modern, 9 Vand. L Rev. 743 (1956); Jamil S. Zainaldin, The
Emergence ofa Modern American Family Law: Child Custody. Adoption, and the Court, 1796-1851,
73 Nw. L Rev. 1038 (1979); and Emelyn Foster Peck, Adoption Laws in the United States: A
Summary of the Development of Adoption Legislation and Significant Features of Adoption Statutes,
with the Text of Selected Laws, Children's Bureau Publication No. 148 (1925). Others detail the
modern adoption process. See. e.g., Adoption Law and Practice (J.H. Hollinger, ed.) (1988) [hereinafter
Hollinger]; Ruth Arlene Howe, Adoption Practice, Issues, and Laws 1958-1983, 27 Fain. L. Q. 173
(1983); and John M. Stoxen, The Best of Both "Open" and "Closed " Adoption Worlds: A Callfor
Reform of State Statues, 13 J. of Legis. 292 (1986). However, heretofore we are unaware of any
published summary of developments in the critical period, 1925-1940, when the shape of the adoption
secrecy policy emerged. For the textual discussion, infra text accompanying notes 92-105, we have
relied on original historical research.
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A. The Evolution of the Parental Rights Doctrine
There is nothing in the legislative history of the early adoption statutes that
would indicate that adoption was conceived of as anything more than an extension
of the existing parental rights doctrine to authorize permanent transfers of parental
authority and inheritance rights. Rights of parental association were and are
conceptually distinct from matters of possession or decision-making authority as
illustrated by the apprenticeship doctrine. Similarly, there was nothing in early
twentieth century general contract law that would preclude the enforcement of two
separate independent contracts between parties to a bargain. Yet this
reconceptualization of adoption as a status that even willing parties could not alter
became imbedded rather quickly in American law.
From ancient times forward, biological parents have been deemed to have
possessory and proprietary "rights" in their offspring.2" The parental rights
doctrine recognized the father's natural or inherent and paramount authority to
exercise the personal rights of association and nurturance of his child and to make
decisions affecting the child's well-being or, afortiori, to choose a surrogate who
could exercise delegated parental authority during the child's minority. This
parental authority was recognized by statute in England in 1660.21 The father (and
eventually the mother as well) could appoint a tutor to undertake parental duties of
education, appoint a guardian of his child's property, or, by deed or will, dispose
of the custody of his child, "either born or unborn, to any person, except a popish
recusant, either in possession or reversion, till such child attains the age of one and
twenty years."" ' In both England and the United States, this doctrine is the source
of the authority of a biological parent to create temporary arrangements and as was
ultimately recognized, to achieve the permanent transfer of a child for adoption.
It is also the source of American constitutional protection for parental
decisionmaking.' I
According to Blackstone, the parental rights doctrine rested on the assumption
that human reproduction carries emotional as well as genetic bonds that will
motivate a parent to secure his child's continuing welfare: "[Though laws provide
for enforcement of parental duties] providence has done it more effectually than
any laws, by implanting in the breast of every parent that natural storge, or
20. Several scholars have criticized the ancient and persistent treatment of children as mere
chattel, as proper subjects for contracts. See Barbara Woodhouse, Who Owns the Child? Meyer and
Pierce, and the Child as Property, 33 Win. & Mary L Rev. 995 (1992). See also Margaret Jane Radin,
Market-Inalienability, 100 Hare. L. Rev. 1849 (1987) for a broader criticism of the commodification
of children. Conversely, others have proposed that adoption law and practice, though subject to some
regulation, should acknowledge and more nearly reflect market forces. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Landes
& Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. Legal Stud. 323 (1978); Richard A.
Posner, The Regulation of the Market in Adoptions, 67 B.U. L. Rev. 59 (1987).
21. 12 Car. l1, c. 24, § Vill [1660].
22. 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 450 [1765] (Ist ed. reprint
1966).
23. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,43 S. Ct. 625 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510,45 S. Ct. 571 (1925); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 64 S. Ct. 438 (1944).
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insuperable degree of affection, which not even the deformity of person or mind,
not even the wickedness, ingratitude, and rebellion of children, can totally suppress
or extinguish.""
The most common variant of the parent's contractual power was indenture or
voluntary apprenticeship of the child. The contract transferred the parent's rights,
including his right to the child's wages and his duty of support, to the new master."
Until the mid-nineteenth century in England, the father possessed an almost
unlimited right to choose a surrogate and even to revoke at will a contract of
custody, although the child had established some bonds with the caretaker. 6
However, even then, there were signs of doctrinal change. As early as 1756, the
British Court of Chancery was claiming the royal prerogative as "parenspatriae""
24. 1 Blackstone. supra note 22, at 435.
25. Though these were voluntary arrangements in the sense of an ordinary contract between the
adults, they were not voluntary insofar as the child was concerned. Apparently the child's consent or
confirmation was not required during minority. Lucy S. Forrester and Charles F. Hicks, Dependent
Children and Social Welfare Legislation, 15 J. Pub. L. 349 (1966). Involuntary apprenticeship was a
parallel concept used for the custody transfers of orphans, abandoned or destitute children, and bastards
who were legally considered to be 'filius nullius'--the "child of no one"-the private responsibility
of no father. I Blackstone, supra note 22, at 447. This mechanism has been characterized as
"involuntary" apprenticeship because the consent of the biological parent was not required. The local
or parish government assumed the parent's authority to negotiate a contract with a master whereby the
child's services were exchanged for the master's promise to support and sometimes to educate the child.
See generally, Michael Grossberg, Governing The Hearth: Law & Family In Nineteenth Century
America 260-66 (1985); Presser, supra note 16, at 453-60,472-73. In Colonial America until the late
I 800s, involuntary apprenticeship was commonly used because early America had few institutions or
asylums. See Jacobus tenBroek, California's Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, Development
and Present Status, 16 Stan. L. Rev. 257 (1964).
26. Regina v. Smith, 22 Law J. Q.B. 116-17 (1853). This case involved a clear agreement
between a father and his brother-in-law transferring the care of a six-year-old daughter. The father
agreed that he would not interfere with the child's uncle or seek to remove her from his care until the
child was able to provide for herself. After only a year, the father sought to revoke his agreement and
by writ of habeas corpus sought her return. The law court approved the writ, finding that the father was
at liberty to revoke his consent. Though this case has been cited by American scholars for the
proposition that in England, parental authority was absolute and custody agreements were revocable,
James Schouler, A Treatise On the Law of Divorce, Separation and Domestic Relations § 748, 802 (6th
ed. by A.W. Blakemore 192 1), there was no issue that the father in Smith was unfit to retake the child's
custody. Furthermore, the assertion of the general principle ignores the contrary decisions of the Court
of Chancery.
27. Parens patrlae-literally "the King as father of the country"-was first viewed as a duty
owed by the crown to its subject. Chitty defined this duty as follows:
The King is in legal contemplation the guardian of his people; and in that amiable capacity
is entitled (or rather it is his Majesty's duty, in return for the allegiance paid him,) to take
care of such of his subjects, as are legally unable, on account of mental incapacity, whether
it proceed from I st. nonage: 2. idiocy: or 3. lunancy: to take proper care of themselves and
their property.
J. Chitty, A Treatise On the Law or the Prerogatives of the Crown 155 (1820). For a comprehensive
discussion of the effect of delegating this duty as parens patriae to Chancery, see Neil H. Cogan,
Juvenile Law, Before and After the Entrance of "Parens Patriae ", 22 S.C. L.Q. 147 (1970). For a
fascinating discussion of the historical beginnings of Chancery's assumption of its power in custody




in guardianships "to interfere in particular cases, for the benefit of such who are
incapable to protect themselves."2 Thus, while the parent's right to transfer his
child's custody by contract was confmned, his right to dishonor his agreement was
restricted. By 1820, the Chancery Court was clearly exercising its power to review
custody agreements and to enforce them if the parent's attempted revocation
disserved the child's interests. 29
In the United States by the time of the late nineteenth century, a conflict of
opinion had developed regarding the strength of the parental rights doctrine,
mirroring the split between law and chancery courts in England. Some states held
that custody agreements entered into by parents were invalid and thus, the parent
could freely revoke them and demand the return of the child.0 Other states would
enforce the agreement, but only after a judicial inquiry concerning the needs and
interests of the child." In his treatise published in 1930, Professor Peck suggested
that "more and more, in determining controversies over the possession of a child,
the courts have subordinated the legal rights of the father to the equities existing
in the case, and still more to the real interest of the child itself."32 As one court
explained in an 1908 decision, these voluntary parental agreements conveying the
child's custody to a surrogate were sanctioned because:
The law presumes... that a parent, in disposing of his child, would be
actuated by motives that are proper, and that his chief concern would be
the welfare of the child .... [When state law] provided that the father
could release his parental power over his child to another, it presumed that
the parent would, in making such contract, always have in mind the
interests of his child.
33
This early expression of the American parental rights principle, echoing Black-
stone, includes both an acknowledgement of parental power and its limitation. The
doctrine of parental rights creates only a rebuttable presumption of the enforcea-
bility of any transfer of the child's custody, thus permitting a showing in the
particular case whether the child's needs would be better served by enforcement
or abrogation of the contract. When reviewing child custody disputes, American
28. For further discussion of the development of parens patriae in British and early American
custody disputes, see Lucy S. McGough & Lawrence M. Shindell, Coming ofAge: The Best Interests
of the Child Standard in Parent-Third Party Custody Disputes, 27 Emory L.J. 209 (1978).
29. Lyons v. Blenkin, 37 Eng. Rep. 842 (Ch. 1820). In this case the father sought to regain his
children's custody from their maternal aunt. The court held that having permitted the aunt to support
and care for the children since infancy, the father could not now seek to undo the children's
expectations of her continued care and maintenance. The court awarded custody to the aunt because
this placement would be in the children's best interest.
30. See, e.g., Mayne v. Bredwin, I Halsted, Ch. R. 454 (N.J. 1846); see generally Schouler, supra
note 26, at §§ 748, 802-805, who states that this is the "general American rule."
31. Pool v. Gott, 14 Monthly L. Rep. 269 (Mass. 1851).
32. Epaphroditus Peck, The Law of Persons and of Domestic Relations, § 130,371-373 (3d ed.
1930).
33. Eaves v. Fears, 64 S.E. 269 (Ga. 1908).
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courts embraced the judicial authority of parens patriae, troubled little by the
absence of any monarchical delegation. 4
Aside from formal apprenticeships," throughout the nineteenth century,
parents who were cramped with too many children and too little income arranged
private placements usually with friends or relatives. Obviously, the apprenticeships
and other custody agreements arranged between biological parents and substitute
caretakers were face-to-face transactions. However, these usually informal
placements were enforceable as transfers of custody but accorded the child no legal
rights as an heir of the surrogates." Nevertheless, unlike the apprenticeship
agreements, the surrogate parents often sought to create permanent family bonds
and sometimes even promised to provide for the child in their wills. In exchange,
the surrogate family received the right to the child's services and custody.3 Some
wealthier surrogates were able to obtain private legislative acts authorizing their
adoption of a child, but even then, most courts refused to find that the child was the
heir of the adopting parents.3" A new legal mechanism was required that would
confirm the biological parent's authority to relinquish claims of heirship to the
child as well as claims to the child's possession and control.
In 1851, Massachusetts enacted the first Anglo-American adoption statute,
reviving the ancient authorization of Roman law.39 During the Roman Empire, a
man formally adopted another's child for two main reasons: to prevent extinction
of the family and to perpetuate the family rituals of ancestor worship.4° The
adoptee became subjected to thepatriapotestas of his new father; this power gave
34. See. e.g., In re Mitchell, I Ga. Rep. Ann. (R.M. Charlton, 489) 291, 293 (1836): "All legal
rights, even those of personal security and liberty may be forfeited by improper conduct, and so this
legal right of the father to the possession of his child, must be subservient to the true interests of safety
of.the child, and to the duty of the State to protect its citizens of whatever age."
35. Although the indenture ofchildren was not a part of the common law as accepted in America,
apprenticeships, both voluntary and involuntary, had been authorized in this country by state statutes
since colonial times. Clark v. Goddard, 84 Am. Dec. 777 (Ala. 1863).
36. The statutory order of succession is established by legislation in all states and can only be
altered by the decedent's execution of a valid will or testament. The enforceability of a contract to make
a child an intestate heir or even to provide for the child by testament is governed by general principles
of contract law although in most states greater formalities are required and the remedy of the
disappointed beneficiary may be more limited. See § 2-701, Uniform Probate Code, 8 U.LA. 66(1982); see generally Paul G. Haskell, Preface To Wills, Trusts & Administration 55-61 (2d ed. 1994).
37. Hollinger, supra note 19, §§ 1-21 to 1-22.
38. See. e.g., Ferguson v. Jones, 20 P. 842 (Or. 1888); Long v. Hewitt, 44 Iowa 363 (1876);
Shafer v. Eneu, 54 Pa. 304 (1867). These cases illustrate that even after the enactment of adoption
statutes, courts continued to construe them strictly and to deny inheritance rights for the adopted child
unless the statute explicitly provided for such rights.
39. Unlike the Roman law, the common law of England never recognized formal adoption, and
not until 1926 with the enactment of a statute did England recognize formal adoption that accorded
inheritance rights. "Adoption of Children Act," 1926, 16 & 17 Geo. 5, ch. 29. Although British law
developed the parental rights doctrine, somewhat ironically, the penultimate extension of that
doctrine--a permanent transfer of authority and responsibility for adoption-had never before been
recognized. Artificial parenthood via adoption was an anathema to the British property concepts of
ownership through ancestry and inheritance based on consanguinity. Zainaldin, supra note 19, at 1044-
46.
40. Presser, supra note 16; Huard, supra note 19.
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the adopting father absolute control over his children, "including even the power
of life and death."' The child's interest was not a public concern, although the
child might well benefit indirectly from the adoption. The Roman adoption laws
generally allowed the child to inherit from his or her adopted father and severed the
child's ties with his biological family, thereby creating a new artificial family that
would last for the child's life. Although the concept of the substitution of families
originated at Roman law, the notion that a.complete severance of social ties with
the biological family was inherent in or essential to the effectuation, of the
substitution of legal rights and authority was remarkably absent. Ancient adoptions
were completely disclosed, publicly acknowledged and culturally endorsed
transactions.4' The great Emperor Augustus was the adopted child of his biological
uncle, Julius Caesar, who with his wife, Calpurnia, was unable to produce
biological offspring.
The Massachusetts statute of 1851 prescribed the ordinary civil suit model for
adoption proceedings.43 The Massachusetts adoption model, which required
judicial supervision and approval of the adoption, quickly spread to other
jurisdictions." The pleadings fully disclosed the identities of the biological
parents4 and adopting parents, and all parties appeared in court. The hearing was
open to the public, and newspapers commonly reported details concerning the
adoptions." Within a hundred years, the model had changed. The biological
parents had become phantomized: Written consents to the adoption were ordinarily
taken before any petition was filed, and they no longer appeared at the hearing.
41. Presser, supra note 16, at 447.
42. There are modem examples as well. In 1947, nearly one-third of the children on the island
of Mokil in the eastern Caroline Islands were found to have been adopted and living out of the homes
of their biological parents. In addition, "When the culture of the Polynesian Marquesas Islands was first
studied adoption had been developed to the point where practically all children were adopted. A couple
would ask for an infant before it had been born, and social pressure was so strong that the natural
parents would find it almost impossible to refuse the request.... In societies such as these it is easy
to be an adoptive parent or an adopted child for the adoptive family becomes as normal a unit as the
biological family." Rael Jean Isaac, Adopting a Child Today 165 (1965).
43. 1851 Mass. Acts ch. 324. Massachusetts enacted the prototype of the generally applicable,
modern adoption statute. Earlier, several states, -for example, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas,
enacted statutes that simply provided a procedural mechanism for authenticating and recording private
adoption agreements. See Presser, supra note 16, at 465-67, and Hollinger, supra note 19, at §§ 1-22
to 1-24, for discussion of the different statutes. General adoption laws were a logical step after previous
decades of private legislative acts to formalize adoption. Costly and inefficient, these private acts
affected few children. Presser, supra note 16, at 463-64; Zainaldin, supra note 19, at 1042-43.
44. See Presser, supra note 16, at 466 n.l 12.
45. Using the plural "biological parents" is slightly misleading. Until the 1960s, only the mother
of an illegitimate child was thought to possess parental rights in her child's custody and thus, only her
consent was required for her child's adoption. In Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S. Ct. 1208
(1972), the Supreme Court recognized that in issues of child custody, putative fathers of illegitimate
children must be accorded due process of law. Still today, in adoption cases, the putative father's rights
are not congruent with the mother's rights. Only if the putative father has seized his "opportunity
interest" by demonstrating the assumption of parental responsibility toward the child is he empowered
to block an adoption by withholding his consent. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262, 103 S. Ct.
2985, 2993-94 (1983).
46. Hollinger, supra note 19, at §§ 1-37-1-38.
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They were not identified in the adoption petition. The parties to the adoption could
be linked only by coupling the document of consent with the adoption petition, a
connection only the court or the placement agency could make.47 A completely
new birth certificate was issued which replaced the personal data of the biological
parents with the personal data of the adopting parents.
What had happened in the intervening century to cause this about-face? There
is no single watershed event, but instead a combination of social forces that
coalesced to produce a change in the adoption paradigm.
B. Early Adoption Statutes and the Shif from Contract to Status
Reflecting the parens patriae limitation upon the parental rights doctrine, the
early adoption statutes explicitly expressed a concern for the child's welfare
separate from the adults' proprietary interests in the child.4 Like custody claims
arising out of contract, consensual adoptions required a two-step analysis: an
initial finding that the adoption agreement existed4' and then and only then, judicial
review to ensure that the adoption served the child's best interest. Thus, the
Massachusetts statute required the biological parents' written consent to the
adoption, and also the consent of the child if over thirteen years of age. For young
children, the judge was authorized to speak on their behalf. Next, the Massachu-
setts statute required that the adopter and spouse join in the adoption petition and
required court approval of their suitability as parents: that they possessed
"sufficient ability to bring up the child, and furnish suitable nurture and education
... and that it is fit and proper that such adoption should take effect."' Finally, the
statute also resolved the question of heirship and the legal status of all the parties
in the adoption: the adopted child would become "to all intents and purposes" the
legal child of the adopters, and the natural parents would be divested of all legal
rights and obligations with regard to the adopted child.51
47. As early as 1949, the Children's Bureau recommended the separation of documentary
evidence concerning the biological parents and the adopting parents. See Essentials of Adoption Law
and Procedure (Children's Bureau Publication No. 331-1949) 13 (1949).
48. Many scholars have interpreted family law towards the end of the nineteenth century as
generallyprogressive and child-centered. See Presser, supra note 16, at 492, and Grossberg, supra note
25, at 273-78. Although they acknowledge the judiciary's narrow construction of the adoption statutes
in inheritance disputes and courts' hostility towards the adopted child's right as an heir, they emphasize
that the language of early adoption statutes expressed a public policy of insuring protection for the
child's own needs. However, earlycases suggest that although courts dutifully proclaimed the centrality
of the child's welfare, their analysis more often than not ignored any concern for whether the child's
interests would be promoted by recognition of an alleged adoption contract. See, e.g., Vandermis v.
Gilbert (Pa. 1899) (procedural irregularity in the adoption proceeding justified the removal of a seven-
year-old from the custody of a close family friend), and authorities cited supra note 25.
49. The parent could sue a third party for enticement if he or she induced the child to leave the
parent's home or harbored the child after he had left the parent. The parent's damages were for the
value of the loss of the child's service and society. See Schouler, supra note 26, § 750, at 807-1 1.




Although none of the early statutes, including the Massachusetts model,
mandated secrecy or sealed adoption records,52 a misconstruction of the concept of
parental substitution laid the groundwork. Although commonly overlooked by
commentators, the earliest post-adoption contact dispute, Stickles v. Reichardt;"
was decided by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in 1931. The father of a child
whose mother had died when he was eight months old had been forced to place him
in the home of relatives although the father had been a faithful parent, providing
both support and consistent visitation. When the child was three, the father's
employer and longtime friend proposed that he and his wife adopt him because they
could provide greater material advantages. Both of the adopting parents repre-
sented to the father that they would respect his parenthood and permit continued
visitation after the adoption. The father agreed, and the adoption was finalized.
Four months thereafter the adopting parents notified the father to stay away from
their home and repudiated the agreement. Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court
noted the "strong emotional appeal" of the facts,' it sustained the demurrer that the
father had no cause of action to compel performance of the agreement for
visitation.
In material part, the Wisconsin adoption statute described the effect of an
adoption decree:
A child so adopted shall be deemed, for the purposes of inheritance and
succession and for all other legal consequences and incidents of the
natural relation of parents and children, the same to all intents and
purposes as if the child had been born in lawful wedlock of such parents
by adoption, excepting that such child shall not be capable of taking
property expressly limited to the heirs of the body of such parents....
The natural parents of such child shall be deprived, by such order of
adoption, of such legal rights, if any, of whatsoever nature which they
may have respecting such child and its property."
There is no indication on the face of the statute that the parties were precluded from
altering their post-adoption status by contract. Even if the statute were interpreted
as disabling the biological parents' from the assertion of any continuing parental
rights, certainly the statute did not disable the new, fully empowered adopting
parents from ceding some of their parental rights to anyone, including the
52. Little documentation exists to explain why the Massachusetts Legislature passed such a
progressive, child-centered law. In his in-depth study of Massachusetts legislative documents,
Zainaldin found "[n]either public discussion nor debate surrounded the passage of the act." Zainaldin,
supra note 19, at 1043 n. 11. According to an 1 874 commentary, "[The Massachusetts statute] was, as
we are informed, originally passed as a remedy for the distressing cases arising under the custom of
adopting children, which was then increasing rapidly in that state, through the efforts of foundling
societies." The Law ofAdoption, 9 Am. L. Rev. 74, 80 (1874), quoted in Zainaldin, supra note 19, at
1044 n.13. For discussion of these organizations, see the infra text accompanying notes 64-68.
53. 234N.W. 728 (Wis. 1931).
54. Id. at 730.
55. The Children's Code of Wisconsin, 1929 Wisc. Laws ch. 439, § 322.07.
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biological parent. As the new, legal parents, according to the parental rights
doctrine, the adoptive parents would be bound by their contract. Judicial review
of any contract was limited to ensuring that the child's interests were served by
enforcement. The court interpreted Wisconsin's effect of adoption statutory
provision to withdraw the power of both parties to agree to any arrangement
permitting a continuing relationship between the biological parent and his child.
Properly construed, "effects of adoption" provisions should be viewed as
neutral expressions of public policy, neither approving nor forbidding the
enforcement of privately negotiated contact agreements.S6 Although there is no
recorded legislative history for this particular statute nor for the comprehensive
Children's Code of Wisconsin of 1929, of which it was a part, the court further
simply assumed that the child's interests would be disserved by enforcing the
visitation contract. There was no factf'mding about the impact of continued contact
with his father upon the son nor did the appellate court find the record deficient.
As the court observed:
In determining matters having to do with the custody of children, the
primary question is, What is for the best interest of the child? Where a
parent has voluntarily contracted away his rights, and the child as a result
has formed new attachments, it may very well be that a situation has been
created which a court will hesitate to disturb, not on the principal ground
that the contract was valid or invalid, but because, everything considered,
the welfare of the child demands the continuance of the new relationship.
In many cases language is used which indicates that the court's conclu-
sion is based upon the contractual rights of the parties as such, but in
reality that is only one factor in a number or factors which leads the court
to the conclusion that the best interest of the child require[s] its custody
to be left where the contract [of adoption] placed it."
The Stickles decision was strongly criticized in a contemporary law review
commentary, which urged that contractual rights of continued contact should be
enforced unless it is demonstrated that the child would suffer from enforcement."
The commentary cited two instances of public policy that supported enforcement:
the court's parallel authority to permit visitation in divorce cases unless the child
was harmed by a continued relationship with the noncustodial parent, and the
encouragement of adoptions. As the anonymous author elaborated:
The usual consent to adoption is given because the natural parents feel
that they cannot provide for their child as adequately as the prospective
56. This construction was ultimately endorsed by a New Mexico Court of Appeals in In re
Adoption of Francisco A., 866 P.2d 1175 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993).
57. Stickles, 234 N.W. at 730.
58. Note, 16 Iowa L. Rev. 538 (1930-3 1). The Stickles decision was also the subject of a brief
recent cases report in Note, 15 Minn. L Rev. 719(1930-3 1), which concluded that the decision reached




adoptive parents, not because the natural ties of affection are weak and
they wish to part with the child forever. Thus they will condition their
assent to the adoption on a provision that they be allowed to visit the child
after the adoption and if they know that such a condition will be
unenforcible after the child is adopted they may refuse to consent at all.
The child's advantages in life are thus lessened and he faces the world
under handicaps which might have been removed-his welfare has been
sacrificed to a technical interpretation of the statutory status of adoptive
parents. The prospective foster parents are deprived of the companion-
ship and affection of the child and the natural parents sustain a burden
which is of no special benefit to anyone. Hence, adoptions which might
take place to the advantage of everyone concerned-the child, the foster
parents, and the natural parents-are thwarted. 9
By 1936, when Professor Chester Vernier published his treatise on American
family law, he noted that the typical statute used language borrowed from the
Massachusetts model that the adopted child is to be considered "to all legal intents
and purposes" or "in all respects" as the legitimate child of the adopting parents.'0
As he reasoned:
It seems probable, however, that such provisions will be construed
broadly as being intended to create the artificial parental relationship with
all of the incidents naturally arising therefrom. If the legislative intent is
found to be to permit a substitution of parents in legal effect, it would
seem clear that the legal rights of the natural parent are cut off by the
adoption."
C The Social Context of Early Adoption
Around the same time as the enactment of the first Massachusetts adoption
statute, the practices of American charitable agencies underwent a shift from an
institutional model, taking in infants and schooling them until mature enough (at
about age seven) to work in apprenticeships or indenture, to placing younger
children in foster families.62 Despite the enactment of adoption statutes, at the turn
59. Note, 16 Iowa L. Rev., supra note 58, at 540.
60. 4 American Family Laws § 261,406 (1936).
61. Id.
62. The early practice of the institutionalized incubation of children may have been due in part
to the eugenics movement. Because any "feeble-minded" trait would not manifest itself immediately
in the infant, both the institutions and prospective wealthy parents, fearful of adopting a defective child,
thought it prudent to arrange adoptions of only older children. For potential adopting parents of
moderate means, very young children represented an immediate economic loss. In an era in which
children were valued for their contribution to the family enterprise, Hollinger, supra note 19, at § 1-44,
older children whose stamina and character could be more accurately appraised were preferred as less
risky additional family members.
The reasons prompting the shift toward early adoptive placement are complex. Presser hypothesizes
that the apprenticeship model had fallen into abuse at the hands of overreaching masters looking for
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of the century, most "adoptive" placements still occurred beyond the pale of the
law. When birth families were unable to arrange for temporary custody or
adoptions with other relatives or friends, their only recourse was to surrender the
child to public almshouses, "Infant's Hospitals" or foundling asylums operated by
religious or other private charitable organizations.63
In 1853, the New York Children's Aid Society of New York was organized
and slightly later in 1865, the Children's Aid Society of Boston followed. A major
mission of both of these powerful early child protection enterprises was the placing
of young children with families." While infant adoption served a public purpose
of conserving precious charitable resources at a time of massive immigration and
urban poverty, the primary purpose voiced by their officers was to salvage a future
for children whose biological families could not provide for them."S Initially these
organizations operated outside the general statutory framework for adoption,
without court supervision or executive regulation.
The charters of these charitable societies permitted their officers to receive
destitute children from their parents and to execute agreements of adoption on their
behalf with persons willing to "assume the obligations ofparents."' Rarely did the
cheap labor; that the rise of public education made private institutional instruction unnecessary; and
that immigration threatened to swamp the abilities ofprivate charitable organizations to provide lengthy
care for children. Presser, supra note 16, at 474-81.
63. Presser documents the tremendous growth of these institutions between 1800 and 1860. See
Presser, supra note 16, at 472-74.
64. Id. at 474.
65. With messianic zeal, an 1850 report of a Boston charitable organization extolled the benefits
of adoption:
[Y]ou should see the neglected and exposed, for whom vice and infamy seemed waiting as
for their certain prey, when some messenger of mercy has led them away, and brought them
here in safety from the contagion and ruin. And, following these children farther into life,
you should see some adopted into families, where they are loved and cherished as if natural
members of the household; ... finding in those among who they were placed friends, who
care kindly for them, and toward whom their affections are called warmly forth, although
there is none to claim kindred of blood with them. You should see a happy wife, the mother
of a promising family... and to hear such a one say, "What would have become of me, had
it not been for the asylum, and the family in which its managers placed me?"
Annual Report of the Boston Female Asylum 32 (1850).
Not everyone so enthusiastically endorsed adoption nor the ascendancy of nurture over nature on
which it was based. A member of the bar of Massachusetts, William H. Whitmore, eventually published
a treatise challenging the social utility of adoption. With misgivings approaching the vitriolic, he
opined:
In this country, in most of the states, when the relationship of an adopted child has been
established, it is irrevocable.... Considering the fact that the subjects of adoption are so
largely taken from the waifs of society, foundlings or children whose parents are depraved
and worthless; considering also the growing belief that many traits of mind are hereditary
and almost irradicable [sic.]; it may be questioned whether the great laxity of the American
rule is for the public benefit.
Whitmore, The Law of Adoption 73-74 (1876). For this juxtaposition of the contrasting philosophies
of nineteenth century professionals, we are indebted to Presser, supra note 16.
66. Matter of Thorne, 49 N.E. 661 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1898). Some organizations operated under
legislative charters and received children by court commitments. In return for public funding, they were
subject to at least some state supervision. Hollinger, supra note 19, at § 1.03[2] n.23. Other
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agencies enter into formal releases for adoption when a child was placed.67 There
was no judicial oversight of these arrangements; indeed, many adopting parents
failed to seek a private legislative act of adoption,6' leaving the children in a legal
limbo.
However, in addition to the placing-out activities of chartered philanthropic
agencies, around the turn of the century, there emerged a thriving private market
for arranging adoptions. A California report issued in 1910 noted: "Under the
designation of maternity homes, lying-in hospitals, baby homes or baby farms,
there is in existence a class of institutions that traffic in the illegitimate children."69
These entrepreneurs attracted pregnant, unwed girls to their facilities with the
promise of secrecy thereby concealing the illegitimate birth and sparing the girl's
reputation. For a small fee the girl delivered the baby in the facility, left the child
with the baby "farmer," and returned to society with the explanation that she "had
been taking the rest cure."70 The facility would then sell the infant to an adopting
parent. Even if there were papers of transfer, such as a surrender from the birth
mother to the agency and in turn, from the agency to the adopting parents, there
was no requirement that the papers be filed in court. Operating without any public
oversight, similar operations flourished in many states.
Yet taking a "rest cure" trivializes the experience of many impoverished
pregnant women. A description of certain Texas maternity homes' practices paints
a more damning picture of the pressures that might cause an unwed mother to resort
organizations, like the Children's Aid Society of New York, received children only through voluntary
placements from biological parents and were subject to no state supervision. See also Arthur D.
Sorosky et al., The Adoption Triangle 30-31 (1978).
67. Reverend Charles Loring Brace, the founder of the New York Children's Aid Society, has
become infamous for his development of the Society's "Emigration Plan" the purpose of which was to
"connect the supply of juvenile labor of the city with the demand from the country, and to place
unfortunate, destitute, vagrant and abandoned children at once in good families in the country." Charles
L. Brace, The Best Method Of Disposing of Pauper and Vagrant Children 12 (1859). Thus, Brace
seemed to perform the same function in the late 1800s as the poor law officials did before him: to meet
the demand for cheap labor needed in the nation's westward expansion from the supply oforphaned and
destitute children. Under his leadership, the Society was responsible for rounding up and relocating up
to 100,000 northeastern urban street "orphans" to western states although many of these children had
living parents. Hollinger, supra note 19, at §§ 1-27 and 1-32. See also Diana Dewar, Orphans of the
Living (1968). For a more complex portrait of Rev. Brace, see Presser, supra note 16, at 480-87.
Regulation of agency adoption practices did not occur until the 1920s.
68. Hollinger, supra note 19, at § 1-32. Moreover, this phenomenon prevailed for over a half-
century. Only 30% of the nearly 1,000 children placed out by one New York charitable organization
from 1898-1922 were ever legally adopted. S. Thies, How Foster Children Turn Out (1924), cited in
Hollinger, supra note 19, at § 1-46.
69. State Board of Charities and Corrections, 1908-1910 Biennial Report, quoted by Jacobus
tenBroek, California "s Adoption Law and Programs, 6 Hastings L. J. 261,301 (1955). As defined by
a 1917 Tennessee statute, a "Maternity home" is "[a] house or other place maintained or conducted for
the care and treatment ofwomen during pregnancy and subsequent to the birth of children, and usually
advertised for such work and the disposition of unwanted children." 1917 Tenn. Public Acts ch. 120,
§ 4 (Thompson's Shannon's Code 1918, § § 4436a-65a9).
70. TenBroek, supra note 69, at 300-01.
71. Hollinger, supra note 19, at 1-33.
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to a babydealer." Some operators used confidentiality as an inducement for the
birth mother to relinquish the child to the facility, shielded from the stigma of
unwed motherhood; however, the shield could also become a sword as some baby
farmers used the knowledge of the illegitimate birth to blackmail any birth mother
who changed her mind about leaving the child with them.73 Although confidential-
ity may have incidentally protected the birth mother and child, it was a
powerful inducement for many adopting parents. The seller promised the
adopting parent complete secrecy and confidentiality to increase the demand
for his product. Potential adopters would have found confidentiality
particularly attractive because of the great shame and discrimination then resulting
from illegitimate birth.7" From all the available information, these baby farms
apparently arranged the first inter-party confidential adoption. In effect, the sellers
used secrecy as a kind of product differentiation to induce adopters to buy their
babies."
The exertion of state power over the privateers-the operators of maternity
homes, baby homes, and baby farms-was essential to the protection of all parties
72. According to an early Texas Report:
It is said to be the practice of many maternity homes to refuse admission to any unmarried
pregnant woman who will not first sign her consent to the adoption of her unborn baby.
Hungry,jobless, afraid to face her family, with parturition rapidly approaching, often distant
by miles from free hospitals, perhaps previously denied hospitalization because their
maternity wards were crowded, the young mother, ignorant of the existence of social
agencies which might safeguard her maternity, or, more often, living in a community
absolutely lacking any such salutary facilities, in her despair signs the official consent blank.
Under Texas law this blank, under whatever harsh conditions procured (short of fraud), is
sufficient to enable a court, uninformed of these conditions, to give her baby forever to
persons unknown to her....
This may be further illustrated by the frequently expressed attitude of the superintendents
of some maternity homes. When asked why they refuse admission until after the mother has
"signed away her baby," these women sometimes reply: "if the girl once sees her baby, or
nurses it, she'll never give it up." In brief, these people are saying: "We are able to supply
the baby market only by maneuvering the prospective mother into a choice between delivery
on the highway and giving up her baby."
Texas' Children: The Report of the Texas Child Welfare Survey 116-17 (University of Texas Bureau
of Research in Social Science 1938) [hereinafter Texas' Children].
73. Id.
74. See Burton Z. Sokoloff, Antecedents ofAmerican Adoption, The Future of Children, Spring
1993, at 21-22.
75. We concede that we are drawing an inference, albeit a very plausible explanation, about the
role confidentiality may have played based upon the clearly successful market that developed with the
baby farms and upon the published descriptions of their practices. In contrast, Professor Hollinger
provides a much more benign explanation in her presentation of the history of adoption practice:
Anonymity between birth parents and adoptive parents was more likely to prevail in
placements made by agencies to which the child's custody had been voluntarily or
involuntarily committed than in direct placements. This was due not to any clear policy
favoring anonymity but to the incompleteness of the records kept by these agencies, as well
as to the large numbers of parents who simply abandoned their children without any means
of identification. These factors also made it extremely unlikely that adult adoptees would
ever be able to ascertain the names or whereabouts of members of their original families.
Hollinger, supra note 19, at § 1-38.
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to an adoption and eventually prompted legislation which transformed adoption
from a privately negotiated contract to a highly regulated status. In 1917,
Minnesota drove privately arranged or "independent" placements for adoption into
court for review and approval, a stance it continues to take today.76 It prohibited
both the release or receipt of children outside the judicial process of adoption, thus
ending the drift of surrendered children who were never formally adopted. In what
was then the boldest response to the excesses of baby brokers, the Minnesota
statute provided:
No person other than the parents or relatives may assume the permanent
care and custody of a child under fourteen years of age unless authorized
so to do by an order or decree of court. Except in proceedings for
adoption no parent may assign or otherwise transfer to another his rights
or duties with respect to the permanent care and custody of his child under
fourteen years of age, and any such transfer hereafter made shall be
void."
Other states responded with less draconian measures, choosing instead to
regulate child-placing agencies by prohibiting transfers without approval of a state
agency,"8 by requiring reports of adoptive placements to a central state agency,79 by
requiring licensure, supervision and periodic inspections of any agency,"0 and by
prohibiting adoption advertising."' The principle of public supervision of
adoption was established and the modem child welfare system began to take
shape.
76. Minn. Gen. Stat. 1913, § 7151, as amended by 1917 Minn. Laws ch. 222, p. 335-37. See
infra note 106 for the list of states, including Minnesota, that currently prohibit independent adoptions.
As Howe has observed,
[Omften the "private" or"independent" adoptive placement is nothing but a legal fiction that
deems a direct placement is made whenever a natural parent voluntarily consents to a
placement arranged by an attorney, physician, clergyman, or other third person intermediary
chosen by the natural parent. Such independent placements often come under legislative
scrutiny because of concern that trafficking in children leads to the making of illegal profits
at the expense of a child's welfare.
Howe, supra note 19, at 176.
77. Minn. Gen. Stat. 1913,addedby 1919 Minn. Laws, extra session, ch. 51, § 2. North Dakota
enacted a similar statute, though it prohibited the assignments of children under the age of 18. 1919
N.D. Laws ch. 77, as amended by 1923 N.D. Laws ch. 152, § 1. As early as 1913, Minnesota had
required reports of all children placed for adoption by agencies to the state board of control. Minn. Gen.
Stat. 1913, § 654 4, p. 1417.
78. See. .g., Illinois, Smith's Rev. Stat. 1921,ch. 127, § 53,p. 1887.
79. See, e.g., N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law, § 114 (McKinney 1938), as amended by 1924 N.Y. Laws ch.
323. See also Peck, supra note 19, at 23 n.42.
80. See, e.g., North Dakota, 1923 N.D. Laws 162; Wisconsin, Wisc. Stat. 1923, § 58.03(1), p.
594.
81. See e.g., New Jersey, Act of Feb. 28, 1918, ch. 147, § 101, Acts of 1918, p. 343, as amended
by Act of Apr. 11, 1919, ch. 97, § 2, Acts of 1919, p. 22 2.
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D. Twentieth Century Reforms: The Erection of the Wall of Secrecy
Minnesota's regulation of placements for adoption was accomplished in a
comprehensive revision of its existing adoption laws in 1917. Another notable
consequence of that revision was the enactment of the first true confidentiality
provision." There were three additional features of the Minnesota revision: an
investigation of every proposed adoption by a public agency; a transitional waiting
period between placement and final decree; and potential annulment of a final
adoption. Taken as a whole, these reforms provided somewhat greater protection
for adopted children and a great deal more protection for would-be adopting
parents. The Minnesota statute initiated a wave of similar reforms throughout other
states.
Global supervision of adoptive placements was coupled with increased
scrutiny of the particular proposed adoption. According to the Minnesota statute,
the state board of control was invested with the responsibility to "verify the
allegations of the petition, to investigate the condition and antecedents of the child
for the purpose of ascertaining whether he is a proper subject for adoption, and to
make appropriate inquiry to determine whether the proposed foster home is a
suitable home for the child."' 3 Unfortunately, this salutary provision could be
waived by the court "upon good cause shown, when satisfied that the proposed
home and the child are suited to each other." We have no data showing how often
or for what'reasons the waiver power was used. Other states quickly incorporated
investigation .into their statutory adoption frameworks.'
Although also subject to judicial waiver, the Minnesota statute imposed a
general requirement that a child must have lived for a certain length of time, usually
six months, in the home of the adopting parents before an adoption decree could
be granted. Again, this became a common feature of other states' laws.' Like the
investigation requirement, the waiting period suspension, had a mixed purpose.
Such provisions could operate to protect the child from an unsuitable home,
especially when coupled with supervisory inspections during the period by state
officials.'6 The adoptive parents were clearly protected against impulsive decisions
to adopt, difficulties in adjusting to parenthood, or situations in which the child
developed some intolerable defect. Although the Minnesota prototype did not
specify what relief would be available if problems arose during the transition
82. See infra note 91 for discussion of the slightly earlier New York statute.
83. 1917 Minn. Laws ch. 222, § 7152.
84. See New Mexico, 1925 N.M. Laws § 2. This statute made mandatory an investigation by
State Board of Public Welfare.
85. Ohio, Gen. Code § 8030-l, added by Laws of 1921 (vol. 109). p. 180; Georgia, Act of Aug.
19, 1922, No. 521, § 8, Acts and Resolves of 1922, p. 75; North Dakota, 1913 N.D. Laws § 4446, as
amended by 1923 N.D. Laws ch. 151; New York, N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law, § 112 (McKinney 1938), as
amended by 1924 N.Y. Laws ch. 323; 1925 N.M. Laws § 2. Unlike these other statutes, the Virginia
law and Vermont law required a waiting period of one year. Va. Code § 5333 (1919), as amended by
1922 Va. Acts ch. 484, p. 839; 1923 Vt. Laws No. 60, § 7.
86. See, e.g., the Va. Code § 5333 (1919), as amended by 1922 Va. Acts ch. 484, p. 839.
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period, other states subsequently clearly authorized annulment of any interim
adoptive placement orders. Whether the adopting parents could retreat from the
adoption on demand if simply dissatisfied, is not at all clear.'7
A retrospective summary of the purpose of the waiting period laws published
in 1938 clearly indicates that the primary intended beneficiaries were the adopting
parents and that the annulment power should be generously wielded. It recounts the
problem that can occur when unexpectedly, the adoptive parents find they can
conceive biological offspring. The emotional and financial stress of having two
children, one biological and one adopted, may produce a "sorry" outcome."8
Defects may also be manifested in the child. "These possibilities, far from being
remote, have been known to every child guidance clinic, and every large juvenile
court. The parents now come in begging piteously for relief from what they
consider to be an unfair burden. The child, already suffering from his handicap,
has to bear, with it, the burden of the parents' resentment.'
9
The desire to provide greater protection to adopting parents is more clearly
demonstrated by the authorization for the subsequent annulment of the adoption if
the adopting parents could demonstrate a pre-existing or genetic defect in the child.
As the Minnesota statute provided: "If within five years after his adoption a child
develops feeble-mindedness, epilepsy, insanity, or venereal infection as a result of
conditions existing prior to the adoption, and of which the adopting parents had no
knowledge .... the court may annul the adoption and commit the child to the
guardianship of the state board of control.""0 This change discounted any interests
87. Statutes enacted by Vermont and Virginia were quite open-ended, permitting annulment "for
cause shown." The Vermont statute permitted the annulment of the adoption proceeding during the
twelve months after filing in which it remained pending before the court. 1923 Vt. Laws No. 60, § 7.
The Virginia statute permitted motions to annul by the biological parent, the original petitioner or the
child by next friend during a similar twelve-month period. Va. Code § 5333 (1919), as amended by
1922 Va. Acts ch. 484, p. 839.
88. Texas' Children, supra note 72, at 117.
89. Id.
90. 1917 Minn. Laws ch. 222, § 7158. The Ohio statute enacted four years later is identical.
Ohio Gen. Code § 8030-2, added by 1921 Ohio Laws 109, p. 180. The Virginia statute was much
broader, permitting vacation of the decree without time limit or meaningful standard: if termination
is "manifestly right and proper, and especially if it be for the best interests of the child." Its purpose
is also more opaque, since this option is available to the biological parents as well as the adopting
parents and child. Va. Code § 5333 (1910), as amended by 1922 Va. Acts ch. 484, p. 839.
The New York statute applied only to adoptions arranged by child-placing agencies. It more clearly
extended the right of abrogation to the agency, on behalf of the child, as well as to the adopting parents.
The grounds for agency abrogation were for violation of the foster parent's duties toward the child,
including "cruelty, misusage, refusal of necessary provisions or clothing, or inability to support,
maintain, or educate such child, or attempt to or actually change or fail to safeguard the religion of such
child." N.Y. Dom. Rels. Law § 117 (McKinney 1938), as amended by 1924 N.Y. Laws ch. 323. The
companion provision permitted adopting parents topetition for abrogation for the "wilful desertion from
such foster parent, or of any misdemeanor, or ill-behavior" by the child. N.Y. Dor. Rels. Law 118
(McKinney 1938), as amended by 1924 N.Y. Laws ch. 323 (repealed 1974).
Often the adoption agreement could be undone years after the entry of a final decree. In an early New
York case, In re Souers, 135 Misc. 521 (N.Y. Surrogate Ct., Weschester County 1930), a couple with
substantial income had adopted a four year old child through a private charitable agency. When the
child was seventeen years old, the adoptive parents petitioned the court to have the adoption abrogated
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or needs of the child and instead, was explicitly aimed at reassuring adoptive
parents and minimizing their risk.
Collectively, Minnesota's cluster of adoption reforms demonstrates a policy
aimed at encouraging couples to accept a highly regulated and judicially supervised
process by offering them equivalent or greater protections than they could obtain
from private child-placing entrepreneurs. That context is also helpful in evaluating
the purpose of the confidentiality provisions. The 1917 Minnesota adoption
confidentiality provision was clearly devised to protect the adoption parties from
the prying eyes of other citizens. It stated that, "The files and records of the court
in adoption proceedings shall not be open to inspection or copy by other persons
than the parties in interest and their attorneys and representatives of the State board
of control, except upon an order of the court expressly permitting the same."'"
Obviously, since the birth parents, adopters, and adoptees had access to the court
records and still appeared together in court, these states were not attempting to
promote and preserve anonymity between the parties.
The 1926 Children's Bureau Summary of American adoption laws simply
notes the Minnesota laws without comment concerning their intent, a striking
departure from its usual expansive format.92 The Summary does, however, note a
report published by the Committee on Child Adoption in 1921, which five years
claiming that the child had disobeyed them his whole life and recently had disappeared with the family
automobile. The court concluded that the child's behavior fell under the statute and nullified the
adoption, dissolving all legal bonds between the child, including the child's loss of support and
inheritance rights. The court sympathized with the adoptive parents because they had agreed to adopt
a "dependent" child, not a "defective" child. Interestingly, though not recognized by the court, 4,000
years before the New York statute, the Code of Hammurabi recognized abrogation of an adoption if the
son transgresses against his foster-father." I Albert Kocourek & John H. Wigmore, Evolution of Law,
Sources of Ancient and Primitive Law 387 (1915).
Although only these three states, Minnesota, Ohio, Virginia, and New York had enacted abrogation
or annulment statutes by 1926, permitting such post-adoption relief became a pattern later. For modern
law on annulment of adoptions, see Note, Annulment of Adoption Decrees on Petition of Adoptive
Parents, 22 J. Fain. L 549 (1983-84). See also Unif. Adoption Act, § 3-707, 9 U.L.A. (1994), which
places a six-month time limitation for the filing of any challenge to a final decree, though it does not
specify any grounds for challenge.
91. Minn. Gen. Stat. § 7159 (1913), as amended by 1917 Minn. Laws ch. 222, p. 337. North
Dakota soon followed suit with a nearly identical statute. N.D. Comp. § 4446 (1913), as amended by
1923 N.D. Laws ch. 151.
Prior to these enactments, in 1916, New York became the first state to erect a partial shield
surrounding adoption. The provision simply mandated that "the fact of illegitimacy 'shall in no case
appear upon the record." 1916 N.Y. Laws ch. 453, § 113. There is no legislative history of this earliest
statute. A New York City attorney, John Francis Brosnan, stated that concealing illegitimacy had been
a "long-established rule of practice" in the New York Surrogate's Court, The Law of Adoption, 22
Columb. L Rev. 332, 339 (1922). We cannot be certain whether the statute (or the practice) was
intended to protect the adopted child from the social stigma of illegitimacy, Holling~r, supra note 19,
at § 13-15, or to promote adoptions of younger children at a time when potential adopting parents were
leery that illegitimates could inherit a "feeble-minded trait from their unwed mothers," Hollinger, supra
note 19, at § 1-43. In any case, this statute did not prevent the public or the parties to the adoption from
inspecting the record for other facts'about the birth parents and the adopting parents.
92. See Peck, supra note 32, at 19.
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later led to the recognition of adoption in Great Britain.93 This British Committee
Report recommended that all records of an adoption not be open to inspection by
any person without an order of the court. As the Report explained:
[O]ur attention has been drawn to the lack of security felt in such cases by
those who have taken permanent charge of a child. Possessing no definite
legal rights over the child the foster parents run grave risks that at any
time the natural parents may appear and disturb it, claim to take it away
and even attempt to levy blackmail. The sight of the child after it has
enjoyed all the advantages of a good home may awaken in the natural
parents a desire to recover it. Witnesses have stated that it is no uncom-
mon thing, when a child has reached an age at which it can work and earn
wages, for parents who have habitually neglected it and left it to be
brought up by a relative or even a stranger, to claim it back simply in
order to take its earnings.... [M]any suitable people are deterred from
coming forward to adopt a child by the fear of subsequent claims and the
possible necessity, should they wish to retain it, of litigation uncertain in
its issue. Such people would find encouragement in the knowledge that
a defimite legal status would be given to them as adopting parents and that
any attempted interference by the natural parents could be summarily
restrained.9"
No mention is made of a policy of protecting a biological parent from the
shame of having relinquished a child for adoption or to protect the child from the
stigma of illegitimacy. The paramount intent was to protect the security of the
adopting parents. Far more effective than restraining interference by unscrupulous
biological parents after placement would be a provision that could shield adopting
parents from disclosure of their identity. That was precisely the tack recommended
by this British Committee:
50. Notice should be given to the registrar of births, deaths, and
marriages in the district where the birth of the child was originally
registered, that an order of adoption has been made by the court in
question, and that the records of the court are filed in the court; but such
notice should not contain any information which would lead to the
identification of the adopter.
51. An office copy of the Order should be sent to the Registrar-General
and after a lapse of time the other papers relating to the case might be
deposited in a suitable public office. Such papers should not be open to
inspection by any person without an Order of the Court.9
93. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
94. Home Department (Great Britain): Command Report of the 1921 Committee on Child
Adoption 1 13.
95. Id. ] 50 and 51 (emphasis added). A second committee, the "Child Adoption Committee"
was appointed by the Home Department in April 1924. Composed of an entirely different membership,
its charge was quite similar to that of the earlier Committee on Child Adoption: to "report on the main
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Without recorded legislative history we cannot confidently assess the influence
that a British Report may have had on American legislation, but shortly after its
publication, New York and Pennsylvania amended their laws to provide for
comprehensive confidentiality." In 1924, New York became the first state to seal
adoption records from the view of both the public and the parties, although it left
the issue to the trial court's discretion.97 The only chinks in the secrecy created by
provisions which in their view should be included in any Bill on the subject [of adoption]." Home
Department (Great Britain): Command Report of the 1924 Committee Report at 3 (Apr. 6, 1925). The
proper scope of confidentiality provisions continued to be a central feature of public debate:
A topic which has been the subject of much discussion before us is that of secrecy. There
are those who attach great importance to an element of secrecy in adoption transactions and
by secrecy is meant not merely that the transaction itself should not be a matter of common
notoriety but that the parties themselves should not become known to each other, that is to
say, that the natural parent shall not know where the child goes even though the adopters
may know from whence the child comes. Certain of the Adoption Societies make this
feature an essential part of their policy. They deliberately seek to fix a gulf between the
child's past and future. This notion of secrecy has its origin partly in a fear (which a
legalised system of adoption should go far to dispel) that the natural parent will seek to
interfere with the adopter and partly in the belief that if the eyes can be closed to facts the
facts themselves will cease to exist so that it will be an advantage to an illegitimate child
who has been adopted if in fact his origin cannot be traced. Apart from the question
whether it is desirable or even admissible deliberately to eliminate or obscure the traces of
a child's origin so that it shall be difficult or impossible thereafter for such origin to be
ascertained, we think that this system of secrecy would be wholly unnecessary and
objectionable in connection with a legalised system of adoption and we should deprecate
any attempt to introduce it.
Id. 1. 28, at 9. This Committee recommended that authorizing the court to exclude the press and public
from any hearing and limiting the public's access to adoption register information constituted an
adequate response. However, in its proposed bill which ultimately was enacted, the Registrar-General
was restrained from furnishing information from its records to "any person." "TThe Adoption of
Children Act," 16 & 17 Geo. 5, ch. 29, § 1I (1926).
96. One group of scholars does assert that the original purpose of the confidentiality laws was to
protect the adoptive family from blackmail or embarrassment by third parties such as reporters or
"unscrupulous relatives." Sorosky et al., supra note 66, at 38.
97. N.Y. Dom. Rels. Law § 113 (McKinney 1938), as amended by 1924 N.Y. Laws ch. 323
provided in its entirety:
Order. - If satisfied that the moral and temporal interests of the person to be adopted will
be promoted thereby, the judge or surrogate must make an order allowing and confirming
such adoption and directing that the person to be adopted shall henceforth be regarded and
treated in all respects as the child of the foster parent or parents. If the judge or surrogate
is also satisfied that there is no reasonable objection to the change of name proposed, the
order must also direct that the name of the minor be changed to such name as shall have
been designated in the [verified adoption petition]. Such order must be filed and recorded
in the office of the county clerk of such county and shall be open to the public. The fact of
illegitimacy shall in no case appear upon the record. The written report of the investigation,
together with all other papers pertaining to the adoption, shall be kept by the judge or
surrogate as a permanent record of his court, which may be sealed by him in his discretion
and withheld from inspection by a proper order. No person shall be allowed access to such
sealed records except upon an order of a court of record, and such order shall not be granted
except on good cause shown.
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this statute were that the change of name order remained a public document and
that sealing was left to the discretion of the judge. Both of these holes were soon
closed.
Even as late as 1925, some adopted children continued to use their surname of
birth. A 1925 Pennsylvania statute provided: "If desired by the parties the decree
may also provide that the person adopted shall assume the name of the adopting
parent or parents." Like the earlier New York statute, it left the issues of records
sealing to the discretion of the court.' s Most states by the end of the 1930s required
the issuance of an amended birth certificate for the adopted child and sealed the
original. These statutes not only shielded the fact of illegitimacy but also the
identities of the birth parents and also had significant symbolic value: "The
adopted child was 'reborn' as the child of the new family, with a new identity and
a new identification in the form of a birth certificate, exactly the same as if he/she
was born to them. The original birth certificate with all of its debits was sealed up
and replaced with a new amended one, replete with credits."
Finally, in 1938, mandatory secrecy became state policy. New York amended
its adoption laws to require the sealing of all adoption records, 'including the
original birth certificate, and except upon court order, prohibited access to the
public as well as the birth parents, adopting parents and the child. Furthermore, it
apparently permitted only the adopting parents to object to any attempt to obtain
information." ° A book on adoption practice published in New York two years
thereafter gives a contemporary opinion about the purposes of forced confidential-
ity: "Reporters nosing around for news might come upon something really juicy
and publish it, causing untold suffering and permanent damage. Unscrupulous
relatives could trace a child if they wished, and use their knowledge to upset a well-
established relationship, if they did not do worse, and use it for actual
blackmail."'O'
The following year, Pennsylvania enacted an identical statute. 1925 N.Y. Laws Act 93. § 4.
98. 1925 Pa. Laws No. 93.
99. Sorosky et al., supra note 66, at 38.
100. The New York statute provided, in material part:
The written report of the investigation together with all other papers pertaining to the
adoption shall be kept by the judge or surrogate as a permanent record of his court and such
papers must be sealed by him and withheld from inspection. No person shall be allowed
access to such sealed records except upon an order of a judge or surrogate of the court in
which the order was made or of a justice of the supreme court. No order for access and
inspection shall be granted except on due notice to the foster parents and on good cause
shown.
1938 N.Y. Laws ch. 606, p. 1615.
101. C.S. Prentice, An Adopted Child Looks At Adoption 62-63 (1940), quoted in Sorosky et al.,
supra note 66, at 38. Some judicial confirmation of that purpose can be found in the famous "Baby
Lenore" case, People ex rel. Scarpetta v. Spence-Chapin Adoption Serv., 269 N.E.2d 787 (N.Y. Ct.
App. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 805, 92 S. Ct. 54 (1971). The court observed that the policy of
secrecy was necessary "to prevent the strife and harassment that could be caused by a parent ..... Id.
at 793. Paradoxically, the court relied on that policy to deny the interventioh by the adopting parents
in a hearing on the revocability of the biological mother's surrender.
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By 1949, the Children's Bureau recommended mandatory confidentiality as
an "essential of adoption."'" The only rationale given was that, "In the majority
of cases privacy is desired by the parties concerned in an adoption. Records and
papers contain very personal and intimate information that should be protected as
confidential." 3 If states primarily wanted to protect the child from the stigma of
illegitimacy, then more limited statutes that forbade the disclosure of the child's
birth status would have sufficed. If the primary legislative purpose were to protect
the birth parents and adopting parents against public invasions of their privacy,
then the earlier Minnesota version that withdrew adoption record material from
public access would have sufficed. Sealing the records to protect the members of
the biological family makes little sense in view of the fact that the adopting parents
would have known basic information from pre-adoption counseling or otherwise
could have obtained information essential to the child's well-being on motion to the
court. If the adoptive parents desired to annul the adoption, the biological parents
were not necessary parties and need not be identified nor located for the proceed-
ing.
Logically, the primary if not the exclusive intent of the mandatory confidential-
ity statutes must have been to protect the adopting family and induce them to adopt.
Secrecy was a movement fueled by market forces. State regulated agency
adoptions could not compete with private or independently arranged adoptions
which promised secrecy and non-interference to the adopting parents. The
economic depressions of the 1920s and 1930s created a surfeit of poor children
whose birth families could not care for them at a time when would-be adopting
parents able and willing to assume responsibility for an added family member were
in short supply. During that time period, states enacted other incentives that were
clearly aimed at protecting adopting parents but even these measures were
insufficient. Mandatory confidentiality was the missing feature needed to attract
adopting parents to the more highly regulated agency sector. Policymakers
succumbed to the fears that without such protection, uncaring, even "unscrupulous"
biological relatives, including the birth parents, would seek out the child and
disrupt the adoptive family. Although there was no validation of that assumption
at the time of the enactment of the first record-sealing statutes and recent studies
discount it,"° the assumption has persisted. As one veteran agency supervisor
bluntly put it, "You wouldn't give a burglar the combination of your safe because
you know he'd break in."' 05
III. THE SHIFT IN THE AMERICAN ADOPTION PARADIGM
In what we tend to think of as the "traditional" secret model-though
a tradition of only sixty years-adoption is arranged by intermediaries, either
102. Essentials of Adoption Law and Procedure (Children's Bureau Publication No. 331-1949
(1949)). •
103. Id. at 24. Today the requirement is nearly universal. See Stoxen, supra note 19, at n.44.
104. Paul Sachdev, Unlocking The Adoption Files (1989).
105. Id. at 186.
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a public or private agency or an individual professional, usually an
attorney."° Birth parents who are willing to surrender their child for adoption are
paired by the intermediary with would-be adopting parents. The intermediary
makes the matching decisions and usually is also responsible for transferring the
physical custody of the child to the adopting parents. In an infant adoption, it is the
intermediary who appears at the hospital to sign the medical release and who will
deliver the child to the adopting parents who are eagerly waiting off-stage.
Although most states require that non-identifying health histories of the biological
family members be provided to the adopting parents, 7 the role of the intermediary
is to insulate the parties from each other, precluding any personal exchange of
information between the parties. Indeed, the intermediary is subject to contempt
and sometimes criminal sanctions for violating the provisions of confidentiality. '
During the pendency of the adoption, the court records are kept confidential, and
upon the entry of a final decree, the records, including the original birth certificate,
are sealed."° The official registrar of records is required to issue a new birth
certificate which lists the adopting parents as the child's birth parents. The
adopting parents' dates and places of birth are substituted for the original data of
the birth parents."0 In the legal paper trail of an adoption, the biological parents
vanish from sight.
By the 1940s, social work professionals routinely counseled adopting parents
that they should treat the adoption as if it had never happened:
[In nonrelative adoptions, agencies] often advised the parents against
disclosing the adoptive status to the child and to treat him/her as if he/she
were their natural born. Adoption became viewed as a means of
providing a sense of fulfillment in the lives of infertile couples. The
interests of the adoptee were held secondary to the interests of the
adopters who were seen as doing the child a favor by taking him/her into
their home. The motto was "a home for every child."''.
106. Only eight states forbid "private" adoptions arranged by the individual professional:
Colorado, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-4-108 (1986); Connecticut, Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 45-63(3) (West
Supp. 1987); Delaware, Del. Code Ann. tit. 13 § 094 (Supp. 1986); Massachusetts, Mass. Ann. Laws
ch. 210 2A (Michie/Law Co-op 1981) (Supp. 1987); Michigan, Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 710.41-.43
(West Supp. 1987); Minnesota, Minn. Stat. Ann. § 259.22(2) (West 1982; Supp. 1987); North Dakota,
N.D. Cent. Code § 50-12-01-50-12-17 (1981 & Supp. 1999); Tennessee, Tenn. Code Ann. § 14-10-.116
(1980); and possibly Ohio, O.R.C. § 5103.6 (Ohio Supp. 1996), as construed by In re Adoption of
Zschach, No. 1994-CA-14, 1994 WL 779768 (Ohio Nov. 14, 1994). For a discussion of the policy
implications of attempts to outlaw such adoptions, see William Meezan et al., Adoptions Without
Agencies: A Study of Independent Adoptions (1978).
107. See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-3-205 (1995); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-22-116 (Michie 1999).
108. Section 7-106 of the Uniform Adoption Act (1994) prohibits the unauthorized disclosure of
identifying information from adoption records and reports. The choice of enforcing penalties is left to
enacting states. See. e.g., Iowa Code Ann. § 600.16 (West 1996); La. Ch.C. art. 1186.
109. Unif. Adoption Act, § 6-102,9 U.LA. (1994). See, e.g., S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-1780 (Law
Co-op. 1976); Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-15 (1953).
110. Unif. Adoption Act § 3-802,9 U.LA. (1994). See. e.g., Idaho Code § 39-258 (1998); Ala.
Code § 26-10-4 (1975).
Ill. Sorosky et al., supra note 66, at 34.
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However, by the late 1960s, adoption counseling practices changed. Adopting
parents were encouraged to reveal to the child that he or she was adopted. In part,
this change was a concession to the reality that the fact of adoption is hard to
conceal, even if elaborate precautions are taken as illustrated by this reported
encounter:
One woman who had a son of her own and subsequently adopted a second
boy determined to keep the adoption secret and moved with her family to
Florida severing all connections with her former friends and relatives.
Eight years after her move, when her adopted son was nine, she was
walking on the beach with her sons and bumped into a vacationing former
acquaintance from New York. After expressing amazement at seeing her
friend after all these years in such unlikely fashion, her first question was,
"And which is the adopted one?" While for obvious reasons it is
impossible to know how many adoptive parents in the last generation
successfully kept their secret, the truth in many cases eventually came
out-often with disastrous impact on the child or young adult. It is
essentially for this reason-that the truth will out-that agencies have
been so insistent that adoptive parents must tell the child, and tell him
when he is very small, that he is adopted."'
More importantly, social scientists accumulated evidence that attempts by
adoptive parents to supplant the biological parents by pretending that the child had
no biological ancestry could be damaging to the child's orderly, normal develop-
ment as well as to the adopting family's stability. According to Erikson, an
essential task of human development is to appreciate and resolve questions of
identity." 3 For the adopted child, this adjustment is complicated by his or her
double identity: a genealogical and biological identity that differs from the social
identity as a member of the adopting family. Revealing the fact of adoption to the
child without a willingness and ability to discuss what is known about ancestral
facts implies that those facts may be shameful and suppresses the child's normal
and essential curiosity which, in turn, can jeopardize the adoptive parent's role as
a trusted confidant.
The publication of SharedFate by Canadian sociologist David Kirk confinmed
these theoretical concerns by empirical research."" Kirk published his work in
1964, at a time when standard adoption agency practice clearly promised adopting
parents a parenting role that was identical to the biological parent's rights and
responsibilities, although disclosure of the fact of adoption was advised. Kirk's
book became a turning-point in adoption practice. Using large data samples from
three cities, Kirk sought to assess attitudes toward adoption from both the
112. Rael Jean Isaac, Adopting a Child Today 1971 (1965).
113. Erik H. Erikson, Identity: Youth and Crisis (1968); Erik H. Erikson, Childhood and Society
(1950).
114. H. David Kirk, Shared Fate: A Theory of Adoption and Mental Health (1964).
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community and from adopting parents. He found a thinly disguised community
rejection of the notion that the parental bond by adoption was or should be the
same as the biological bond. "5 Kirk also found that due to community disapproba-
tion, adopting parents had attempted to ignore the psychological fact that their role
as parents was unique and inseparably linked to the child's biological identity. He
theorized that secrecy contributed to the doomed pretence that the adopting family
is no different from a biological family. Kirk reconceptualized the unique
relationship between adopted parent and child as shared fate: just as the child must
come to terms with his relatedness to a biological ancestry, so too the adopting
parents must acknowledge the legitimacy of the child's task and accept it as their
own as well."6
At about the same time that Kirk was questioning the wisdom of adoption
counseling practices and the legal fiction that a complete substitution of families
could be accomplished, adult adoptees began challenging the paradigm's
permanency of secrecy. Two best-selling autobiographies detailing the persistent
longing of the adopted child for information and reunion with biological relatives
stimulated the growth of adoption search assistance groups." 7 Ultimately, that
countermovement forced state legislatures to reexamine policies requiring
permanent secrecy of adoption records. As a result, most states at least now permit
115. When asked the open, global version of the question, would it be "natural" for a mother of
two children, one adopted and one biological, not to know how to choose if both were drowning and
she could save only one, 76% of the respondents thought this was a "natural" reaction. However, when
probed by a question asking what such a mother should do, 46% of his citizen sample thought she
should save her biological child; only 3% thought she should save the adopted child. Only 17% agreed
to "the nearest one," while 29% refused to answer the imponderable. Id. at 26.
116. In today's research, Kirk's constellation of variables assessing the adjustment of the adopting
family is still used. Communication: communication between the adopting parents and child about the
adoption beyond simply telling the child about his adopted status; empathy with the child: the adopting
parents' empathy for the child's connection to his birthfamily and its importance for the child's self-
understanding and identify; empathyfor the biologicalparents: the adoption parents' empathy for the
biological parents' difficulty in making the adoption decision, understanding the biological parents'
need for information about the child, and other attempts to view the adoption from the perspective of
the adoptive parents; acknowledgement of status: acknowledgement that the adoptive family is
different from the biological family and of the different issues it faces; acknowledgement ofthe child's
history: interest in the child's history or background beyond medical information. These conceptual-
izations are taken from Harold D. Grotevant et al., Adoptive Family System Dynamics: Variations by
Level of Openness in the Adoption, 33 Fain. Process 125, 132 (1994).
117. Jean Paton is generally credited as being the earliest pioneer in the movement to challenge
the permanent anonymity of adoption. Her account of her successful attempts to find her biological
mother was published as The Adopted Break Silence (1954). Thereafter she founded Orphan Voyage,
a support group for adoptees. Similarly, after publishing her autobiographical account of the obstacles
encountered in her search for biological parents, The Search for Anna Fisher (1973), Florence Fisher
founded the Adoptees' Liberty Movement Association. For a discussion of the growth of adoption
search assistance groups as well as self-help information, see Hal Aigner, Faint Trails: A Guide To
Adult Adoptee-Birth Parent Reunification Searches (1986) and Cynthia D. Martin, Beating The
Adoption Game (1988). It has been estimated that "at any instant, the total number of [adoption] triad
members who are searching for each other is probably between 100,000 and 300,000, a number too
large to pretend that everything is great in adoption today." Bill Perrin, State 's Adoption Policies Need
to be Revised, The New Orleans Times-Picayune, Oct. 8, 1990, at B6.
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the adopted person io petition the adoption court for disclosure of information in
the case of a medical emergency or other compelling necessity. Is Furthermore,
most states now provide for a voluntary registry which enables a registered adopted
person, upon majority, to be reunited with his or her registered birth parents if a
match of mutual interest can be made." 9
Adoption practice has changed radically since the 1960s. 2 ' Agencies routinely
now prepare a "Life story book" for a child placed for adoption, though the amount
and type of information it contains will vary depending upon the degree of co-
operation of the birth parents.'2' However, some reformers view these changes as
insufficient and argue that matters of secrecy should be left to the individual
preferences of the parties. There is a rich variety of contractual possibilities, and
an increasing degree of participation by both the biological parents and adopting
parents in the pairing or matching process before adoption. Birth parents are often
given a book with biographical information and photographs describing potential
adopting families from which to make a selection. Conversely, in this informal
process, adoptive parents are provided with more biographical information about
the biological parents than was traditionally available. In view of the relative
scarcity of adoptable infants, usually the adoptive parents lack the luxury of choice
among birth families; instead, their choice is simply a more informed one about
accepting responsibility for this particular child. This heightened awareness of
relevant facts by both parties is noncontroversial and is considered sound adoption
practice by professionals.
As an added component, the birth parents and adopting parents may meet and
exchange information face-to-face but without disclosing their full identities such
as their complete names, work and home addresses. If adoption placement is
elected by the birth parents before the child's birth, the couples may even decide
118. See, e.g., Unif. Adoption Act, § 6-105, 9 U.L.A. (1994) which governs the availability of a
civil action to obtain disclosure of adoption information that is not otherwise obtainable pursuant to §
6-103 (nonidentifying information)and § 6-104 (identifying information). See generally Jason Kuhns,
The Sealed Adoption Records Controversy: Breaking Down the Walls of Secrecy, 24 Golden Gate UL.
Rev. 259 (1994).
119. A complete list is found in Hollinger, supra note 19, at § 13-A (Supp. 1995). Tennessee
recently enacted substantial revisions to its sealed adoption records laws. As a matter of right, an adult
adoptee is entitled to all records of his or her adoption except any home study of the adoptive parents.
If a member of the birth family has signed a "contact-veto," the adoptee must agree not to attempt
personal contact, on pain of criminal and civil penalties. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-129 (1995). Alaska
and Kansas permit adult adoptees to obtain copies of their original birth certificates which reveals the
identities of the birth parents. Alaska Stat. § 18.50.500 (Michie 1991); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 65-2423
(1992).
120. The 1968 Child Welfare League of America's Standards for Adoption Service discouraged
the transmission of detailed descriptive data about the birth family. Rev. §§ 4.12-4.15, CWLA, New
York, 1968. That professional policy influenced practice in the 1970s. According to a Massachusetts
adoption specialist, "[A]doption agencies shared very little other than medical background, if unusual,
religion of the biological mother, if important to the parties, and the child's residential history from
birth to adoptive placement." Elton B. Klibanoff, Genealogical Information In Adoption: The
Adoptee's Quest and the Law, I I Fam. L.Q. 185, 186 (1977).




to permit the adoptive parents to accompany the pregnant mother to medical check-
ups or the delivery itself.'
While any of those arrangements abridge traditional notions of secrecy in
preparing for an adoption, none create what is usually thought of as an "open
adoption." An open adoption is a process "in which the birth parents meet the
adoptive parents, participate in the separation and placement process, relinquish all
legal, moral, and nurturing rights to the child, but retain the right to continuing
contact and to knowledge of the child's whereabouts and welfare."'2 Adoption
specialists agree that the critical feature of an open adoption is that it envisions a
continuing relationship between the birth and adopting family despite a final decree
of adoption. That relationship contemplates both post-adoption information
sharing about the child's development and personal contact between the birth
family and the child. Even under an open adoption, the obligation to share
information need not involve identifying information about the adopting parents'
addresses and telephone numbers and visits with the child can be arranged through
an intermediary such as a family friend or the adoption agency. 24 Of course, as
long as personal contact with the child is a sine qua non of the model, limitations
desired by the adopting parents may become impossible to achieve. At a very
young age, children can memorize their addresses and telephone numbers.
Many adoption specialists believe that post-adoption contact arrangements
should permit the parties to avoid face-to-face meetings between the birth family
and the child if they want to ensure the security and privacy of the adoptive home.
Aside from the conceptual baggage of an "open adoption," the label has connota-
tive baggage. In common usage, "open" is an absolute term: "Not shut in or
confined, not surrounded by barriers; to which there is free access or passage on
all or nearly all sides; unenclosed, unwalled, unconfined.""' Reformers have
suggested the substitute term "cooperative adoption" which more fully reflects the
notion that the parties to an adoption agreement are free to hand-tailor their
arrangements and if desired, to avoid face-to-face contact.126
Today cooperative adoptions are negotiated by public and private agencies and
by professional intermediaries with increasing frequency, despite the uncertainty
of their performability or enforceability. 12 We now turn to a consideration of the
122. Gloria Hochman &Anna Huston,Factsheet: Open Adoption,National Adoption Information
Clearinghouse, Rockville, Md.
123. Annette Barn et al., Open Adoption, 21 Soc. Work 97, 97 (1976). For similar definitions,
all centering on the maintenance of contact, ranging from visits to telephone calls to the exchange of
photographs, see Amadio & Deutsch, supra note 15. at 61-62 (1983-84); and Laurie A. Ames, Note,
Open Adoptions: Truth and Consequences, 16 L. & Psych. Rev. 137 (1992).
124. Kennyetal.,supranote 12.
125. The Oxford English Dictionary (compact ed.) 1993 (1985).
126. Kenny et al., supra note 12. Professor Appell uses the term "collaborative adoption" in
preference to cooperative adoption although she does not clearly distinguish between the two forms.
Appel (1995), supra note 15. Because cooperative adoption is the term more widely used in practice
and because it more nearly mirrors the process of our mediation model, we have elected to use that term
as our model with that understanding of its meaning.
127. See infra text accompanying notes 305-316.
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appellate decisions that have reviewed post-adoption contact agreements. Under
the two-step analysis of the parental rights doctrine, if a court found a post-
adoption contact agreement in addition to a surrender of all other parental rights,
we might expect courts to honor the contact agreement, provided that the court
found it to serve the best interest of the child. As we shall see, that has not been
the path of the jurisprudence for most of the past sixty years.
IV. THE RESPONSE OF THE COURTS TO POST-ADOPTION CONTACT AGREEMENTS
Nationwide, only a handful of reported cases address the validity of a post-
adoption contact agreement in an infant adoption by a non-relative. 2 Of these, six
jurisdictions, Wisconsin, Arizona, Louisiana, Kansas, Ohio and New Jersey, have
forcefully rejected the attempted reservation of visitation rights.
A. Decisions Refusing Enforcement ofPost-Adoption Contact Agreements
Three rationales have emerged from these decisions: first, by authorizing
adoption, legislatures have implicitly withdrawn the authority of the parties to alter
their post-adoption relationship; second, such agreements are inseparable and
inconsistent with a surrender for adoption; and, third, as a matter of public policy,
such agreements are per se contrary to the best interest of the adopted child. The
first basis, that the typical effects of adoption statute precluded the confection of
any agreement by the parties that would permit a continuing relationship between
the child and his biological relatives, was introduced by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court in Stickles v. Reichardt. That decision clearly resulted from a statutory
misconstruction in conflict with the parental rights doctrine and has been
previously criticized.'" Stickles has not been relied on or even cited by any
subsequent appellate court.
The second rationale which conflates the adoption agreement with any
purported agreement for continuing contact has proved to be more
attractive to appellate courts. 3° In dictum in a Louisiana case, Hill v.
1
128. Other reported decisions address the enforceability of post-adoption contact agreements in
adoptions by relatives or foster parents of the child. Courts are split on enforceability. See, e.g., cases
refusing enforcement: Lowe v. Clayton, 212 S.E.2d 582 (S.C. 1975) (adoption of an older child by an
aunt); McLaughlin v. Strickland, 309 S.E.2d 787 (S.C. Ct. App. 1983) (adoption of an older child by
a stepparent). Cf cases approving enforcement: Weinschel v. Strople, 466 A.2d 1301 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1983) (adoption of an older child by a stepparent); In re Ruby T., 181 Cal. App. 3d 1201 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1986) (adoption of older children by foster parent). The same policyconcerns for the preservation
of a preexisting relationship between the child and the biological parent are not present in infant
adoptions by non-relatives. Thus, one should hesitate to infer that the courts of Maryland and
California would enforce visitation agreements in infant adoptions. To avoid these problems of
projecting future receptivity of state courts, we have limited our textual discussion only to decisions
reviewing nonrelative adoptions.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 53-61.
130. In an intrafamily adoption, In re Topel, 571 N.E.2d 1295 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991), the opinion
most baldly displays this thinking:
A decree of adoption severs forever every part of the parent/child relationship. The child
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Moorman, 131 the Court of Appeals warned that the. attempted reservation of
visitation rights mightjeopardize the adoption itself.132 Similarly, in In re Adoption
ofJ.H.G.,33 the Kansas Supreme Court has also signaled that adoptive parents'
promise of post-adoption contact could amount to misrepresentation or fraud
sufficient to invalidate a birth parent's consent to the adoption.' However, in that
case, the court also ducked the issue by finding that there was no "clear understand-
ing and agreement as to what, if any, visitation would be allowed."' 3
Most recently, the Ohio appellate courts have flirted with this rationale in In
re Adoption of Zschach.36 In Zschach, the biological mother gave a written,
unconditional consent to the adoption of her four-month-old child although she
later attempted to prove a verbal agreement for continuing contact. As Justice
Pfeifer characterized the mother's claim:
It was [the biological mother's] fear of not being able to see her daughter
which set the series of events in motion. [The adopting mother] played
on [the biological mother's] fears about [the biological father's interven-
tion], and persuaded [her] to let the child stay with her, where [the
is severed entirely from its own family tree and engrafted upon another. For all legal and
practical purposes, an adopted child is the same as dead to its parents. The parents lose the
right to ever see the child again.... We believe it is simply impossible for one to validly
consent to the termination of all his parental rights; when, at the same time, he retains the
right to exercise visitation privileges with that child. We hold that-as a matter of
law-"consent" under such circumstances does not exist.
Id. at 1298-99. Subsequently, the Indiana legislature has approved post-adoption contact agreements
for non-infant adoptions. See supra note 9.
131. 525 So. 2d 681 (La. App. lstCir. 1988).
132. In Hill, the court could avoid this issue because the mother failed to attack the adoption decree
within the statutory time limitations. Subsequently, in Dugas v. Dugas, 614 So. 2d 228 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1993), another intermediate appellate court did invalidate the adoption. In that case, involving an
older child with an established relationship with his grandmother, the court held that the grandmother's
"reason or cause for entering into this agreement was based on the fact that although she would
terminate her legal rights to Scotty, she would still retain visitation rights. Had she not been assured
of that, we feel she would not have signed away her legal rights to her grandson. Therefore we find that
there was error as to the nature of the contract." Id. at 232. Under prior law, a surrender for adoption
could be challenged for error as well as fraud or duress. Under the current law, the validity of a
surrender can be attacked only on grounds of fraud or duress and the appeal must be filed within 90
days of its execution or of entry of the adoption decree, whichever is earlier. La. Ch.C. arts. 1147-1148.
Under the new, more limited statute, there are no cases challenging an adoption based on violation of
post-adoption contact agreement.
133. 869 P.2d 640 (Kan. 1994).
134. Most of the opinion is devoted to the issue of the timing of the consent because the natural
mother's consent to the adoption was given within 12 hours of birth and was thus voidable under
Kansas law. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-2116 (1995). Here the court ultimately held that the mother's
attempt to set aside her consent was not timely because a final decree of adoption had been entered prior
to her action. In In reAdoption of Hammer, 487 P.2d 417 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1971), the Arizona Court of
Appeals gave short shift to a challenge that promises of continued contact constituted extrinsic fraud
vitiating the mother's consent, although the court may also have been troubled by the fact that this was
an oral agreement.
135. J.H.G., 869 P.2d at 648.
136. No. 1994-Ca-14, 1994 WL 779768 (Ohio Nov. 14, 1994).
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biological father] would not be able to find her. [The biological mother]
claims that she consented to the adoption only because [the adopting
mother] agreed to allow [the biological mother] and her other children be
a part of the baby's life. The agreement apparently was that [the
biological mother] and her children would be referred to as the baby's
aunt and cousins. [The biological mother] believed she was consenting
to an open adoption.'
The Ohio Court of Appeals ultimately held that a genuine issue of material fact
existed as to whether the mother's consent had been fraudulently induced by
promises of post-adoption visitation.' The Ohio Supreme Court reversed,
affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment. It avoided confronting the
issue of the unity of the adoption contract and post-adoption contact agreement by
finding insufficient evidence to support the mother's allegations that her consent
to adoption was the product of fraud, misrepresentation or undue influence.'39
The issue was more bluntly raised by the putative father's claim in Zschach.
His agreement with the adopting mother explicitly stated that his consent to the
adoption was "conditioned" upon the grant of visitation "to include at least twenty
hours per month in the Final Decree of Adoption."" Moreover, the agreement
provided that, if the visitation rights were not included in the decree, then "this
consent shall be null and void."'. The interlocutory order of adoption included the
visitation agreement, but the final decree granted almost two years after the child's
birth did not incorporate the visitation agreement. The Ohio Court of Appeals held
that the natural father's consent conditioned on post-adoption visitation rights was
tantamount to a written objection to the adoption, noting that the Ohio law
governing adoptions does not recognize a partial consent to an adoption by one
who has a statutory right to withhold such consent." 2 Again, the Ohio Supreme
Court reversed and again avoided a definitive resolution of the issue by holding
that the contact agreement was not the equivalent of the statutory right of putative
fathers to file an objection to the adoption. By not properly preserving his claim,
the father's constitutional rights had not been violated by the trial court's failure
to grant him a hearing on visitation rights before stripping that provision from the
final decree of adoption."3
If like the putative father's surrender in Zschach, a parent's adoption consent
is expressly conditioned upon the reservation of continuing visitation rights, then
upon breach of the condition by the adopting parents, standard contract theory
would provide the parent with complete remedies, including recision of the contract
to adopt. Recharacterization that the adopting parent's covenant to ensure
137. 665 N.E.2d 1070, 1083 (Ohio 1996) (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).
138. No. 1994-CA-14, 1994 WL 779768 (Ohio Nov. 14, 1994).
139. Id.
140. 665 N.E.2d at 1071.
141. Id.
142. No. 1994-CA-14, 1994 WL 779768, at $2 (Ohio Nov. 14, 1994).
143. 665 N.E.2d 1070 (Ohio 1996).
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continuing access to the child fraudulently induced the parent to consent to the
adoption would also produce nullification of the adoption. In such instances in
which the biological parent expresses such ambivalence about his consent to the
adoption, the trial court should find that his consent is not freely and voluntarily
given and refuse the proposed adoption. To avoid such uncertainty, a legislature
following the Uniform Adoption Act model might decide to withdraw the remedy
of adoption recision despite the confection and later breach of a post-adoption
contact agreement.'" With that pronouncement in place, parties choosing to agree
to continuing contact would be clearly aware that the agreement to adopt and the
agreement for continuing contact were independent obligations.
But ordinarily, the parties intend that the contract to adopt and any contract for
post-adoption contact are independent and severable agreements. The clearest
example of such arrangements was presented to the New Jersey Supreme Court in
In Re D.MH. 14' During the mother's pregnancy, the adoptive parents transported
her to the clinic for prenatal visits and fully discussed the mother's hopes that she
could remain "a big part of the baby's life" not as a full-time parent but as a
"nannie" or "Aunt Jennie."'" Five days after the birth of her child, the mother
gave the child into the adopting parents' custody. Three months later, the mother
signed a consent form for the adoption. Although no written agreement was
executed nor mentioned in the consent form, the trial court found that the adoptive
couple promised the natural mother, while still pregnant, that she could "visit with
the child and be informed as to the child's progress" after the adoption.'47 During
the first year, the arrangement was honored. The mother called the adoptive
parents about once a month to ask about the child's development and to obtain
photographs of him. The parties had dinner together when the child was six
months old. When the child was ten months old, the adoption petition was filed.
Shortly thereafter, the amiability of their continuing relationship shattered.
The Court found that two contracts had been reached by the parties: a
surrender of parental rights and an acceptance of parental obligations by the
adopting parents, and an agreement for continuing visitation. The confection of
two contemporaneous agreements both involving the same subject matter poses
thorny interpretational questions under contract law. Do the two contracts merge
so that a reservation of the lesser right to continued visitation becomes a condition
essential to the enforcement of the greater promise to surrender the child for
adoption? 4" Is the denial of visitation fraudulent conduct by the adopting parent
justifying the recision of the adoption? Conversely, can the presence of two
separate contracts be interpreted as independent agreements?
If the answer turns on the intent of the parties, then the independent contracts
interpretation would appear to be the correct one. In D.MH., the biological mother
and the adopting parents avoided any appearance of condition by executing a
144. See supra note 13 for the text of the Comments to § 1-105 of the Uniform Adoption Act.
145. 641 A.2d 235 (N.J. 1994).
146. Jd. at 237.
147. Id.
148. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts § 8.4 (1982).
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standard unconditional adoption agreement and yet agreed to a wholly separate
contract for continued visitation by the mother. The mother perceived that she
could not adequately care for her child and believed that adoption, rather than some
other temporary custodial arrangement, was in the child's best interest. By
agreeing to adoption, she acknowledged that her legal status as parent would end;
no longer would she have priority as the legal representative of her child during
minority nor would they have any inheritance rights from each other. She was also
willing to grant to the adopting parents not only possessory rights to the child's
custody but also the right to control the child's behavior and make all decisions
concerning the child's person and property-except the right to cut off all future
relationship between the mother and her child. The adopting parents agreed to
adopt the child and by the separate contract, to waive their right to control their
child's associations by permitting a relationship with the mother, albeit a
nonparental role of a fond relative.
When the mother pressed to see the child and personally give him his present
for his first birthday, the adoptive parents balked but eventually relented.
Apparently due to this disagreement, the mother filed suit to regain custody and to
block the adoption. At issue at the adoption hearing was whether the visitation
agreement vitiated her consent to the adoption. 4 The New Jersey Supreme Court
properly ruled that proof of a post-contact agreement does not give a biological
parent the right to rescind a surrender and, thus, to annul an otherwise valid
adoption by non-relatives. In justification, the court simply noted that the
legislature had not recognized post-adoption contact rights and thus a surrender
could not be conditional. Because the remedy sought by the biological mother in
D.M.H. was annulment of the adoption rather than enforcement of the post-
adoption contact agreement, the court stated that it "need not and do[es] not
address or resolve the validity of a voluntary and consensual open-adoption
agreement."'" But the court then proceeded to address such agreements and
clearly signaled that it was not receptive to their enforcement.'
149. An alternative theory offered for affirming the adoption was that no consent of the mother was
needed due to her misconduct toward the child. Using an extremely expansive definition of
abandonment, the court found abandonment. Abandonment is typically defined as the "settled intent
to permanently forego all parental rights and obligations." See, e.g., O.S. v. C.F., 655 S.W.2d 32 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1983); Matter of Burney, 259 N.W.2d 322 (Iowa 1977). Most courts would not have found
abandonment when both an agreement and the mother's post.adoption contact were proved.
150. D.M.H.,641 A.2d at 245.
151. In D.M.H., the court defined open adoption, distinguished between relative and non-relative
adoptions and noted that the majority of other states refused to recognize birth parent visitation in non-
relative adoptions. Though uncited by the Supreme Court, in two earlier cases, lower appellate courts
ofNew Jersey had approved the preservation of birth parent visitation rights by court orders in relatives'
adoptions: In re Adoption of Children by F., 406 A.2d 986 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1979) (stepparent
adoption) and Kattermann v. DiPiazza, 376 A.2d 955 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977) (grandparent
adoption). The court pointed out that a proposed 1993 statutory amendment authorizing consensual
visitation or communication between the birth parent and the adopted child in a non-relative adoption
had been rejected by the New Jersey legislature. Finally, the court commented: "The trial court
determined ... that the child had fully bonded to his adoptive parents" and "that [the mother] Miss H
is to [the child] ... for all practical purposes a complete stranger." 641 A.2d at 245. Most infant
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In disputes in which the biological parent seeks only enforcement of the post-
adoption contact agreement, there is no claim that the adoption should be disturbed.
The validity of the adoption need not and should not be affected at all by the
contact agreement, provided that the parties fully understand and accept the
separateness of their transactions. Family law has long recognized different
species of authorized relationships with children: first, full custodial authority or
natural guardianship of the child's person and property, such as that exercised by
both parents in an intact family; second, separate guardianships-guardianship of
the child's property and guardianship of the child's person; and, third, upon
divorce, sole (or exclusive) custody as well as joint custody; and visitation rights.'
A biological or adoptive parent, often a grandparent, and sometimes a step-parent
may claim visitation rights without seeking the status of a parent and the more
expansive powers of custody."5 3 A claim to visitation is a lesser and independent
right. Recognition of the more limited visitation claim serves an important social
need to avoid full-blown custody disputes and to match the remedy with the
petitioner's ability to sustain only a relatively limited relationship with the child.
Similarly, Anglo-American law has long recognized that a parent may voluntarily
contract away any of the separate and separable powers and rights he or she may
have regarding the child. " No prior court approval is required for the performance
of such contracts and the parent is bound, subject only to a reviewing court's
jurisdiction to enforce, modify or abrogate them if proof is made that they do not
serve the child's best interest.
The third rationale cited by courts that have refused enforcement of post-
adoption contact agreements is that they are per se not in the child's best interest.
Like the Wisconsin Supreme Court in the Stickles case,'55 these courts have not
focussed on the needs of the particular child in the dispute by requiring evidence
of his or her needs, but instead have relied on global assertions of children's needs.
In essence, such assertions amount to a finding that continuing contact agreements
violate a public policy of protecting children.
In In the Matter of the Adoption of Hammer, " the Arizona Court of Appeals
also refused enforcement of a visitation agreement with little illumination of the
supposed dangers to the child. As it characterized the birth mother's assertions:
[The birth mother] alleged the existence of a secret agreement between
herself and the adoptive parents under which the adoptive parents agreed
that [she] would continue to live with the adoptive parents "as long as
possible"; that [the birth mother] would continue to have full and liberal
adoptions by non-relatives could be similarly characterized. The language of the D.M.H. opinion
indicates that without a legislative endorsement of post-adoption contact agreements, the New Jersey
Supreme Court is unlikely to enforce them.
152. Homer H. Clark, Jr. & Carol Glowinsky, Domestic Relations: Cases and Problems 665-671
(5th ed. 1995); Boskey, supra note 17.
153. See infra note 239.
154. See discussion of the parental rights doctrine supra Part Ii, text accompanying notes 20-38.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 53-61.
156. 487 P.2d 417 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1971).
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rights of visitation with her [two daughters] and that the adoptive parents
would not attempt or seek to alienate the minor children's affection from
their natural mother. The petition went on to allege that this agreement
was fulfilled until May of 1967 [three years after the final decree of
adoption] when the adoptive parents moved to the State of Michigan and
there [the birth mother's] visitation rights were denied and the children's
affections were alienated. 57
A breach of any such agreement cannot constitute a ground for vacating a final
decree of adoption because such an agreement is "contrary to the purpose and
intent of our adoption laws and certainly detrimental to and against the best
interests of the adopted child."' 8
In Hill v. Moorman,"5 9 the biological mother consented to the adoption of her
twenty-month-old child. In exchange for her consent, the adoptive parents signed
a document giving the mother "reasonable visitation rights." When they reneged
on the visitation agreement after the adoption was finalized, the mother sought to
enforce the agreement. The Louisiana Court of Appeal held that the post-adoption
visitation agreement was "against public policy":'
An agreement providing for visitation by a third party would impair the
adoptive parents' rights. Such an agreement might also impair the new
parent-child relationship with very undesirable consequences.' 6 '
Like the earlier Arizona decision, in denying enforcement to the agreement, the
Louisiana court's opinion does not amplify upon what public policy is offended,
the nature of the impairment, or the undesirable consequences.
In the Zschach case, the Ohio Supreme Court similarly found that post-
adoption contact agreements violated public policy. As the Court interpreted the
legislative purpose underlying adoption:
[This statute] reflects the legislature's intent to find families for children.
In [Adoption oft Ridenour62 we commented upon the legislative purpose
behind such a proscription as follows: "If preconditions are imposed on
157. Id. at419.
158. Id. at 420.
159. 525 So. 2d 681 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1988).
160. Id. at 681-82.
161. Id. at681-82.
162. 574 N.E.2d 1055 (Ohio 1991). In Ridenour, the court reviewed an adoption which did not
raise the issue of any agreement for visitation rights. At stake, instead, was the authority of a trial court
to impose grandparent visitation rights upon the adopting parents or to deny the adoption if they
objected. Two sisters, aged 21 months and seven months, were removed from their father's care after
the death of their mother and placed in foster care, subject to visitation rights in favor of the children's
paternal grandparents and maternal grandparent. Two years later when the foster parents sought to
adopt the girls, the trial court refused the adoption because "of the difficulties it would create for
grandparent visitation rights." Id. at 1059. The Ohio Supreme Court reversed finding the trial court
had abused its discretion in refusing the adoption and was without authority to "consider the possibility
of post-adoption visitation by biological grandparents following a stranger adoption." Id. at 1060.
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the adoptive parent-child relationship, or if adoptive parents are forced to
agree to share parenting responsibilities with people whom they do not
know, many potential adoptive parents will be deterred from adopting.
Moreover, even where adoptive parents consent to visitation by biological
relatives whom they do not know, such an arrangement is bound to be
stressful for the child, particularly where the parties are not favorably
disposed toward one another."' 63
Thus, the Court assumed, without citing any authority, that even consensual
visitation is inherently harmful to the child. Although the Zschach case presented
the Ohio Supreme Court with an opportunity to recognize the distinction between
court-ordered and consensual visitation, it declined finding no legislative approval
of either alternative. As Justice Pfeifer lamented in his dissent:
If we were able to do the fair thing in this case, it would be to order the
parties to carry out the agreement they originally intended-custody to the
adoptive parent with visitation by the natural parents. However, Ohio
does not recognize "open" adoptions-pursuant to [our effects of
adoption statute), biological parents lose all parental rights when their
child is adopted .... Thus, we are forced to fit this most unusual scenario
into a statutory scheme with "one size fits all" rules.'"
B. Decisions Approving Enforcement of Post-Adoption Contact Agreements
Asbsent explicit legislation, only the appellate courts of Connecticut and
Massachusetts have recognized the validity and enforceability of post-adoption
contact agreements.
In Michaud v. Wawruck 65 the Connecticut Supreme Court held that post-
adoption visitation agreements do not violate public policy and are enforceable if
in the best interest of the child. The opinion does not recite the full history of the
child, but at some early point in her life, the child apparently was removed from her
mother's care and was placed in foster care by the state. She was two-and-one-
half-years old when her mother's parental rights were terminated. Thereafter, the
mother sought to set aside the termination order on grounds that her consent had
been fraudulently procured by the child's father. In a clear compromise of that
lawsuit, the fosterparents who wanted to adopt the child and the mother entered
into a written agreement.
Unlike the other reviewed cases, this agreement is quite detailed, probably
because the public adoption agency was involved in the negotiations. The
agreement, labeled "Open Adoption and Visitation Agreement," unambiguously
stated that the parties would cooperate with the agency in the completion of the
163. In re Adoption of Zschach, 665 N.E.2d 1070,1074 (Ohio 1996).
164. Zschach, 665 N.E.2d at 1082 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting). Subsequently, the Ohio legislature has
authorized post-adoption contact agreements. See infra Part VI.
165. 551 A.2d 738 (Conn. 1988).
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adoption and that the birth mother would withdraw her motion to set aside the
termination of her parental rights. The visitation provisions were set out in a
separate paragraph:
The adopting parents will cooperate fully with the natural-mother in the
natural-mother's visits with the child both now and after the adoption
takes place until the child's 18th birthday. The parties agree to be guided
in carrying out this provision by the present laws of Connecticut regarding
reasonable visitation . . as they pertain to visitation rights of non-
custodial parents in dissolutions of marriage. The tender age of the child
and her high sensitivity to her, up to the present, state of uncertainty shall
be taken into account by the parties. Each of the parties shall at all times
in good faith endeavor to maintain in the child respect and affection for
the other parties. The rights of visitation shall not be exercised by the
natural mother at any time or in such a manner as to interfere with the
education and normal social and school activities of the child. Visitation
shall be twice a month for three (3) hours each visit at the Wawrucks'
home.'"
After the adoption was fimalized, the adopting parents refused to honor the
agreement and cut off the mother's visitation. The birth mother responded by
seeking specific enforcement of the agreement.
The trial court, echoing the sentiments of other courts, held that existing
adoption statutes precluded private agreements that would perpetuate a relationship
between the birth family and the adopted child. The Connecticut Supreme Court
reversed, finding that open adoption agreements were not expressly forbidden'67
and were potentially enforceable. On remand, the trial court was to determine if
enforcement would continue to serve the child's best interest. 68
The only ambiguity in Michaud is whether the authorization of open adoption
arrangements applies to any adoption, even infant adoptions in which there is no
claim of a psychological bond between the birth parent and child. The opinion
does not present any details concerning the degree of bonding between the natural
mother and child, who at best was three-years-old when visitation ceased. The
broad language of Michaud seems to authorize open adoptions in general
166. Id. at 739 (citation to Connecticut statutes omitted). Although the agreement was recorded
with the court, it was not incorporated into the final decree of adoption.
167. Although Connecticut has no statute authorizing an open adoption, the court nevertheless
looked to the general visitation statute in the Family Law chapter entitled "Dissolution of Marriage,
Legal Separation and Annulment." Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-59 (1994). By interpreting this statute very
broadly to encompass adoption proceedings as well as dissolution actions, the court held that thejudiciary has great discretion "to grant the right of visitation with respect to any minor child ... to any
person" and the only criterion under the statute is the best interest of the child. Michaud, 551 A.2d at
741. The court also perceived the critical distinction between visitation rights and custody/parental
status. Thus, the visitation rights accorded the natural mother in Michaud need not infringe on the
adoptive parents rights to control and custody.
168. For a discussion of such a fact-finding hearing, see Smith v. Brett, No. FA93 030 76 90 S,
1994 WL 411003 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 29, 1994), and the text accompanying infra notes 303-315.
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regardless of whether the birth parent's claim is based on a developed or potential
relationship with the child. 6 9
While the Connecticut Supreme Court opinion properly separates the issue of
post-adoption parental status and post-adoption visitation, it does not provide much
discussion of how public policy is served by the enforcement of the parties'
agreement. In the only passage that addresses this issue, Justice Peters wrote:
We are not prepared to assume that the welfare of children is best served
by a narrow definition of those whom we permit to continue to manifest
their deep concern for a child's growth and development. The record...
demonstrates that, in the present case, the "Open Adoption and Visitation
Agreement" was openly and lovingly negotiated, in good faith, in order
to promote the best interest of the child. The attorney for the child
reported that the child thought the agreement between her mother and her
soon-to-be adoptive parents would be "the best world that she could
imagine." This agreement did not violate public policy. 70
Massachusetts is a state that has long approved post-adoption contact
agreements even in infant adoptions. In a 1973 case, Adoption ofa Minor,7 ' the
Supreme Judicial Court considered a visitation agreement concerning a newborn
placed several days after birth with prospective adopting parents before any
meaningful relationship could have developed between the natural mother and the
child. The birth mother agreed to consent to the adoption in return for visitation
rights. The adopting parents then signed a document allowing visitation at "all
reasonable times" at their residence. Six months later, before the adoption was
finalized, the natural mother sought to withdraw her consent even though the
prospective adopting parents had fully complied with the visitation agreement. The
mother argued that, because her consent was conditioned on post-adoption
visitation rights, it was invalid and against public policy.
169. The court observed:
The plaintiff's rights are not premised on an ongoing genetic relationship that somehow
survives a termination of parental rights and an adoption. Instead, the plaintiffis asking us
to decide whether, as an adult who has had an ongoing personal relationship with the child,
she may contract with the adopting parents, prior to adoption, for the continued right to visit
with the child, so long as that visitation continues to be in the best interest of the child.
551 A.2d at 740-741 (Conn. 1988). Citing this passage, Professor Appell gives a limited holding to
Michaud, noting that the open adoption agreement was between adoptive parents and a biological
mother who had an ongoing relationship with the child. Appell (1995), supra note 15, at 1039.
However, later in its opinion, at 741-42, the court is more expansive:
Similarly, Weinschel v. Strople, 56 Md. App. 252,261,466 A.2d 1301,1305 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1983), concluded, as do we, that as long as the best interest of the child is the
determinative criterion, public policy does not forbid an agreement about visitation rights
between a genetic parent and adoptive parents.
(Emphasis added).
170. Michaud, 551 A.2d at 742.
171. 291 N.E.2d 729 (Mass. 1973).
1999]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
The appellate court held that the visitation agreement between the natural
mother and adoptive parents was not against public policy and could even be
incorporated into the adoption decree. The court did not rely upon any statutory
authority, stating simply that the welfare of the child was its "supreme inquiry." 72
Thus, the agreement would be enforceable only to the extent that it advanced the
child's welfare. Any provision that granted the natural parent "a legal right
overriding the welfare of the child" would be against public policy, but only that
"offending provision would be unenforceable."'73
In sum, whether rejecting or upholding attempted post-adoption contact
agreements, appellate court opinions have displayed a superficial analysis of their
effect upon the child's best interest. Especially striking is the fact that courts
appear disinterested in the findings of social science research. Although legal
doctrines developed in earlier centuries have been criticized for their blindness to
the child's interests in disputes over the child's care and control, the systematic
study of childhood and child development did not occur until the late nineteenth
century.'74 Until proof accumulated that childhood experiences profoundly
affected human development and research was able to identify children's needs at
each stage of their development, the law's inattention to a child's emotional and
psychological needs is at least understandable and perhaps justifiable.
However, the same defense cannot be asserted for the jurisprudence of the last
half-century. As these cases illustrate, courts are still making sweeping assump-
tions,'75 citing mysterious "very undesirable consequences" for the new adoptive
172. Id.at731. The court noted that a recent amendment to the adoption statute requires tho words
"unconditionally surrender" in the prescribed consent to adoption form. Id. However, this amendment
did not apply retroactively in this case. There are no subsequent reported Massachusetts cases
interpreting the Adoption of a Minor holding in light of this amendment. However, there are
subsequent decisions that approve the inclusion ofcontinued visitation agreements within public agency
permanency planning for children whose parental rights have been terminated. See Adoption of Adam,
500 N.E.2d 816 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986); Adoption of Abigail, 499 N.E.2d 1234 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986);
Petition of the Dept. of Soc. Services to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 467 N.E.2d 861 (Mass.
1984).
173. A Minor, 291 N.E.2d at731.
174. As late as the nineteenth century, childhood was viewed merely as a state of physical
maturation for the individual whose characteristics and abilities were fixed at birth. See, e.g., Jean
Jacques Rousseau, Emile: or, On Education (A. Bloom trans. 1979). At least one authority has
postulated that scientific interest in human behavior was first sparked by the publication of Darwin's
theories of evolution in 1859. Before then, inquiry into the nature and development of men and women
was within the province of theologians and philosophers. Paul H. Mussn et al., Child Development
and Personality 9 (4th ed. 1974). Darwin's macrocosmic work suggested the theory that there might
well be an parallel evolutionary process at work at the microcosmic level in individual human
development which would affect adult personality and behavior. An American experimental
psychologist, G. Stanley Hall of Clark University, is generally credited with producing the first
systematic study ofchild development. G. Stanley Hall, The Contents'of Children's Minds on Entering
School, I Pedagogical Seminary 139 (1891). Since then, of course, there has been an explosion of
research. See, e.g., Stephen J. Ceci & Maggie Bruck, Jeopardy in the Courtroom: A Scientific Analysis
of Children's Testimony, especially Legal and Behavioral Approaches to Children "s Suggestibility:
1900-1985 and The Recent Past: Changes In Legal and Behavioral Approaches 47-74 (1995).
175. The exceptional discussion is found in the New Mexico Court of Appeals opinion in In re the
Adoption of Francisco A., 866 P.2d 1175 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993), a contest concerning older children
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parent-child relationship 6 and concluding that "such an arrangement is bound to
be stressful for the child."' " Harm is deemed axiomatic: "The obvious problems,
emotional and otherwise, which would likely result from such interference [by
biological parents] to the detriment of the child, and efforts of the adoptive parents
to properly rear the same, are too basic and numerous to here require any
elucidation or enumeration."'
7
In the next section, we will examine those assumptions in light of a growing
body of social science research.
V. SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH ON THE EFFECTS OF OPENNESS
IN THE ADOPTION PROCESS
In part,judicial assumptions about the destructiveness of post-adoption contact
agreements may be attributable to the dominance of the psychoanalytical theory of
human development during this century. As Silverstein and Demick note, this
theory focussed on individuation, separation of the self from others, beginning with
the mother, as the most important task of healthy maturation.7 9 Theorists of this
school, such as Kraft and her colleagues, warned that openness in adoption can
cause serious adjustment problems for all parties to an adoption. Continued contact
can interfere with the biological parent's grieving and separation from the
relinquished child; can interfere with the child's need for a safe, psychological
space for the unfolding of development and with the child's attachment to the
adoptive parents; and can interfere with the adopting parents' sense of security and
permanent attachment to the child.' 0
As Silverstein and Demick describe the influence of psychoanalytical theory
in shaping policies of confidentiality and secrecy:
between a former foster parent and the agency selected adoptive couple. A divided Court reversed the
grant of court-ordered visitation rights to the former foster parent. The special concurrence by Judge
Hartz, at 1188-1190, identifies three policy considerations at stake in post-adoption visitation, though
his analysis is not limited to consensual agreements. Does such visitation serve the child's best interest?
Who should make the determination of the child's interests, the courts or the adoptive parents? Will
adoption be discouraged if the state can order post-adoption visitation? Furthermore, in discussing the
child's best interest he reports relevant social science research.
176. Hill v. Moorman, 525 So. 2d 681, 682 (La. App. 1stCir. 1988).
177. In re Adoption of Ridenour, 574 N.E.2d 1055, 1063 (Ohio 1991), quoted with approval In
In re Adoption of Zschach, 665 N.E.2d 1070 (Ohio 1996).
178. McDonald v. Berry, 134 S.E.2d 392, 393 (S.C. 1964).
179. Deborah R. Silverstein & Jack Demick, Toward an Organizational-RelationalModelofOpen
Adoption, 33 Fain. Process 111 (1994). See also McRoy et al., supra note 14, especially Chapter 3 for
a discussion of other theoretical perspectives on adoption.
180. In 1985, they published a trilogy of influential articles summarizing extant research and
calling for a reappraisal of the wisdom of open adoptions: Arienne D. Kraft et al., Some Theoretical
Considerations on Confidential Adoptions. Part I: The Birth Mother, 2 Child& Adolescent Soc. Work
J. 13 (1985); Adrienne D. Kraft et al., Some Theoretical Considerations on Confidential Adoptions,
Part I: The Adoptive Parent, 2 Child & Adolescent Soc. Work J. 69 (1985); and Adrienne D. Kraft
et al., Some Theoretical Considerations on Confidential Adoptions. Part X.1: The Adopted Child, 2
Child & Adolescent Soc. Work J. 139 (1985).
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[A]t the heart of the clinical defense of confidentiality is the practical and
emotional mandate of separation. More simply, healthy birthmothers are
expected to separate from their children forever and to have no future
knowledge of their whereabouts, to grieve this loss, and essentially to
forget, disconnect from this troublesome episode in their lives. Healthy
adoptive parents are expected to resolve their infertility prior to adoption
and proceed with their lives, unencumbered with future thoughts or
feelings for the children they were unable to conceive or for the other set
of human beings who gave birth to the child they now raise-as if
significant differences between adoptive and biological family relation-
ships do not exist. The psychologically healthy child who has been
separated from his or her birth family is expected to grow from infancy to
adulthood and ultimately die, untroubled by the lack of access to his or
her genetic or cultural heritage, a legal and constitutional privilege denied
to no other human being in our society.
The birth mother who spends years and possibly a lifetime longing
for reassurance about, or contact with her child; adopted children who
grow up longing for information, explanation, or contact, afraid of
alienating adoptive parents if they voice their desires; and the adoptive
parents, were they to collude either with the birth mother or child in
facilitating any connection, particularly early in the child's life: all are
regarded as exhibiting a similar pathology. That is, they have been
unsuccessful in resolving their grief over their lost relationships and,
consequently, have been unable to disconnect, separate, and differentiate
as mature, autonomous, adult human beings."'
The emergence of a new theory, emphasizing the importance of maintaining
relationships with others-the self-in-relation theory-creates a new perspective
for assessing the central task of achieving maturity and conversely, for labeling the
pathological. This theory no longer posits separation as the central task. Instead,
a much more complicated notion of self-identity is postulated which acknowledges
that identity itself is continually shaped and reconfigured due to the influence of
significant relationships. 2 A relationship requires the achievement of an
181. Silverstein & Demick, supra note 179, at 114 (citation omitted).
182. For this new theory, Silverstein and Demick credit Carol Gilligan, In A Different Voice:
Psychological Theory and Women's Development (1982) and Jean B. Miller, Toward A New
Psychology of Women (1976) and 22 Stone Center Works in Progress 1-23 (1986):
What Gilligan and Miller articulated was the validity and complexity of the sophisticated
task of maintaining a sense of oneself in the midst of being aware of and responsible to the
needs and realities of others. Miller and her colleagues have defined and validated, as
essential human characteristics, the innate need to participate in reciprocal emotional
relationships with other human beings, and the innate potential to enhance the quality of
these relationships and of life itself by accentuating one's empathic awareness of the other.
Silverstein & Demick, supra note 179, at 114.
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individual identity and yet a willingness to cede some independence for intimacy
and interdependence.'
In the adoption context, this theory becomes more comprehensible due to the
"shared fate" conceptualization of Kirk.'8 The genetic and social contribution of
both sets of parents shape the adopted child's identity. It is not pathogenic but
normal and imperative for the child to acquire information about his biological
family, just as in daily interactions, he or she acquires information about the
members of the adoptive family. The child's search for "Who am I?" is an
amalgam of both the genetic and social contributions to identity formation.
Furthermore, as Kirk observed, as the child's caretakers, the adopting parents are
responsible for assisting their child in developing empathy for the pressures that
caused the biological parents to relinquish him to them. For that formidable task,
the adoptive parents must themselves develop empathy for the biological parents.
Through this theoretical lens, acknowledgement of the immutable interrelatedness
of the child and his biological family and thus, of the interrelatedness of adopting
family and the child's biological family, can be viewed as the principal develop-
mental task of the adopted child and the adopting family.
Aside from changing theories of adjustment to adoption, the question is fairly
asked whether we know enough to make sensible public policy choices about the
wisdom of permitting cooperative adoptions and enforcing post-adoption contact
agreements. For each of the members of the "adoption triad," the biological
parents, the adopting parents, and the child, we will first present the theoretical and
the empirical research on the traditional closed or confidential model of adoption.
We will then discuss similar research of more open models.
Though there is a substantial body of research on the traditional, closed model,
research on the cooperative adoption model is relatively scarce. There are now two
large scale empirical studies. Professor Grotevant and his colleagues have
collected interview data from biological parents, adoptive parents, and the children
in 190 adoptions. At the time the sample was drawn, the ages of the adopted
children ranged from four to twelve years. Because their work is based on a
representative sample of adopting parents recruited from fifteen states, it will be
hereinafter referred to as the "National Study.""' Professor Berry and her
colleagues have compiled a larger data base, a questionnaire return sample of 1,396
adoptive placements made in California. Their work has focused on the reactions
of adopting parents and indirectly, the reactions of adopted children. This study
183. Theodore Lidz, The Person: His and Her Development Throughout the Life Cycle (1976).
184. See supra the discussion of Kirk's book, Shared Fate, in the text accompanying notes 114-
116.
185. Three published reports are based on this data set. The first study collects data from the
adoptive parents who were interviewed during the period 1987-1992. Harold D. Grotevant et al.,
Adoptive Family System Dynamics: Variations by Level of Openness in theAdoption, 33 Fain. Process
125 (1994). A second study reports data derived from the interviews of 171 of the adopted children.
Gretchen M. Wrobel et al., Child Participation in Openness, 67 Child Development 2358 (1996). The
views of 169 biological mothers in the database who were interviewed about openness options have
been reported in Ruth G. McRoy et al., Changing Practices in Adoption (1994).
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will be hereinafter referred to as the "California Study. 1 6 Both the National Study
and the California Study are on-going, longitudinal studies which ultimately should
provide us with a great deal more knowledge about the impact of post-adoption
contact arrangements.
Since post-adoption contact agreements did not begin until the 1970s, currently
there simply are no longitudinal studies following the biological parents, the child
and the adoptive parents through the child's transition into adulthood. There are
also methodological difficulties in the scientific study of openness in adoption."87
Furthermore, any study comparing the attitudes and experiences of families in open
adoptions with those in closed adoptions would need samples drawn from each
model. Because of the rich variety of post-adoption contact agreements, many
adoptions continue to be more or less closed or "confidential."'88 By definition,
when the biological and adopting parents have consciously chosen the closed
model, they may be unwilling to participate in research that at least to some degree
compromises their privacy. As a result, the empirical research that does offer
186. The sample was drawn from adoptions completed in California during the one year period,
July 1988-June 1989. Based on questionnaires returned by the adopting parents in the sample, three
articles have so far been published which address the impact of openness on adopting parents: Berry
(1991), supra note 7; Marianne Berry, Adoptive Parents' Perceptions of and Comfort with. Open
Adoption, 72 Child Welfare 231 (1993); and Marianne Berry et al., The Role of Open Adoption in the
Adjustment of Adopted Children and Their Families (forthcoming 2000) (on file with authors)
[hereinafter Berry (2000)].
A fourth publication spawned by this same California sample compares the preparation for adoption
provided for adoptive parents in independent, agency and public adoptions and assesses the parents'
levels of satisfaction with the resulting adoption. Berry (1996), supra note 1. While preparation for
adoption is an important aspect of satisfaction with any adoption, confidential or cooperative, the
findings of this article are off-point for this discussion. We will address that issue in Part VI of this
article.
187. Some of the empirical studies involve the use of questionnaires and or cross-sectional samples
which can produce findings of restricted validity. The limitations of a questionnaire survey are obvious.
The scientist has only the written responses and lacks any knowledge of the context in which they were
given, including information about whether they are the product of private, independent thought or
carefully considered. A survey conducted by individual interview provides not only the context but also
an opportunity to resolve any misunderstanding, to clarify or probe a particular response. A cross-
sectional sample is one that takes a group of individuals at a given point and examines the group profile
in terms ofvariables. If it thereafter follows the subjects, it can only compare the group's characteristics
as a group at the initial point and at the later point. A cross-sectional study cannot produce valid
conclusions about individual development.
188. Grotevant and his colleagues have identified six types of adoptions along a continuum of
openness: (I) Confidential adoptions: minimal information is exchanged and the exchange typically
ends at the adoption decree; (2) Time-limited mediated adoptions: nonidentifying information is
exchanged through an intermediary, typically adoption agency personnel; (3) Ongoing mediated
adoptions: nonidentifying information is exchanged through an intermediary on a continuing basis,
even after adoption; (4) Time-limited fully disclosed adoptions: direct communication and full
disclosure of identifying information occurs for only a limited period; and (5) Ongoing fully disclosed
adoptions: direct communication and full disclosure continues for the indefinite future. Grotevant et
al., supra note 185. Demick & Wapner use differing labels but similar distinguishing variables. Jack
Demick & Seymour Wapner, Open and Closed Adoption: A Developmental Conceptualization, 27
Fain. Process 229 (1988).
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comparative data about pairs of parents in open vis-a -vis closed adoption
arrangements often involves small samples.' "
Despite those limitations, we are beginning to accumulate some interesting
data that focuses on the variable of the degree of openness in adoption and its
impact on both the biological parents and adoptive parents, and to a lesser degree,
on the child. Because most legislative and judicial concern centers on the
perceived deleterious effect of cooperative adoption on the adopting parents, we
begin with a review of that literature.
A. Adaptation by the Adopting Parents
Theorists have hypothesized that confidentiality in adoptions is essential to the
assumption of a full, secure parenting role by the adoptive parents.'" Although
there are surprisingly few studies of the adopting mother-infant bonding process,"'
scholars inferred that interferences by biological family members might disrupt the
new parent's attachment to their child and found anecdotal support for this
concern:
[O]ne mature adoptive mother, after receipt of a letter from the birth.
mother, felt a constraint in her previously wholehearted and joyful
involvement with her infant. She felt "someone is always looking over
my shoulder. There's a glass wall between me and the baby.""
189. Harriet E. Gross, Open Adoption: A Research Based Literature Review and New Data, 72
Child Welfare 269 (1993), presents the findings from two Illinois studies. The first study involved in-
depth interviews with 32 adoptive parents and 15 of the associated biological parents in private agency
placements made between Fall 1989 and Fall of 1991. The second study reported questionnaire
response data from 75 adoptive families who had earlier (1985-1990) adopted children from the same
agency before it began recommending greater openness to its clients. An Oregon study of the use of
mediation as a process for creating cooperative adoptions is the subject of Jeanne Etter, Levels of
Cooperation and Satisfaction in 56 Open Adoptions, 72 Child Welfare 257 (1993). The sample is
drawn from adoptive parents who entered into such arrangements in adoptions through a private
adoption agency in the period 1984 to mid-1987. Their levels of cooperation were not compared with
closed or confidential adoption parents. An even smaller sample involving interviews with both
biological and adoptive parents in seventeen adoptions ranging from confidential to fully disclosed is
described in Ruth G. McRoy & Harold D. Grotevant, Open Adoptions: Practice and Policy Issues, 6
J. of Soc. Work & Human Sexuality 119 (1988). Belbas studied twelve families who experienced
differing degrees of openness. Nancy F. Belbas, Staying in Touch: Empathy in Open Adoptions, 57
Smith C. Stud. in Soc. Work 184 (1987). Finally, data from 59 biological mothers were reported in
Terril L. Blanton and Jeanne Deschner, Biological Mothers' Grief" The Postadoption Experience in
Open Versus Confidential Adoptions, 69 Child Welfare 525 (1990).
For a general survey of both theoretical and empirical literature as of 1993, see Marianne Berry, Risk
andiBenefits of Open Adoption, The Future of Children, Spring 1993, at 125 [hereinafter Berry ( 993)].
190. In an unpublished study, Smith found that prospective adoptive parents who had elected
confidential adoptions did so because they feared that they could not otherwise act as full parents. J.
Smith, Attitudes of Prospective Adoptive Parents Towards Agency Adoption Practices, Particularly
Open Adoption. Paper presented at the meeting of the National Committee for Adoption, Washington,
D.C. (Apr. 1991), quoted in Grotevant et al., supra note 185, at 127.
191. Kraft et al.,supra note 180, at 71.
192. Id. at 78.
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In addition to the negative impact of post-adoption contact on bonding within
the adopting family, two other therapeutic concerns emerge from the clinical
literature: that adopting parents' sense of the inviolability and permanence of their
relationship with the child will be jeopardized and that they will rue openness and
will feel more dissatisfied than adopting parents who can arrange confidential
adoptions. Using the largest, most representative sample of adoptive parents, the
National Study studied each of these potential problems. A range of adoptions was
represented, from completely confidential to ongoing, fully disclosed arrangements
with some personal contact.
The most compelling concern about cooperative adoptions is their potential for
undermining the parental bonds between the adopting parents and the child. The
National Study examined the strength ofparent-child bonding across the continuum
of openness. Using a cluster of variables testing acceptance of the special role of
adopting parents, they found that the adoptive parents in ongoing, fully disclosed
adoptions rated significantly higher on each subtest of adjustment than adoptions
with less contact with biological family members. The adopting parents in fully
disclosed adoptions demonstrated greater communication with the child about the
adoption, greater empathy for the child's interests in and needs for connection to
his biological heritage, greater empathy for the biological parents, and overall,
greater understanding of their unique role as parents by adoption and the distinct
satisfactions and problems of that status.'93
The National Study also found little to support the second concern that
adoptive parents in cooperative adoptions would be more fearful and less secure
in their parenting relationship. Obviously the ability of the adopting parents to
negotiate and agree to the details of post-adoption interaction creates some sense
of their power and control as parents. But the real issue is whether with a
negotiated contract, their parental security is compromised. Specifically
concerning the touted fear of the biological parents' reclaiming the child, Grotevant
found the lowest degrees of fear in ongoing, fully disclosed adoptions.'9 In their
consideration of why this result occurred, they theorize that without personal
experience, adopting parents are left with only vague, generalized fears based upon
stereotypes of overreaching biological parents.'9  Perhaps in confidential
193. Following Kirk's theoretical work, they found that greater openness appears to reduce harmful
"maladaptive beliefs" common among adoptive parents, such as, denying that an adoption family must
confront and resolve special issues in addition to the usual complement of problems facing any family
or blaming any difficulties posed by the child on his or her genealogy or genetics rather than accepting
responsibility for parenting. Kirk, supra note 114. See Joan F. DiGiulio, Assuming the Adoptive
Parent Role, 68 Soc. Casework 561 (1987).
194. 77.2% of adoptive mothers and 82.5% of adopting fathers in fully disclosed adoptions
indicated "no fear" of reclaiming. McRoy et al, supra note 185, at 16.
195. The media have occasionally hyped biological parents as neurotic creatures who stalk
adopting parents with an unrelenting obsession to reclaim their child. See, e.g., High Incident:
Welcome to America (ABC television broadcast, Sept. 26, 1996). In the case of Little Orphan Annie,
of course, it was the villainous Miss Hannigan who created imposter biological parents bent on
reclaiming their beloved child.
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adoptions, the adopting parents are also haunted by the "maybes." For adopting
parents in cooperative adoptions, the reasons most often coded for the lack of fear
of reclaiming were generated by their actual experience, impressions, and
statements of reassurance of the biological parents. Indeed, although all adopting
parents, across all types of adoptions were equally secure in their role as "full"
parent, those in completely disclosed adoptions manifested the highest perception
of permanence.'"
Similarly, in contrast to the hypothesis that adopting parents would
become dissatisfied with any more open arrangements, the National Study
found high levels of adopting parents' satisfaction with their particular power
and control across all types of adoption. However, Grotevant and his
colleagues caution that the important variable may be the power of the
parent to agree to and initially fix the level of openness, including the right
to remain unreachable as in a confidential adoption. - The adoptive parent
has the power to control the degree of openness through declining to adopt except
using a closed or confidential model. Some authors like Professor Berry suggest
that this power is illusory because the market dynamics are such that adoptive
parents perceive that they have no choice but to accede to demands for contact if
they want to adopt a child. 97 As Grotevant and his colleagues respond to this
hypothesis:
The measure applied in this study would have captured dissatisfac-
tion had people felt forced into a type of adopiion, if that was in
fact what had happened. Our findings suggest that it did not, in
fact happen, OR that if it did, it ultimately became acceptable and
satisfactory for these families. The adopting parents in this study
are satisfied; so satisfied, in fact, that any dissatisfaction tends to
focus around their desire for more, not less, contact with the
birthparents.g'"
The California Study found similar levels of satisfaction. Like the National
Study, the California Study included independent, private, and public adoptions,
with varying degrees of openness. Unlike the National Study, nonconsensual
contact arrangements, usually urged by public agencies with older children, as well
as consensual arrangements for post-adoption contact were represented in the
196. Grotevant et al., supra 185, at 140-41.
197. Marianne Berry, The Effects of Open Adoption on Biological and Adoptive Parents and
the Children: The Arguments and the Evidence, 70 Child Welfare 637 (1991) [hereinafter Berry (1991
I)].
198. Grotevant et al., supra note 185, at 142. Interestingly, dissatisfaction, when it was expressed,
concerned a desire for more rather than less contact with the biological family. Thirty adopting mothers
(15.9%) and 25 adopting fathers (13.2%) wanted more contact across all levels of adoptions. Only two
fathers, both of whom were in intermediary-controlled contact adoptions, wanted less contact. Id. at
138.
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sample.'" In the first survey of the adoptive parents one year after placement,
differences in satisfaction or comfort levels emerged between the two groups:
Adoptive parents in open adoptions [arranged through independent or
private agency placements], for the most part, are cautiously comfortable
with postplacement contact, and the expectation or plan for that contact
seems to be a critical factor.... [P]lanning for contact was the best
predictor of comfort."t
Even among public agency adoptions and adoptions of children with a history of
mistreatment-groups with otherwise low levels of comfort with contact-those
who met the biological parent prior to placement reported significantly higher
levels of comfort with postplacement contact."'
Three years later, the adoptive parents were resurveyed. Adoptive parents still
expressed high levels of comfort: Nearly three out of every four (73%) reported
feeling either "very comfortable" or "comfortable" with openness.20 2 Overall, 92%
of the adoptive families reported satisfaction about the adoption experience." 3
Other studies report similar levels of satisfaction.2"
B. Adaptation by the Adopted Child
By all measures, empirical studies of adopted children in confidential
adoptions indicate that these children experience unique adjustment problems
centered on their hybrid status. Although most adopted children individually are
within the normal range of functions, as a group they are more vulnerable to
behavioral and educational problems than are children living in intact homes with
their biological families."3 There is a developmental trend revealing changing
concerns as the child matures. In a study of 85 six- to seventeen-year-old adoptees
199. "Adopters who used public agencies were much more likely than other adopters to say that
the agency or court-made the ultimate decision [about contact]." Berry (1993), supra note 189, at 240-
41. In addition, Professor Berry notes that foster parent adopters were also more uncomfortable about
openness, to have a negative impression of the biological parents, and to state that contact would have
a negative influence on the child. Id. at 241.
200. After planning, in rank order, the other key predictors of comfort were: the child's absence
of a history of mistreatment, the biological mother's level of education, the directness of contact, the
adoptive mother's older age, and face to face contact between the adopting parents and the biological
parents before placement. Berry (1993), supra note 189, at 249.
201. Id. at252.
202. Berry (2000), supra note 186, at 11. In this reported research, those who had adopted foster
children were excluded, leaving a sample size of 764 children.
203. Id. at 13.
204. In Professor Gross's in-depth interview study of 32 adoptive parents and 15 of the associated
biological parents, overall, 84% were "mainly satisfied." Only two families have had difficult
relationships with the biological parents and had discontinued the relationship for the present. The
biological mother had left the country in one case and in the other case, contact was discontinued
because neither set ofparents has pursued it. Gross, supra note 189, at 276-77.
205. Brodzinsky, supra note 14. Cf K.S. Marquis & R.A. Detweiler, Does Adopted Mean
Different? An AttributionalAnalysis, 48 J. of Personality & Soc. Psych. 1054 (1985).
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who were placed as infants with middle class families, the younger elementary
school aged children viewed their adoptive status positively, although they
acknowledged intrusive or unbidden thinking about their birth family. In contrast,
older children and adolescents are more likely to view their adoption with
ambivalence. As Smith and Brodzinsky explained:
These [age difference] results are understandable in the context of earlier
findings dealing with developmental changes in children's beliefs about,
and understanding of, adoption. Previous research suggests that young
children have a limited ability to understand the realities of their family
status. Because of their cognitive immaturity, they often view adoption
in unrealistically positive ways. As they mature cognitively, though, they
become more aware of the implications of being adopted, including the
loss of biological family members, cultural and ethnic ties, and even the
loss of part of themselves. As a result, a sense of ambivalence about
being adopted begins to emerge for many children, and continues to grow
into adolescence."
Although identifying the precise cause(s) of adjustment difficulty has eluded
researchers,0 7 both individual and adoptive family dysfunctions have been linked
to lack of information about the adopted child's ancestry."' In adolescence,
adopted children reportedly suffer greater emotional disturbance and identity crises
than do other adolescents who possess the "biological reference points"" needed
to formulate and accept a sense of identity.2t Lacking that compass, these
adolescents experience confusion and can veer between villainizing or lionizing
their biological family. For some adopted children, the "maybes" can become all-
consuming. As Professor Wrobel and her colleagues have reported:
Children with less information about birthparents tend to wonder about
the birthparents' health and well-being and are most curious about what
their birthparents look like. One child when asked what he would like to
ask his birthparents stated, "I'd like to ask their names. 'Cause I don't
really know their names. I want to know what they look like. I can't
think of anything else." Children with more information about birth-
parents tend to be curious about what the birth mother has been doing
since they last had contact with her, when they will get to see her again,
206. Daniel W. Smith & David M. Brodzinsky, Stress and Coping in Adopted Children: A
Developmental Study, 23 J. of Clinical Psych. 91,96 (1994) (internal citations omitted).
207. Brodzinsky, supra note 14, at 153.
208. J.P. Triseliotis, In Search of Origins (1973); Kenneth Kaye & Sarah Warren, Discourse about
Adoption in Adoptive Families, 4 J. of Fain. Psych. 406 (1988).
209. LC. Berman & R.K. Bufferd, Family Treatment to Address Loss in Adoptive Families, I J.
of Fam. Psych. 406 (1986).
210. P.M. Brinich & E.B. Brinich, Adoption and Adaptation, 170 J. of Nervous& Mental Disease
489 (1982); L.R. Dickson, W.M. Heffron & C. Parker, Children from Disrupted and Adoptive Homes
in an Inpatient Unit, 60 American J. of Orthopsychiatry 594 (1990); Ruth G. McRoy et al., Adoption
Revelation and Communication Issues: Implications for Practice, 71 Families in Soc'y 550 (1990).
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or meet her if they have not done so, and information about birth siblings.
One child stated that "Sometimes I wanted to meet her myself and then
Mom set up this rule, not until I'm 18. And I really wanted to meet her,
'cause you know my Dad said I could and talked it over with my
.birthmother and she would be glad if I met her." Another child who felt
his birth mother "probably has a baby of her own," wanted to know "if
she [birth mother] has a baby."211
As Professor Berry has pointed out, the fact that there are adjustment problems
experienced by adopted children in traditional, closed adoptions does not
necessarily mean that preempting the need to know about one's heritage by earlier
openness will prevent psychological maladjustment. 22 Indeed, greater openness
may perhaps create different and new kinds of problems. However, adoption
specialists believe that the traditional secrecy of the process ignores the child's
inevitable curiosity about his or her roots and implies that the facts of heritage are
shameful and need to be hidden. They hypothesize that openness should heighten
the prospects for the development of healthy self-esteem. In other words, greater
openness should ease the adopted child's adaptation to his status. Increased
information should provide a reality check for the process of identity formation
minimizing confusion and anxiety about "who I am." '
Finally, theorists maintain that postdecree communication between the birth
parents and the child provides the child with an extended family group of
supportive adults."' They urge that post-adoption relationships between the
adoptive and biological families pose greater promise for positive interactions
because the families, though similar to post-divorce custody and visitation
arrangements, lack the emotional baggage typically accompanying marriage
dissolution and family reconstitution. Privately arranged agreements for post-
adoption communication may diminish rivalry for the child's affection that can
occur when contact is postponed until the child becomes an adult and may
contribute to the harmony of future cooperation and emotional support of the child.
Three empirical studies have examined the impact of greater openness on
children who were adopted as infants: an unpublished New Zealand report, 2 ' the
211. Wrobel et al.,supra note 185, at 2371.
212. Berry (1991 11), supra note 197, at 639.
213. Berry (1993), supra note 189,at 127.
214. Fady Hajal & Elinor B. Rosenberg, The Family Life Cycle in Adoptive Families, 61 Am. J.
of Orthopsychiatry 78 (1991); S.A. Bradbury & M. R. Marsh, Linking Families in Preadoption
Counseling: A Family Systems Model, 67 Child Welfare 327 (1988).
215. M. Iwanek, "A StudyofOpen Adoption Placement," 14 Emerson Street, Petone, New Zealand
(1987). In her overview of the literature, Professor Gross reports that Iwanek's study, based on
interviews with the adopting parents, found open discussions between the adopting children and their
parents about biological family members and reported that the children "seemed at ease talking about
them." The children's response to the potential of future contact ranged from "enthusiastic" to
"intermittent interest", with the opportunity to meet siblings "highly valued." Gross, supra note 189,
at 274.
We are inclined to agree with Professor Gross that published studies of the effects of openness on
children who were adopted when older and with preexisting bonds with their biological families present
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California Study,"" and the National Study."1' The California Study, by far the
most massive, reports data from questionnaires returned by adopting parents,
representing 1,268 families with children who were adopted over a range of ages,
from infancy to sixteen year olds. Based on a standardized behavior inventory,
Professor Berry found that as rated by their adoptive parents, children with post-
placement contact with members of their biological families had significantly better
behavior scores than children in adoptions with no access to birth parents."'
However, a follow-up survey conducted two years later found no significant
differences according to the degree of openness in reported behavioral problems
of the children, now in their adoptive placements for over four years. 9 As Berry
summarized the study's findings: "The child's interpretation of any contact or
relationship with biological parents in an open adoption is at the center of the
debate over the benefits of continued access, and it is precisely this interpretation
that is yet to be illuminated by research."22
Part of the National Study has involved interviews and self-assessments made
by 171 children who were adopted as infants and at the time of the interviews,
ranged in age from four to twelve years. Comparison groups were set up across all
types of continuing contact, from fully confidential to fully open arrangements.
The researchers focussed on assessing the child's satisfaction, curiosity about birth
parents, overall feelings of self-worth and understanding of adoption. An
interesting interaction was found between satisfaction with the arrangements,
whatever they were, and continuing curiosity about the birth family. Across all
types of post-adoption contact, older children were more curious and generally less
satisfied than younger children. However, only the older children in fully disclosed
adoptions remained curious but on balance, were still "satisfied" with their access
agreements. Using standardized tests assessing perceptions of self-worth or self-
esteem, all children reported having positive images of themselves. Thus, the
theoretical projections of harm to the child were not validated. Finally, this study
found that being provided with more information about the child's own adoption
and birth family enhances the child's level of understanding of adoption and his or
her unique status as an adopted child.2 '
quite distinguishable dynamics. Id. at 271-72. For a discussion of those studies, see Berry, supra note
189.
216. Berry(1991 11), supra note 197.
217. Wrobeletal.,supranote 185.
218. Berry(1991 1I),supra note 197.
219. Berry (1996), supra note 1. Interestingly, this survey did find that the adopting parents'
perceptions of their children's behavioral problems were higher than the norms on the Behavior
Problem Inventory, a standardized assessment test. More than one-quarter of the adopted children had
scores higher than norms.
220. Berry (1993), supra note 189, at 133.
221. Wrobel et al, supra note 185. An extremely interesting finding of the study was that a
discrepancy existed between the degree of openness avowed by the adopting parents and that
acknowledged by the child. The children in this study were interviewed privately. Some information
received from biological parents in "mediated" or semi-open adoptions was not always shared with the
children. As a result, these researchers chose to use the children's characterization of arrangements
rather than the adults. Although no definitive conclusions can be drawn from the withholding of
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Evaluating the impact of post-adoption contact on children is extremely
complex; however, at a minimum the theoretical fears that children would be more
anxious, confused and compromised by increased information and or contact have
been disproved.
C. Adaptation by the Birth Parents
The birth parents are thought to be the most obvious beneficiaries of post-
adoption contact agreements. Indeed, in an adoption market of scarcity, their
superior bargaining power is believed to be the impetus behind the open adoption
trend.m Now possessing socially sanctioned alternatives to adoption such as single
parenthood, foster care and abortion, the number of biological parents who
ultimately opt for adoptive surrender of their child has been steadily diminishing
over the past twenty years." Researchers have found that the availability of the
option to have continuing contact influenced some biological mothers to choose
adoption. 2'
Kraft and her colleagues emphasized that the typical birth mother who
surrenders a child for adoption is herself a child, an adolescent with her own
developmental process yet to be completed. As they warn, "Most adolescents are
not cognitively capable of assessing the consequences of a decision of whether or
not to maintain contact with the child..... A confidential adoption, while no less
momentous, is less complex a choice.""5 There is consensus in the clinical
community that all biological parents experience grief similar to the death of the
child when they surrender a child for adoption. 2 ' Some clinicians go further,
information, they conjecture that "[A]s children discover that they have been excluded from information
provided by their birthmothers, their satisfaction with the current level of openness that contains
exclusion of available information may be negatively affected." Id. at 2371.
222. Biological parents "enjoy considerable power and choice in the determination of the degree
and extent of contact they will have with their relinquished child, and stand to gain the most from that
contact. It is this lack of control on the part of adoptive parents, however, that is associated with
adoptive parents' negative experiences with openness." Berry (1991 11), supra note 197, at 648.
223. C.A. Bachrach, Adoption Plans Adopted Children. andAdoptive Mothers, 48 J. of Marriage
and the Fain. 243 (1986).
224. R.P. Barth, Adolescent Mothers 'BeliefsAbout Open Adoption, 68 Soc. Casework 323 (1987).
In contrast, however, McRoy and his colleagues found in their larger study of 169 birth mothers that
most did not seek adoption because of the availability of an openness option and in fact, did not know
about such alternatives until made aware by the adoption agency. McRoy et al., supra note 14. These
apparently conflicting results can be harmonized by appreciating that some biological parents will
choose adoption regardless of the openness option. The target sample should be mothers who chose to
forego adoption. In the research of Kallen and his colleagues who interviewed 105 pairs of adolescents
and their mothers, the major barrier to the adoption choice was the lack of continuing information about
the fate of a child who is surrendered for adoption. David J. Kallen et al., Adolescent Mothers and
Their Mothers View Adoption, 39 Fain. Relations 311 (1990).
225. Kraft et al., supra note 180, at 18.
226. Seven stages of the grieving process have been postulated: denial, anger, guilt, depression,
preoccupation with the lost person, bargaining and acceptance. Pam Lamperelli & Jane Smith, The
Grieving Process ofAdoption: An Application of Principles and Techniques, J. Prof. Nursing & Mental
Health Servs. 24 (Oct. 1979).
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theorizing that mourning is circumvented and may remain unresolved if continued
contact can be anticipated. Thus, two separate concerns emerge from this
literature: that biological parents will remain trapped in grief to their psychological
detriment or that they will still consider the child "theirs" and may inappropriately
interfere in the lives of the adopting family or even challenge the adopting parents'
primacy as the child's parents.
Only one empirical study has validated the concern that biological mothers in
cooperative adoptions experience relatively higher levels of grieving. In a mail
questionnaire survey of 59 birth mothers, Blanton and Deschner found that the
eighteen who were in cooperative adoptions were significantly more dependent and
saddened than the birth mothers in confidential adoptions.2'7 However, using a
larger sample McRoy and his colleagues found that over time, birth mothers in
direct contact with adoptive families were less likely to express regret about the
placement decision than mothers in confidential or less open irrangements.
22s
These findings are compatible with the views of some clinicians that despite
prolonged grieving, biological parents can still on balance, view cooperative
adoptions favorably. Some adoption counselors believe that openness assuages the
grief of biological parents who surrender the child for adoption and need not
necessarily impede their adaptation to the reality of loss.229 More control over the
post-adoption arrangements may mitigate fear of the unknown, or misgivings about
how the child will fare in the adoptive home."o Two additional studies have found
that the overwhelming majority of birth mothers expressed satisfaction or high
satisfaction with more open arrangements.n 1
The second related and often expressed concern is that regardless of the
mutuality of the initial agreement, the adoptive parents will eventually lose control
over the arrangements due to the biological parents' increasing insistence on more
227. Blanton and Deschner, supra note 189.
228. McRoy et al., supra note 14.
229. Kenneth W. Watson, Birth Families: Living with the Adoption Decision, 44 Pub. Welfare
5 (1986); Cathy Chapman et al., Meeting the Needs of the Adoption Triangle Through Open Adoption:
The Birthmother, 4 Child & Adolescent Soc. Work 203 (1986).
230. Baran et al., supra note 123 In comparisons between groups of teenage mothers who
surrendered their children for adoption and those who declined adoption, Kallen and his colleagues
found that the overriding concern of the surrendering mothers was the need to have continuing
information about the child. Kallen et al., supra note 224, at 315.
231. Gross, supra note 189; Etter, supranote 189. Professor Gross's research is based on in-depth
interviews with 32 adoptive parents and 15 of the associated biological parents in placements made
between the Fall of 1989 and Fall of 1991. Of the biological mothers, only one was dissatisfied and
contact has been discontinued. All the others were satisfied and felt positive about the relationship they
have developed with the adoptive families. Gross, supra note 189, at 276-77. Etter used a
questionnaire to study the use of mediation to arrange cooperative adoption. She surveyed 56 adoptions
four and one-half years after placement. In 32 of these adoptions, both a biological parent and an
adoptive parent responded. She found that 94% of the biological parents reported being "satisfied"
with the level of openness. (Their other choices were "neutral" (3%) or "dissatisfied" (3%). Etter,
supra note 189, at 262-63. Neither the Gross nor the Etter study had a companion group of biological
parents in a confidential adoption; therefore, comparisons in satisfaction cannot be assessed. The study
by McRoy et al., supra note 14, found that birth mothers were satisfied across all types of post-adoption
contact arrangements.
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frequent and intense forms of contact. A Canadian study of attitudes toward
disclosure of information and potential reunion between an adopted child and his
birth family found that birth mothers exhibited acceptance of their decision to
surrender their children and expressed great deference to the adopting family:
Significantly, birth mothers agreed that they generally would not make the
initial contact [with their adult child] but disagreed on perception of the
reasons. Contrary to what adoptees thought, birth mothers stressed that
they did not forget the child they relinquished, but they were fettered by
the belief that they had renounced all their rights to the child because his
real parents were the people who adopted and raised him. Furthermore,
they were afraid their initiative might upset the adopted child or disrupt
his life [or cause trouble in the adoptive family].232
This self-restraint was confirmed in the California Study of adoptions four
years after placement. Professor Berry found that contact had in fact diminished
despite initial expectations of the adopting parents. Contact increased in only 4%
of these adoptions. In 49% of the adoptions with changes in contact, the adopting
parents reported that the birth parents requested the change and that 39% were by
mutual agreement. For those parents still in contact, contact was not frequent: on
the average, they had three mail contacts, three phone contacts, and one in-person
contact with the birth parent over the previous two years. 3 The National Study
produced similar widely varied arrangements and no evidence of overreaching
demands by the biological parents."4
These findings are a far cry from bald assumptions that biological parents are
like burglars, who cannot be entrusted with any information that may lead to
contact with their surrendered children. All available evidence points to the
conclusion that biological parents appear to adjust to the loss of their parenting role
and are unlikely to overreach and attempt to disrupt the developed relationship
between the child and the adopting family.
In sum, despite misgivings among professionals and initial uncertainty
acknowledged by the pioneer adopting parents, cooperative adoptions appear to be
working-to be "satisfying"-to those who chose that option. Although given the
232. Sachdev, supra note 104, at 72.
233. Berry (2000), supra note 186, at 10.
234. As Grotevant and his colleagues note:
The frequency and intensity of contact in the fully disclosed families ranged quite widely.
The frequency ofvisits was heavily influenced by geographical distance. When the adoptive
family lived far from the birthmother, visits may be once a year or less, although letters and
phone calls may be exchanged more frequently. In general, most families did not have visits
with the birthmother more than a few times a year. The exchange ofphone calls, letters, and
holiday and birthday gifts was more typical. In some cases, contact with the birth mother
was infrequent, but there was more contact with other members of her extended family. The
wide variation in both frequency and intensity of contact within the fully disclosed sample
is indicative of the informal and ongoing negotiation process that occurs in each individual
family's situation.
Grotevant et al., supra note 185, at 129-30.
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uniqueness of the negotiating parties' needs and personalities it is impossible to
attribute openness as a cause of adopting parents' security, at a minimum these
studies disprove the theoretical converse: that a degree of openness leads to
heightened fears of retrieval or a perception of the impermanence of the parent-
child relationship.
Compared to the adults, we know much less about the long-range implications
of increased openness for adopted children. The California Study has documented
the lives of the adopting families for only four years after the decree; the oldest
adopted child in the National Study report was nearly thirteen. 5 It will take
another generation before we can truly assess the impact of openness on these
children as they pass through adolescence and themselves become adults and
parents. Nevertheless, adopted children in cooperative adoptions seem to be faring
well, and there is no data that suggest that when their parents elect such arrange-
ments that the children's best interests are disserved.
However, the limits of our scientific knowledge now and in the foreseeable
future certainly caution against court-imposed contact over the objection of one or
both parties. At best, the preliminary data can support only a recognition of
voluntary and knowing agreements, thoughtfully and carefully initiated by the
biological and adopting parents. Both the National Study and the California Study
emphasize the importance of mutuality in reaching any agreement about post-
adoption contact or remaining in a confidential adoption. However, even
recognizing the performability of the agreements requires a leap of faith that the
young children's best interests are nearly always best discerned and protected by
those who love and care for them rather than by psychologists, lawyers, legislatures
or courts.
In the model statute presented in the next section, we have searched for a
process that entrusts decisions about openness to the children's parents, biological
and adopting, and ensures to the greatest extent possible that such decisions are
fully and carefully explored. The process for arriving at consensual post-adoption
contact arrangements also must reinforce the need for flexibility and reevaluation
over the course of any relationship between members of the biological and
adopting families. Among the most remarkable findings shared by all reported
research is the flexibility and accommodation exhibited by both sets of parents in
altering arrangements without court intervention."
235. The oldest child was 12.98 years. Wrobel et al., supra note 185, at 2361.
236. In the National Study, Grotevant and his colleagues found that almost two-thirds of the 57
ongoing, fully disclosed adoptions in their sample did not begin that way. Half (51%) began as
"mediated" adoptions with all inter-familycontacts conducted through an agency intermediary. Perhaps
more surprising, 14% began as confidential adoptions with no pre-adoption or proposed contact
whatsoever. Grotevant et al., supra note 185, at 129. In Etter's study of 56 mediated adoptions, less
than 15% reported having the same amount of contact as they had originally written into their
agreements. Over half (52.2%) reported having more contact than planned, and 3 .I% had less contact.




VI. A CAUTIOUS AUTHORIZATION OF CONSENSUAL AGREEMENTS:
A MODEL STATUTE
As Kraft and her colleagues aptly noted, biological and adopting parents who
have desired continuing family contact have had to create an interactional model.
There simply are no modem imbedded cultural patterns,z" although probably a
great many nineteenth century informal adoptions involved continued interaction
between the child and both of his families. Consequently, writing legislation to
guide these families is a bold undertaking. Of the eleven pioneering states that
have enacted statutes which explicitly authorize some form of cooperative
adoption, 38 only seven of them apply to a nonrelative adoption of an infant.239
Because the proposed model statute controls infant adoptions,2' we will primarily
focus on those statutes enacted by the legislatures of New Mexico,24' Oregon,24 '
Washington,2 43 and Ohio.' (The remaining states, Alaska,4 s Montana,2" and
South Dakota 7 have simply broadly authorized post-adoption visitation without
elaboration.) As might be anticipated due to such a small and recent legislative
sample, collectively, these seven statutes are but a modest beginning point. Though
the major issues that have arisen concerning the effect of post-adoption contact
237. Kraft et al., supra note 180, at 20.
238. See supra note 9.
239. In intra-family adoptions, state statutes typically permit post-adoption visitation between
biological relatives of the child other than the biological parents. For example, at least twenty-nine states
have statutes that authorize grandparent visitation after adoption, but most of these statutes limit post
adoption visitation to stepparent adoptions. See In re the Adoption of Francisco A., 866 P.2d 1175,
1179 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993). Only a handful of these statutes would allow grandparents visitation after
adoption by a nonrelative. Id. Some of these statutes also extend visitation to the child's siblings or
other biological relatives. Id.
240. States such as Indiana, Maryland, Nebraska and New York that authorize post-adoption
contact agreements for older children who have bonded with their biological relatives could extend
existing legislation to include the provisions of our model statute, making modifications when necessary
to achieve a harmonious statutory approach to cooperative adoption. See supra note 9 for citations and
a brief description.
Similarly, our statute explicitly applies only to prospective adoptions. Consequently, predictably
there will be some parties to existing adoptions who have informally agreed to post-adoption contact
without statutory authorization but who would like to enjoy the protections of these new provisions.
We can think of no theoretical reason why even though the adoption has already been completed, they
should not be protected, provided both parties can reach agreement about continued contact
arrangements. In contrast, parties to finalized confidential adoptions should obtain no new rights as a
result of this model statute and instead, should be left to pursue existing adoption registration remedies.
See supra note 119.
241. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-5-35 (Michie 1996).
242. Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.305(2) (1995).
243. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.33.295(l) (West Supp. 1995).
244. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3107.60-3107.65 (Baldwin 1996).
245. Alaska Stat. § 25.23.130(c) (Michie 1995). For the text of the Alaska provision, see supra
text accompanying note 11.
246. Mont. Code Ann. § 40-8-136 (1989), as interpreted by Groves v. Clark, 920 P.2d 981 (Mt.
1996).




agreements are resolved, many issues that can be reasonably anticipated to flow
from authorization remain unresolved.
Though certainly the child's interests are at stake in any custodial arrangement,
we do not believe that in an infant adoption, the courts should be authorized to
impose post-adoption contact absent the consent of the biological and adopting
parents.249 Of the statutes which explicitly authorize some form of cooperative
adoption, all but the Alaska statute are limited to consensual agreements. Thus,
while the child's interests are to be served, references to the child's "right" should
be avoided.249 Different considerations emerge for the child who has bonded with
his biological family before being adopted by others.z" In contrast, for children
who lack sufficient maturity to articulate their own concerns, the persons who are
in the best position to gauge the child's interests are those with natural bonds, the
biological parents, and those with inchoate but vibrant concern for the child's well-
being, the adopting parents. Both sets of parents have the greatest interest in the
child and in future arrangements for the child that can accommodate their personal
and family values, needs and aspirations.s' Consequently, we believe that the only
workable post-adoption arrangements are those that are negotiated and consensual.
Although court-ordered contact may be justified for older children, we would
strongly reject such an authoritarian model for infant adoptions."2
248. The courts of at least three states have assumed the power to order post-adoption visitation:
Connecticut: In re Jennifer P., 553 A.2d 196 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989) (holding that a former foster parent
had standing to petition for visitation rights with a child in custody of the state agency) and
Massachusetts: In re Adoption of Adam, 500 N.E.2d 816 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986); In re Adoption of
Abigail, 499 N.E.2d 1234 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986); Petition of the Dept. of Soc. Servs. to Dispense with
Consent to Adoption, 467 N.E.2d 861 (Mass. 1984) (approving the inclusion of continued visitation
agreements within public agency permanency planning for children whose parental rights have been
terminated); and South Dakota, In re S.A.H., 537 N.W.2d I (S.D. 1995) (holding that a court may
mandate open adoptions in the case of a child in foster home care who had bonded with the biological
mother). In contrast, New York has enacted a statute that pernits continuing contact only in department
adoptions pursuant to N.Y. Social Services Law § 383-c (McKinney 1999) and N.Y. Domestic
Relations Law §§ 71-72 (McKinney 1999). See In re Adoption of Baby Boy D., 676 N.Y.S.2d 862
(Erie Cnty Surrogate's Court 1998).
249. One adoption agency chief has suggested that the "right to be recognized belongs to the child
rathei than to the adults." Pat O'Brien, Director of Downey Side Families for Youth, New York City,
quoted in Debra Ratterman Baker, Legal Analysis: Guidelines for the Appropriate Use of Open
Adoption Agreements, 14 ABA Juv. & Ch. Welfare L. Rptr. 142, 143 (1995). "Rights" suggests
entitlements enforceable by the imposition of duties on someone else by some outside law enforcement
authority. Wesley Hohfeld, Sdme Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied in Judicial Reasoning,
23 Yale L.J. 16 (1923). Ordinarily, recognizing an independent "right" in the child means that some
adult must represent the child and urge the child's interests. For additional discussion, see infra text
accompanying notes 290-291. After Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989),
there would appear to be no federal constitutional right of a child to maintain a filial relationship with
a biological parent after adoption.
250. Appell, supra note 15.
251. See Leonard Marlow & S. Richard Sauber, Handbook of Divorce Mediation, especially In
Whose Best Interests? 73-88 (1990).
252. The courts of Nevada and New Mexico have taken this position. See Morse v. Daly, 704 P.2d
1087 (Nev. 1985); In re Adoption of Francisco A., 866 P.2d 1175 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993).
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Our proposed model statute is based on the overarching principle that the
adopted child's best interest can be served by authorizing greater openness in
adoption. Interaction between the biological and adopting families reflects the fact
that an adopted child maintains a dual familial identity, like dual citizenship,
throughout his or her life. Until medical science makes it possible for the complete
replacement of genetic material, the law's family-substitution model will remain
a fiction. 3 As the social science research demonstrates, the child's adjustment to
his or her duality, a genetic heritage and a socialization heritage, is facilitated by
appreciation of the contributions of both influences that have shaped the child's
individuality. 254
Our model statute requires that biological parents and adopting parents who
are interested in exploring post-adoption contact arrangements must engage in
formal mediation.53 Mediation can be defined as "an informal process in which
a neutral third party helps others resolve a dispute or plan a transaction but does not
(and ordinarily does not have the power to) impose a solution.... The desired
result is an agreement suited to the needs of the parties.""' 6 Although no current
statute authorizing post-adoption contact mentions mediation as a means for
confecting the initial agreement,"2 the custody literature suggests that mediation
is a superior process to adversarial negotiations or court-imposed decrees in
drafting custody and visitation agreements. Indeed, most states either expressly
authorize or mandate mediation for the resolution of caretaking disputes."'
253. As Sir Henry Sumner Maine observed, "The earliest and most extensively employed of legal
fictions was that which permitted family relations to be created artificially, and there is none to which
I conceive mankind to be more deeply indebted." Ancient Law: Its Connection with the Early History
of Society, and its Relation to Modern Ideas 125-26 (1871).
254. Erikson postulated three dimensions to the resolution of identity: psychobiological,
psychosocial and psychohistorical. His psychohistorical category splits out from an immediate genetic
or biological heritage, one's sense of place in his or her extended and projected genealogical family.
See Erik H. Erikson, Identity: Youth and Crisis (1968).
255. We should note that mediation is possible even when the biological parents and adopting
parents do not presently desire a face-to-face meeting nor contemplate such a future encounter. In the
usual custody mediation the parents are in the same room for one or more meetings with the
professional mediator. However, many other mediations involve "bilateral negotiation": the mediator
moves between the parties who remain apart in separate rooms, though they usually know each other's
identities. Charles A. Bethel, The Use of Separate Sessions in Family Mediation, 2 Negotiation J. 257
(1986). Thus, for those parties who desire to avoid a personal meeting or to withhold identifying
information, there is no reason why those limitations could not be honored in fashioning the ground
rules of the mediation.
256. Leonard Riskin & James Westbrook, Dispute Resolution and Lawyers 4 (1988). In its more
familiar guise as a method for resolving present disputes, mediation has been similarly defined by
statute as "a process whereby a neutral third person, called a mediator, acts to encourage and facilitate
the resolution of a dispute between two or more parties. It is an informal and nonadversarial process
with the objective of helping the disputing parties reach a mutually acceptable and voluntary
agreement." Fla. Stat. Ann. § 44.1011(2) (West 1998).
257. TheOregon statute requires a good faith attempt at mediation when later disputes arise about
a post-contact agreement before an enforcement action can be filed. Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.305(4)(a)-(b)
(1993). For further discussion of mediation of disputes arising out of these contracts, see infra text
accompanying notes 311-315.
258. Some states explicitly authorize the use of mediation for the resolution of child custody and
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Because mediation ensures a more considered discussion of alternatives and results
in agreements which are more resistant to later deadlocked disputes, it seems
ideally suited as a process for birth parents and adopting parents who are
considering some sort of ongoing relationship beyond the adoption.
Mediation can achieve two primary goals. First, it ensures that any resulting
agreement is both knowledgeably and voluntarily embraced. It enables the parties
to identify and articulate their desires and concerns and it models collaborative
decisionmaking. A skilled mediator uses sophisticated skills of structured
interaction to reframe proposals to identify mutual advantage, reinforces
concessions to encourage collaboration, equalizes the power between the
negotiating parties, and finds an integrative set of solutions that meet the legitimate
needs of both parties.2 9 These skills are drawn from behavioral science research
on the theory and dynamics of power, conflict and balance."
The second primary achievement of mediation is that it is more effective than
the adversarial or negotiating process for minimizing future conflicts between the
mediating parties."' Admittedly, we can now only speculate about the incidence
of post-adoption disputes over contact obligations between birth parents and
adopting parents. Professor Hollinger has found no cases in which open
arrangements in non-relative adoptions have "gone sour.' 2 In a small sample of
56 open adoptions, Etter found that 100% of the biological parents abided by their
written agreements." 3 Similarly, there is some anecdotal confirmation of
harmonious post-adoption client interaction from adoption agency professionals.' 4
visitation disputes. See. e.g., Alaska (Alaska Stat. § 25.20.080 (Michie 1995)); California (Cal. Fain.
Code § 20019 (West 1994)); Connecticut (Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-53a (West 1995)); and Idaho
(Id. St. RCP, Rule 16(cX12) (1996)). Other states more generally authorize the use of mediation for
the resolution of any type of dispute. See, e.g., Arkansas (Ark. Code Ann. § 16-7-101 (Michie 1995));
Colorado (Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-22-305 (West 1995)).
259. There is robust literature on the goals and dynamics of the mediation process. See. e.g.,
Christopher Moore, The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict (1986); Divorce
Mediation: Theory & Practice (Jay Folberg & Ann Milne eds., 1988); Oma Cohen & Naomi Datner,
The Role of the Mediator in Family Mediation, 13 Mediation Q. 125 (1995).
260. Studies in Social Power (Darwin Cartwright ed., 1959); Morton Deutsch, The Resolution of
Conflict: Constructive and Destructive Processes (1973); Fritz Heider, The Psychology of Interpersonal
Relations (1958).
261. Kent E. Menzel, Judging the Fairness of Mediation: A Critical Framework, 9 Mediation Q.
3 (1991). For a study finding substantial but short-term effects for mediating couples, see Joan B.
Kelly, Parent Interaction AfterDivorce: Comparison ofMediatedandAdversarial Divorce Processes,
9 Behav. Sciences & L. 387 (1991).
262. Hollinger, supra note 19, § 13.02[3], at 13-60. Cf. Hill v. Moorman, 525 So. 2d 681 (La.
App. I st Cir. 1988), discussed supra in text accompanying notes 13 1-132.
263. Etter, supra note 189.
264. During May 1992, Volunteers of America began offering openness in adoption... and
has had considerable success with openness in adoption. Most all placements during the
past three years started with a level of semi-openness. Some have started on a fully open
basis. Only a few can be described as closed or traditional. Many of the adoptions that
started on a semi-open basis have changed to a fully open status after the birth and adoptive
parents had a chance to get to know each other. There have been no major problems with
VOA open adoptions. There have been a few disappointments when people did not live up
to someone's imagined expectations or when ongoing contact was not maintained at the
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However, the legitimacy of open adoption arrangements is still too new to generate
the necessary longitudinal data, and caution appears to be in order.
If post-divorce relationships can be analogized to post-adoption relationships,
then we should be very wary about the fragility of a contact agreement. In their
seminal national study of the resolution of grievances, Miller and Sarat found that
post-divorce disagreements were the "most disputatious and litigious grievance
type we have measured," with the retention of lawyers in nearly 60% of the
cases.
263
Perhaps there are significant differences between the etiology of divorce and
adoption that might promise less future conflict. In non-relative adoptions, unlike
divorce, typically there are no scars of interactive failures, no emotionally-laden rift
that brings them to the contractual negotiation. In adoptions, both the birth parents
and the adopting parents desperately need the cooperation of the others in order to
bring about the transfer of the child. In contrast, the expectations and mind-frame
of divorcing parents are likely to be quite different: Each has an established
relationship with the child and may well believe that he or she can parent the child
best without the assistance (or interference) of the other parent. Consequently, as
of the time of execution, we might well intuit that the parties to a post-adoption
contact agreement would have a greater reservoir of good will available that would
minimize future disputes and the need for subsequent court enforcement of their
agreement.
However, as time passes after the adoption and the parties experience some
degree of child-sharing, emotionally they become more and more like divorcing
pair(s) of parents. Once having come together, their lives now diverge. Changes
in circumstances are inevitable. Their life-styles and parenting philosophies may
become quite different, and the desire of the adopting parent-custodian to control
the counterinfluences in the child's life may eclipse empathy for the needs of the
birth parents or deference to the child's eventual needs to realize his or her genetic
connections. Although it is undeniably true that today American culture
countenances "more fluid notions of what constitutes a family,"2" the law's
frequency hoped for. These are issues with which people can deal. And VOA staff is
always available to help if needed.
Caffarel, supia note 12.
265. Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances Claims, and Disputes: Assessing the
Adversary Culture, 15 L. & Soc'y Rev. 525, 561 (1980-81). No one knows precisely how many
custody disputes are litigated each year, but some national assessments indicate that 35,000
or 10% of all divorces involve custody trials. See Gary Crippen, Stumbling Beyond Best
Interests of the Child: Reexamining Child Custody Standard-Setting in the Wake of
Minnesota's Four Year Experiment with the Primary Caretaker Preference, 75 Minn. L. Rev. 427,454
n.105 (1990). All too frequently, divorced parents wage unrelenting enforcement or modification
litigation. See Turner v. Turner, 455 So. 2d 1374 (La. 1984); Dodd v. Dodd, 403 N.Y.S.2d 401 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1978).
266. Appell (1995),supra note 15, at 1008. Estimates based on 1980 census figures are that 40%
of all American children spend at least some period of their childhood living with families in which one
or both biological parents are absent. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Special
Studies Series P-20, No. 380, Bureau of the Census, Marital Status and Living Arrangements: March
1982, A 5, Table F (Wash. D.C. 1983). From 1970 to 1994, the percentage of White children living
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dominant conceptualization of exclusive parenthood within a nuclear family
still effects individual behavior and idealizations.267 More importantly, despite
the reality of their own experience, many divorced and adopting parents
may cling to the nuclear family as a behavioral ideal, even if not a cultural
norm. Finally, we should anticipate that contact arrangements will need
future modification; the intractable problem with any child-centered
arrangement is that the child is a constantly shifting target of concern,"'
steadily progressing through a series of developmental stages, each bearing
a different set of needs and maturational tasks. Agreements forged when
the child is an infant may not work when the child reaches latency or
adolescence. 69
Although not a panacea for eliminating all future disputes, mediation does
produce greater client satisfaction and less litigation than do court-imposed orders
or lawyer-negotiated settlements. " Requiring mediation before biological and
adopting parents enter into any agreement seems well worth any additional time
and expense. Precisely because they are enforceable in our model and carry the
potential for embroiling the child in future disputes, such agreements should be
subjected to process restraints with proven effectiveness for minimizing misunder-
standing and conflict.271
Thus, we submit that legislatures should cautiously endorse post-adoption
contact agreements. The three premises of our proposed model statute authorizing
and regulating such agreements for infant adoptions are that the child's best interest
cannot be isolated from those of consenting, caring adults; that only consensual
arrangements should be authorized; and that mediation is the appropriate process.
in such families more than doubled (10.5%-23.9%), and the percentage of Black children increased by
a third (41.5%-66.6%). Statistics for children of Hispanic origin are unavailable for the 1970 census.
As of 1994, 36.5% of these children were living with families lacking one or both biological parents.
Bureau ofthe Census, Current Population Reports, P20-484, MaritalStatus andLiving Arrangements:
March 1994, Fig. 3, p. x (Wash. D.C. 1996).
267. Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for
Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70. Va. L Rev. 879
(1984).
268. See John E. Coons et al., Puzzling Over Children's Rights, 1991 B.Y.U. L Rev. 307
(1991)
269. Erikson (1950). supra note 113.
270. Howard S. Erlanger etal., Participation and Flexibility in Informal Processes: Cautionsfrom
the Divorce Context, 21 L. & Soc'y Rev. 585 (1987); Raymond A. Whiting, Family Disputes.
Nonfamily Disputes. andMediation Success, I I MediationQ. 247 (1994); Judith S. Wallerstein&Joan
B. Kelly, Surviving the Breakup: How Children and Parents Cope with Divorce (1980); Joan B. Kelly,
Parent Interaction Afler Divorce: Comparison of Mediated and Adversarial Divorce Processes, 9
Beh. Sci. & L. 387 (1991).
271. Professor Hollinger speculates on a similar theme. She notes in searching for an
explanation for why there are so few reported disputes, "From a more sanguine perspective,
these open arrangements may be so well negotiated, and the parties so careful in their




for reaching (or failing to reach) any agreement. 2  With these premises in mind,
we now turn to the specifics of a model statute.
4. The Articulation of Purpose
A striking omission of all of the extant statutes is that there is no articulation
of legislative purpose or of public policy supporting recognition of post-adoption
contact. Indeed, the central feature of the current statutes is the removal of the
jurisprudential barrier to enforcement without further elaboration of rationale: for
example, Washington's statute provides, "Nothing in this chapter shall be
construed to prohibit the parties ... from entering into agreements regarding
communication with or contact.... "273 Such approach connotes a defensiveness
that denigrates the value of such agreements and occludes their justifiability.
A purpose article should be included as guidance for professionals represent-
ing parties in confecting such agreements and for the courts in construing and
enforcing them. A statute approving cooperative adoptions should contain a
legislative finding or statement of purpose affirming that when both the biological
and adopting parents agree upon arrangements for continuing contact, the adopted
child's best interest is well served. In an infant adoption, the child's interests are
fully protected by the mediation of the biological and adopting parents. 274
Consequently, we believe that the New Mexico statute's creation of a presumption
that the agreement serves the child's best interest is justified. Such a provision
would not be novel; indeed, it is nothing more than an extension of the
traditional presumption of the parental rights doctrine. Thus, a Purpose provision
might read:
Section 1. Purpose
The purpose of this chapter is to authorize continuing contact after
afinal decree of adoption between an adopted child and members of his
biologicalfamily or others'7' in order to promote the child's best interest,
including the child's needs for psychological continuity and a complete
272. We should note that the use of mediation in family controversies is not without its critics.
Professor Fineman has argued that the combined recent trend toward joint custody and mediation is a
dangerous professional power shift from lawyers and the legal system to the "helping professions." She
points out that the justice of any resolution depends upon the reflection of widely held values-and the
accuracy of fact-finding, essentials best preserved by laws and the legal process. Feminist theoreticians
have also expressed alarm, arguing that mediation cannot correct persistent power imbalances that
disadvantage mothers in the private ordering of custody resolution; See Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us
Softly: Divorce Mediation and the Politics of Power, 40 Buff. L. Rev. 441 (1992). While we
acknowledge the legitimacy of these ideas, on balance, we believe that greater harm is produced for
children by the adversarial system.
273. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.33.295(t) (West 1995).
274. For a provocative discussion of the possibility that continuing commitment to a child by
multiple family members more than compensates for the potential for conflict, ensuring a system of
checks and balances on caretakers' decisions, see Ira C. Lupu, The Separation of Powers and the
Protection of Children, 61 U. Chi. L Rev. 1317 (1994).




sense of identity as he or she matures. For infants and very young
children, a presumption arises that a knowing and voluntary agreement
regarding continuing contact reached between the child's biological
parents and adopting parents does serve the child's best interests. In
enforcing such agreements, the courts shall deem the child's interests to
be paramount, including the child's need to integrate into the adopting
family, the child's need for stability including his or her reaction to
continued contact, and the child's need for cooperative interaction
between the contracting adults.
B. Ensuring Knowledge of the Contractual Option
Bridging the gap between the written law and a citizen's knowledge about its
important authorized options is critical to informed decisionmaking. The Ohio
statute imposes a duty upon agency staff and attorneys who arrange private
adoptions to inform their clients, both biological parents and adopting parents, of
the post-adoption contact agreement option.27 6  Furthermore, the statute
reflects the fact that such agreements are the client's prerogative rather than a
policy choice of the professional. If the parent and prospective adoptive parent
agree to the terms of the agreement, the professional shall "provide for the open
adoption."2"
Certainly both sets of clients should be informed about all options and the
range of possibilities, from completely confidential to fully open and counseled, as
each considers this serious issue. The inclusion within a model statute of a
provision that underscores the client's autonomy and includes an opportunity for
counseling seems entirely appropriate. Furthermore, clients deserve a copy of laws
that affect their informed decisionmaking. Reading the law may also stimulate
many clients to ask appropriate questions and to explore misgivings with the
adoption specialist, thus promoting exchange and counseling.
276. Ohio. Rev. Code Ann. § 3107.62 (West 1996).
277. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3107.63(A) (West 1996). At the present time not all adoption
specialists wholeheartedly embrace the confection of such agreements. Reflecting that division, the
Ohio statute permits the professional to decline to assist the client who wants such a service as a part
of the adoption; if so, the professional is required to make an appropriate referral to another, willing
resource. Section 3107.63(B) states: "An agency or attorney arranging a child's adoptive placement
may refuse to provide for the birth parent and prospective adoptive parent to enter into an open
adoption. If the agency or attorney refuses, the agency or attorney shall offer to refer the birth parent
to another agency or attorney the agency or attorney knows will provide for the open adoption." Aside
from problems of statutory expression, we believe that such a provision is unnecessary. As a
matter of sound practice and ethics, any doctor, lawyer, accountant or other professional who
disagrees with the provision of a particular service or for other reasons cannot provide the service can
and will decline and refer the client to someone else. Furthermore, if.a carefully drawn statute is




Section 2. Information about post-adoption contact agreements
Any agency [or individual] authorized to place a child for adoption
shall inform the biological parent and the prospective adoptive parent
about options, including the availability of a post-adoption contact
agreement. This duty to inform shall also include an explanation of the
available range of terms, the process for negotiating an agreement and,
if agreement is reached, its enforceability, in accordance with this
Chapter. A copy of this Chapter shall be provided to the biological
parents and to the prospective adoptive parents. The agency [or
individual] may make appropriate referrals as necessary to assist the
parties.
C. Insulation of the (ontact Agreement from the Surrender for Adoption
As earlier demonstrated in our discussion of the jurisprudence in Part IV, a
principal barrier to authorization of continuing contact has been the courts'
confusion of parental status with visitation or lesser forms of contact, the fear that
continued association was incompatible with an unconditional surrender of
parenthood necessary for adoption. Each of the current statutes resolves that
important issue, though in varying ways. Oregon's statute provides:
Failure to comply with the terms of an agreement made under subsection
(2) of this section is not grounds for setting aside an adoption decree or
revocation of a written consent to an adoption.27
The New Mexico statute goes further by requiring that acknowledgement of this
principle be incorporated into any contact agreement:
Every agreement entered into pursuant to provisions of this section shall
contain a clause stating that the parties agree to the continuing jurisdiction
of the court and to the agreement and understand and intend that any
disagreement or litigation regarding the terms of the agreement shall not
affect the validity or the relinquishment of parental rights, the adoption or
the custody of the adopteeY 9
The Indiana statute also requires a concomitant acknowledgement by the adopting
parents that they understand that the birth parents have a right to seek enforcement
of the agreement.8
We propose that a model statute should explicitly insulate the adoption, the
creation of a new legal status, from the agreement for continuing contact. The
distinction between the effects of the two judgments is critical to the child's
stability: the adoption decree remains final and unmodifiable, whereas the
278. Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.305(3) (1996).
279. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-5-35(D)(West 1996).
280. Ind. Code Ann. § 31-19-16-3(2) (West 1999).
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judgment incorporating the agreement must be modifiable as the circumstances
affecting the parties inevitably change. To avoid any possible challenge that either
an adoption surrender or the judgment is conditional upon compliance with the
agreement, the surrender and judgment should contain no mention of the
agreement."' A separate court order should be required to confirm the agreement
as part of the parties' negotiation of the collateral issue of continuing contact.
Following the New Mexico and Indiana models, we believe that the agreement
should explicitly recite the parties' understanding of enforceability but that breach
of their agreement has no effect on the judgment of adoption.
Section 3. Effect of a post-adoption contact agreement
A. Failure to comply with the terms ofan agreement made pursuant
to this Chapter is not grounds for setting aside an adoption decree or
revocation by a biological parent of a written consent to an adoption or
for any action seeking the child's custody.
B. In order to be enforceable as a valid agreement in accordance
with Section 8, a post-adoption contact agreement must recite the parties'
understanding of the fact that any dispute or litigation regarding the
terms of the agreement shall not affect the validity or the relinquishment
of parental rights, the adoption or the custody of the adopted child
although the biological parents may seek enforcement of the terms of the
agreement.
D. Subject Matter of the Agreement
Any model statute should resolve two central ambiguities: what kinds of
continuing contact and which ongoing relationships with the child are permitted.
The current statutes are quite vague about the potential types of interaction. ' Only
281. Cf. N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 383-c (McKinney 1996). The New York statute requires that any
post-adoption contact agreement be spelled out in the surrender document. Rather anomalously,
however, the court is required to seek reassurance from the parent that the surrender is not the product
of any inducements. Thus, this process becomes rather like the "Boyklnization" of an accused in which
all players are presumed to know that bargained for reduction in the grade of the offense or the sentence
is not the sort of inducement that would vitiate the voluntariness of the guilty plea. Boykin v. Alabama,
395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709 (1969). For a transcript and discussion ofjudicial inquiry concerning the
voluntariness of a surrender for adoption, see Petition of Steve B.D., 723 P.2d 829 (Idaho 1986).
282. The Oregon statute authorizes simply "continuing contact" Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.305(2)
(1995). The Alaska statute authorizes only visitation," Alaska Stat. § 25.23.130(c) (Michie 1995),
though arguably less intrusive contact would be included within that recognition of the more intrusive
interaction. Washington authorizes "communication" or "contact," Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §
26.33.295(2) (West 1995). The Ohio statute authorizes "open adoption," specifically endorses the
release of identifying information, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3107.61 (Baldwin 1996), and then negates
the authority to contract about some issues, leaving everything else to negotiation. Section 3107.65(A)
prohibits the parties from agreeing to make an adoption more confidential than permitted by other
provisions of Ohio law which grant access to the social or medical histories of the birth parent, to a copy
of the contents of the child's adoption file, and to nonidentifying information. Uniquely, this Section
also forbids the birth parent or relative "to share with the prospective adoptive parent parental control
and authority over the child placed for adoption or in any manner limit the adoptive parent's full
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the New Mexico statute alludes to the potentially infinite variety of arrangements
that might be tailored to the needs and desires of the parties: "The contact may
include exchange of identifying or nonidentifying information or visitation between
[biological family members and the adopting parents] or visitation between
[biological family members] and the adoptee." '283 As previously outlined, the
purpose of a cooperative adoption agreement in an infant adoption is to permit the
birth parents and adopting parents to negotiate their agreement according to their
own perceptions of their "comfort levels" of openness.' We believe that any
model statute should underscore the expectation of a uniquely negotiated agreement
and should at least suggest to interested parties and their representatives the range
of possible alternatives, including the authority to use intermediaries for any
exchange of information or visitation.
All of the statutes except Washington's, which is limited to birth parents,'
broaden the class of those who may be permitted continuing contact with the child
to include other biological relatives. Oregon's provision is a verbatim copy of the
language proposed in the "Model Adoption Act and Model State Adoption
Procedures" promulgated in 1980 by the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare, as the federal agency was then known.116 The Oregon statute provides:
Nothing in the adoption laws of this state shall be construed to prevent the
adoptive parents, the birth parents and the child from entering into a
written agreement, approved by the court, to permit continuing contact
between the birth relatives and the child or the adoptive parents."8 '
To avoid any potential ambiguity it goes beyond the Model Act to define "birth
relatives" as "birth parents, grandparents, siblings and other members of the child's
birth family." 28
Consistent with our view that each agreement must be uniquely negotiated, we
believe that the parties should be given the latitude to choose from among the
widest possible assortment of biological family members. Indeed, we have qualms
about limiting potential contact to only biological family members. Many
American families are bound together by psychological bonds that are neither
legally recognized nor biologically based.8 9 We can envision a scenario in which
parental control and authority over the adopted child." Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 310.65(A)(1) (Baldwin
1996). Given the vagueness of this admonition, the provision is probably simply a beau geste, extended
perhaps to acknowledge the Ohio Supreme Court's worries in the 7schach case, discussed supra in the
text accompanying notes 136-144, 162-164. The much more powerful limitation is the withdrawal of
the parties' authority to confect an enforceable post-adoption contact agreement, § 3107.65(AXI) and
(C). This aspect of the Ohio statute is addressed in the infra text accompanying note 304.
283. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-5-35(A) (Michie 1996).
284. See supra text accompanying notes 123-127.
285. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.33.295(l)(West 1995).
286. 45 Fed. Reg. 10622 (Feb. 15, 1980), § 104(c).
287. Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.305(2) (1995).
288. Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.305(2) (1995).
289. See Bartlett, supra note 267; Joseph Goldstein et al., Beyond the Best Interests of the Child
(1973) and Before the Best Interests of the Child (1979).
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a biological mother has been raised her entire life by a nonrelative. According to
the current statutes, that de facto "Auntie" could not be included in any contact
arrangements, even though she may have more abiding concern for the child's
welfare and more information to impart to the child about the child's social,
cultural and biological heritage than any of the child's blood relatives. Though we
admit that broadening the class of persons permitted to have contact may be
politically controversial, we would trust the mediation process to result in the wise
selection by the parents of suitable adults eligible for some contact with the child.
Section4. Content of the agreement; contact provisions; effected persons
A. A post-adoption contact agreement must accommodate the needs
and tolerances of both the biological and adopting parents and is subject
to any limitations mutually negotiated by them. The agreement may
authorize direct visitation between members of the child's biological
family or others and the child, in either the adopting parents' home or
elsewhere through a mutually agreed upon intermediary. The parties
may agree to more limited arrangements between members of the child's
biologicalfamily or others and the adopting parents or the child, such as,
communication by telephone or mail, the exchange of either identifying
or nonidentifying information, or other forms of contact.
B. The term "members of the child's biological family" means the
child's birth parents, grandparents, siblings and other biological
relatives.
E. Representation and Other Process Issues
A model statute must ensure that the parties to the cooperative agreement are
adequately represented during the crafting of the agreement and any court hearing.
However, in our proposed model statute, we have consciously rejected the New
Mexico proposal empowering the reviewing court to appoint a guardian ad litem
for the child before accepting a proposed agreement.2 All too often when faced
with a dispute involving a child, the law's solution is to throw another lawyer or
guardian ad litem into the fray who is charged with divining the child's interests.
In reviewing a proposed agreement affecting a young child, predictably such
representation will be simply a pro forma obligation. At this stage of the child's
development, the child's interests cannot be isolated from those of consenting,
caring adults. In an infant adoption, the appointment of a special guardian adlitem
seems like a complicating and needless additional expense providing no additional
protection for the child."' In contrast, as we will discuss later, the appointment of
290. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-5-35(B) (Michie 1996). This statute permits the court to appoint a
guardian ad litem for the child and requires the appointment when "visitation between the biological
family and the adoptee is contemplated."
291. The appointment of a guardian ad litem may be sound public policy for the older adopted
child who is capable of expressing independent views. In those situations, the statute should be
patterned on the jurisdiction's view of the role of the child in custody and visitation disputes: for
example, if and how the child's views are to be solicited by the court and whether his or her views are
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a representative for the child becomes appropriate and necessary only if subsequent
enforcement litigation arises between the biological and adopting parents.
In contrast, during the adoption negotiations, the birth parents and adopting
parents are in great need of adequate representation. As one veteran adoption
specialist has cautioned:
People contemplating adoption are vulnerable. It is easy for them to be
taken advantage of. Most have no prior personal experience with
adoption. They do not know the issues and complexities involved. They
do not know the key questions to ask. They are not in a position to assess
the quality of the services they are receiving. Add to this, varying degrees
of fear and desperation-birth parents knowing time is limited to make
decisions and wondering if anyone will want and be good to their baby,
prospective adoptive parents grappling with the pain of infertility and
fearing that they will never have a chance to be parents. In such
situations, it is easy for feelings of desperation to set in. At such times,
people can easily be led to make decisions and agreements they really do
not want and in other circumstances probably would not even consider.
And sad to realize, there are people in our society who understand this
and are all too willing to take advantage of this vulnerability of people in
need of assistance, especially if large sums of money are involved.292
The use of a professional mediator during the negotiation of any agreement
should allay most of our concern that the parties are educated about the range of
alternatives and are protected from overreaching. Though many adoption agencies
offer mediation services, an independent mediator should be appointed by the
court. The opportunities for overreaching in order to achieve an adoption are
considerable. The appointed professional should be experienced and knowledge-
able not only about mediation but also about the range and risks of post-adoption
contact.
If the parties cannot reach an agreement about continuing contact and either
party insists on such a provision, then the adoption fails. Unlike attempts to
mediate child custody disputes, there is no litigation alternative and any cooperative
adoption statute should eliminate that possibility. Our model only contemplates
consensual post-custody arrangements.
In addition, in most states, independent counsel is required to advise and
represent a birth parent during his or her consideration of whether to execute a
surrender for adoption and to ensure that execution of any surrender is done
binding on the court. In many states, an older child retains the right to "veto" any proposed adoption.
According to § 2-401 (c) of the Uniform Adoption Act, 9 U.L.A. (1964), the "informed consent" of a
minor who is twelve or older is required unless dispensed with by the court. Consistent with such a
stance, an older child's consent might be required for any proposed post-adoption contact agreement.
The Indiana statute, which is limited to adoptions of children who are over two years of age, requires
the consent of a child who is twelve years of age or older to any post-adoption visitation. Ind. Code Ann.
§ 31-19-16-2(6) (West 1999).
292. Caffarel, supra note 12.
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voluntarily with full knowledge of its consequences. Ordinarily, if not invariably,
the adopting parents will secure legal representation in order to ensure that theirs
is a "fail-safe" adoption. Certainly legal representation should encompass the
review of any mediated post-adoption contact agreement.
Section 5. Procedure for confecting a post-adoption contact agreement;
mediation
A. The biological parents and the adopting parents shall be required
to participate in mediation in negotiating and drafting any agreement for
post-adoption contact. The court shall appoint an independent, profes-
sional family mediator qualified to conduct such a process.
B. Any resulting agreement shall be reviewed and approved by
counsel for the biological parents and counsel for the adopting parents.
F. Formalities
The statutes of New Mexico, Oregon, and Washington require that the
agreement between the parties must be written. In at least two cases, courts have
avoided ruling on the enforceability of post-adoption contact by finding that there
was no "clear understanding" between the parties293 or a "secret agreement.""29
Although general contract principles would permit proof of an agreement implied
from the parties conduct, requiring an express, written agreement underscores the
importance of the promises, resolves conflict about the mutuality of the agreement,
and.reduces disputes over the precise terms of contact.
Section 6. Formalities; required declarations
Every post-adoption contact agreement shall be in writing and
signed by the biological parents and counsel and by the adopting parents
and counsel. Every agreement in order to be enforceable in accordance
with Article 8 must recite the following declarations:
(1) That the parties have fireely and voluntarily entered into this
agreement and that it reflects their intent to be bound by its terms, unless
later modified by a replacement mediated agreement or by court order.
(2) That the biological parents have been informed and understand
that upon the execution of the agreement, any dispute or litigation
regarding its terms shall not affect the validity or the relinquishment of
parental rights, the adoption or the custody of the adopted child.
(3) That the adopting parents have been informed and understand
that the biological parents may seek enforcement of the terms of this
agreement by a civil action.
293. In re Adoption of J.H.G., 869 P.2d 640,648 (Kan. 1994).
294. In re Hammer, 487 P.2d 417,420 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1971). See also In rePetition of S.O., 795
P.2d 254 (Colo. 1990): Despite a verbal agreement for post-adoption visitation and actual visitation
by the biological father, the court found that he signed an unambiguous written consent to the adoption.
The court held that, father had knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily consented to adoption.
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G. The Role of the Court
The statutes of New Mexico, Oregon and Washington go further by requiring
court approval of the parties' agreement. Certainly a requirement of court approval
of any agreement affecting the child is not novel in family law negotiations. Court
approval is nearly universally required before a post-separation custody agreement
between divorcing parents is incorporated into the court's judgment. In theory, the
court is to scrutinize the agreement in order to ensure that the provisions adequately
protect the child's interests. In practice, the court only superficially reviews any
agreement of the parents and will approve it unless it contains provisions that are
radical departures from settled norms. If the agreement has resulted from formal
mediation, the court is most likely to defer to the greater expertise of the parents
manifested by their agreement; indeed, some mediation statutes expressly direct the
court to accept the agreement unless the court makes specific fimdings of fact that
the agreement does not serve the child's best interest.295
The statutes of Washington 296 and New Mexico297 authorize the court to reject
the agreement unless it finds that it would be in the child's best interest. 9 The
"best interest of the child" has been severely criticized for its vagueness,
constituting a legislative sanction of judicial arbitrariness in child custody
decisionmaking. 2 An even greater problem posed by court review of post-
adoption contact agreements is that unlike post-divorce custodial arrangements, as
of now there is no settled body of law, no "shadow of the law"'" to guide a court
in making the review at the time of the adoption.
Furthermore, at this stage of the proceedings expert witnesses are likely to be
unhelpful. Only the grossest sorts of projections can be made regarding future
human behavior of any individual, based on past reports or current observations.
Anna Freud called such predictions "difficult and hazardous."3 ' Unlike later
review of the continued feasibility of a particular agreement in a particular
295. See e.g., La. R.S. 9:332 (Supp. 1999).
296. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.33.295(2) (West 1996).
297. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-5-35(c) (Michie 1978).
298. The Ohio statute is slightly more specific. Unless the court finds that the agreement is not
within the child's best interest or impinges upon certain enumerated subjects withdrawn from
negotiability, the court may not nullify or alter the terms of the parties' agreement. Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 3107.65(B) (Baldwin 1996). For enumeration of the terms withdrawn from negotiability, see
supra note 282.
299. Robert Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of
Indeterminacy, 39 Law & Contemp. Probs. 226 (1975); Goldstein et al., supra note 289; David
Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 Mich. L Rev. 477
(1984).
300. Robert Mnookin & Lewis Komhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of
Divorce 88 Yale LJ. 951.96 (1979). They hypothesize that established legal doctrine influences the
terms of out-of-court or negotiated bargains as well. See also Eleanor E. Maccoby & Robert H.
Mnookin, Dividing the Child: Social and Legal Dilemmas of Custody (1992).
301. Anna Freud, Child Observation and Prediction of Development: A Memorial Lecture In
Honor of Ernst Kris, 13 The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child 97, 98 (1958). An entire body of
research known as systems theory hypothesizes that linear predictions cannot be made in a world of
complex and circular causality. See Marlow & Sauber, supra note 251.
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adoption, any initial review at the time of the proposed adoption will necessarily
be a theoretical one. If we believe that consensual arrangements regarding
openness in adoption can serve the interests of adopted children better than a
monolithic secret model, then contact agreements should be authorized. Further-
more, if we believe that the mediation process will produce a mutually satisfying
arrangement, then the particular agreement should be approved. These twin
premises suggest that the agreement-reviewing role of the court at this stage of the
proceedings ought to be very limited. While we would not lightly discard the
court's parens patriae responsibility to oversee any child-centered proceeding, we
would reiterate the principle of the purpose article and accord presumptive validity
to any agreement reached by properly represented parties. 2 If a court rejects an
agreement, it should be required to set forth specific reasons as findings of fact in
support of its decision to override the parties' agreement. Only then can legitimate
concerns surface for appellate review, thus guiding the course of future parties'
negotiations.
Section 7. Court approval; incorporation into judgment
A. At the time an adoption decree is entered, the court entering the
decree may approve a post-adoption contact agreement executed in
conformity with the requirements of this Chapter. If approved, the
agreement shall be incorporated into ajudgment of the court.
B. A presumption arises that a knowing and voluntary agreement
regarding continuing contact reached between the child's biological
parents and adopting parents serves the child's best interests. In order
to reject the agreement, the court shall make a specific finding offact in
support of its conclusion that the child's interests would not be served by
approval.
H. Continuing Jurisdiction: Enforcement and Modification
Courts routinely enforce commercial contracts, granting specific performance
of promises or damages when a breach of obligation has occurred. Obviously,
without a right of enforcement, parties would not be induced to strike bargains or
enter into contracts. Given the social utility and moral force of agreements, when
adopting parents commit to honor post-adoption contact and then may renege
without any burden of proving that the child's best interest is disserved, as in Hill
v. Moorman," 3 the court's refusal of enforcement is shocking. Equally surprising
is the Ohio legislature's decision to authorize "open adoption" while at the same
time flatly denying enforceability to any complying agreements."'
302. The Oregon statute appears to take this tack: If an agreement is submitted, the court will
approve it. Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.305(2) (1993).
303. 525 So. 2d 681 (La. App. lstCir. 1988), see supra discussion in the text accompanying notes
131-132. See also In re Adoption of J.H.G., 869 P.2d 640 (Kan. 1994), discussed supra in the text
accompanying notes 133-135, and Lowe v. Clayton, 212 S.E.2d 582 (S.C. 1975), discussed supra in
note 128.
304. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3107.65(C) (Baldwin 1996) states:
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Admittedly, the enforcement of contracts between parties in a familial
relationship has proved to be more problematic than ordinary contracts, although
there is a clear trend toward recognition of private ordering in both the spousal and
the parent-child relationships.' The statutes of New Mexico, Washington and
Oregon all expressly provide for enforcement provided the agreement continues to
meet the child's best interest. Changes in circumstances between the time of
contracting and the time of court review usually result in a finding of judicial
power to modify the terms of the contract or judgment.s The statutes of New
Mexico and Washington expressly provide for enforcement and have simply
imported the substantive standard and adversarial procedure of actions traditionally
used to resolve child custody disputes. The movant bears the burden of proving a
change of circumstances as a result of which the child's best interest is no longer
well served.3"7 The Washington statute even allows costs and attorneys' fees for
the prevailing party."'
All terms of an open adoption are voluntary and any person who has entered into an open
adoption may withdraw from the open adoption at any time. An open adoption is not
enforceable. At the request of a person who has withdrawn from an open adoption, the court
with jurisdiction over the adoption shall issue an order barring any other person who was
a party to the open adoption from taking any action pursuant to the open adoption.
Even if the parties are willing to bind themselves to enforceability, this power is expressly withdrawn:
"No open adoption shall ... [p]rovide for the open adoption to be binding or enforceable." Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. § 3107.65(AX5) (Baldwin 1996).
305. The 1970s was a watershed period in American family law. One by one, states embraced "no
fault" divorce, thus moving away from collectively imposed norms, expressed as justification or
grounds for dissolution, and toward private ordering of the marital relationship including dissolution.
The role of the courts shifted from judging the merits of the marriage's intolerability to confirming the
decision of both and ultimately, either of the marriage partners. Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act
(1970), 9A U.LA. 200 (1987) § 302. Increasingly, courts have recognized the enforceability of pre-
nuptial contracts. Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (I 983),9B U.L.A. 369 (1987). Similarly, in the
1980's the legal doctrinal revolution regarding private control of the rights and obligations of marriage
spread to the parent-child relationship. "Joint custody" quickly became the national norm and courts
were enjoined to defer to custody, visitation, and decisionmaking plans developed by the parents if they
could agree. Carol S. Bruch, And How Are the Children? The Effects of Ideology and Mediation on
Child Custody Law and Children's Well-Being in the United States, 2 Int'l Law & the Fain. 106-26
(1988); Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, §§ 403,408,409 (1970), 9A U.L.A. 375,437-39 (1987).
306. Section 409 of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (1970), 9A U.L.A. 439 (1987) is
typical. The court may modify a prior child custody decree "upon the basis of facts that have arisen
since the prior decree or that were unknown to the court at the time of entry of the prior decree, that a
change has occurred in the circumstances of the child or his custodian, and that the modification is
necessary to serve the best interests of the child." § 409(b). The Uniform Act is atypical in that it tolls
the modification remedy for two years after any earlier decree, unless there is a swom allegation that
the child's health is endangered. § 409(a).
307, The New Mexico provision states:
The court shall retain jurisdiction after the decree of adoption is entered for the purpose of
hearing motions brought to enforce or modify an agreement entered into pursuant to the
provisions of this section. The court shall not grant a request to modify the agreement
unless the moving party establishes that there has been a change of circumstances and the
agreement is no longer in the adoptee's best interests.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-5-35(E) (1978).
308. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.33.295(4) (West 1996).
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Agreements that call for the continuing exchange of updated information or
communication between the biological and adopting families are not likely to create
enforcement problems for the courts. 3°9 Upon a showing of willful noncompliance,
the court's contempt powers could appropriately be employed. Agreements
promising personal visitation between the biological family and the child pose
greater difficulties. The court's post-divorce enforcement and modification power
in custody and visitation disputes is far from an ideal model for use in visitation
disputes after the child's adoption. Even when all evidence confirms that the
child's interests would be served by enforcement, the traditional remedies may not
achieve parental compliance. As has been more fully developed elsewhere, the law
can sanction the creation of an intimate relationship such as husband and wife or
parent and child or prescribe the consequences upon dissolution of those
relationships, but it is nearly helpless to shape behaviors between individuals who
must remain in relationship but are antipathetic to cooperative enterprise.1 There
is little to suggest that the traditional use of contempt remedies for violations would
be any more effective in the context of post-adoption visitation disputes than in
post-divorce disputes. An adopting parent who must help a child readjust
following some personal contact from the child's biological parent may perceive
that the child is suffering harm from the interaction and seek to end the contact.
Similarly, if the child communicates any dissatisfaction about the adoptive home
during an authorized type of contact, the biological parent may perceive that the
child must be protected by increased contact or monitoring. In either situation, the
parent is not likely to be more cooperative or reassured if the court requires
continued contact.
Realization of the ineffectiveness of court-imposed mandates in intra-family
conflicts may well explain the tremendous growth in the use of alternative dispute
mechanisms, particularly mediation, to resolve child custody and visitation cases."'
Mediation is imposed as a prerequisite for actions either to enforce or to modify the
terms of a post-adoption contact agreement by the Oregon statute:
An agreement [made in compliance with this law] may be enforced by a
civil action. However, before a court may enter an order requiring
enforcement [or modification], the court must find that the party seeking
enforcement participated, or attempted to participate, in good faith in
mediating the dispute giving rise to the action prior to filing the civil
action. t2
309. See, however, the finding that some adopting parents do not share information received from
biological family members with the child discussed supra in note 221.
310. James W. Bowers and John P. Bigelow, The Economics of Relationships and The Limits of
the Law (on file with authors); Donald J. Black, The Behavior of Law (1976); Robert C. Ellickson,
Order Without Law (1991).
311. Saul Levmore, Love It or Leave It: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Exclusivity of
Remedies in Partnership and Marriage, 58 L. & Contemp. Probs. 221 (1995). See also supra note 258.
312. Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.305(4Xa) (1993) authorizes enforcement actions. Section 109.305(4)(b)
authorizes modification using parallel language.
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The Oregon statute avoids making valid agreements easily modifiable and thus
reinforces the original expectations of enforceability. Unless the biological and
adopting parents agree to the modification, the court must find that the subsequent
occurrences of "exceptional circumstances" justifies modification."'
Submission of any disagreements to mediation is a much more viable means
of resolving conflicts and achieving modification of chafing or otherwise
unworkable arrangements of the initial contact agreement."1 4 Although mediation
may not produce a new agreement, its potential success should be exhausted before
the parties resort to adversarial litigation. Like the Oregon statute, our proposed
model statute requires attempted mediation of any dispute over the terms of the
contact agreement, and without an agreement for modification, limits the court's
power to rewrite the contract. However, we submit that the standard for court
modificatiohn should be child-focused. Reasonable persons can disagree about the
extent of the limitation and its phraseology: a finding that unless modification is
granted, the "child's physical, mental, moral, or emotional health would be
endangered," the child's "emotional development would be significantly impaired,"
or "the harm likely to be caused by a change [in the agreement's terms] is
outweighed by its advantages to hir.""'S Until we have more data about the types
of post-adoption contact disputes, their intensity, and their impact on the child's
development, we have opted for the least onerous judicial limitation, a balancing
of the benefits and detriments of any change to the child. If such litigation
becomes necessary, due to the conflict of opinion between the adopting parents and
the biological parents, an independent guardian ad litem should be appointed to
represent the child. Presumably the trial court would also have the advantage of
hearing from expert witnesses in aid of its contemplation of how the child's present
needs are best accommodated.3t 6
However, we are not very sanguine about the ability of litigation to resolve
these sorts of conflicts any more than it has extinguished smoldering custody and
visitation disputes. Aside from enforceability of any court-imposed judgment,
resort to the adversarial system may per se destroy any prospects for cooperation
and continued "openness." As the New York Court of Appeals succinctly put it:
"The courts cannot assure the happiness and stability of these children; that only
their parents could have done, and, hopefully can still do." ' 7
313. Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.305(4)(bXA) and (B) (1993).
314. Even if the contract fails to embrace mediation for the resolution of conflicts, statutes that
approve the confection of post-adoption contact agreements should direct that mediation be exhausted
as a process before enforcement or modification litigation is filed.
. 315. In descending order of onerousness, the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (1970), 9A
U.LA. 282, 398-439 (1987) uses serious endangering as the standard for a denial of visitation rights
to a parent, § 407; significant impairment of emotional development for continuing state supervision
of custody or visitation, § 408; and the balancing of the benefits and harms of change for modification
actions, § 409. The general standard for the initial allocation of custodial and visitation rights between
parents is the sublimely vague, "best interest of the child" test, § 402.
316. See Smith v. Brett, No. FA 93 030 76 90 S, 1994 WL 411003 (Conn. Super. July 29, 1994)
for a recitation of expert testimony that the trial court found to be persuasive in denying any continuing
contact between the adopted child and his biological maternal grandparents.
317. Nehra v. Uhlar, 372 N.E.2d 4,9 (N.Y. 1977).
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Section 8. Enforcement ofpost-adoption contact agreements; modifica-
tion
A. Unless another state has jurisdiction pursuant to the Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, a the court shall retain jurisdiction after
the decree of adoption is entered for the purpose of hearing motions
brought to enforce or modify an agreement entered into pursuant to the
provisions of this chapter.
B. Before hearing either an enforcement or a modification motion,
the court shall refer the parties to mediation. Only if the court finds that
the party seeking relief has participated or attempted to participate in
good faith in mediating the dispute, may it proceed to a determination on
the merits of the motion.
C. The court shall order continuing compliance in accordance with
the agreement and not modify its terms or nullify it unless it finds that the
harm likely to be caused by a modification is outweighed by its advan-
tages to the child.
VII. CONCLUSION
The primary policy choice dramatically presented by post-adoption contract
agreements is whether there is sufficient justification for disabling parents, old and
new, from crafting their own arrangements for their child's well being. As
Professor Grotevant and his colleagues concluded in reporting on the National
Study:
(An] adoptive father made an important point: "Different adoptions fit
different situations. I don't think every glove fits every hand." Each
adoptive family system contains many individuals yoked by the adopted
318. The statutes of Oregon, Washington and New Mexico do not address the predictable situation
that either the biological parents or adopting parents may move out of the state that granted the original
adoption decree and approved the post-adoption contact agreement. See, e.g., In the Matter of the
Adoption of Hammer, supra notes 156-158 and accompanying text. The Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act, 9 U.L.A. 115 (1968), the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub.L. No. 96-
611, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., and the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, 9 U.L.A.
261 (1997) address and resolve questions of interstate jurisdiction by identifying the jurisdiction which
has the maximum current information about and involvement with the child and his caretakers. Both
the Washington and Oregon statutes do not address jurisdiction at all, referring only to enforcement by
civil action. The New Mexico statute attempts to confer continuing jurisdiction on the court which
entered the original adoption decree. The Uniform Adoption Act, 9 U.LA. (Supp. 1994) has no clearly
applicable provisions since it takes no stance on the performability or enforceability of post-adoption
contact agreements. See supra text accompanying note 13.
While it is more efficient for the court of original jurisdiction to hear any subsequent dispute between
the parties as long as the child still remains there, we believe that the UCCJA applies to interstate
disputes over post-adoption contact. Although the UCCJA does not explicitly govern post-adoption
contact disputes, unlike child support orders, such disputes are not expressly excluded. "Custody
determination" is defined as "a court decision and court orders and instructions providing for the
custody of a child, including visitation rights; it does not include a decision relating to child support
or any other monetary obligation of any person." § 2(2).
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child. The adoptive parents' perspective is only one part of the system.
If one carries the hand/glove metaphor a bit further, thinking of the
adoptive family system as the hand and the type of adoption as the glove,
it seems plausible that each glove, or perhaps even individual fingers of
the glove, may need to be knitted for each family system. Additionally,
the gloves may need to be hand-knitted rather than mass produced and
made of natural fibers that breathe, grow, and change with the hand." 9
The accumulated scientific data do not justify the wholesale rejection of the
adoption parties' contractual authority, and our model statute promotes the
necessary hand-tailoring process. However, future disagreements over the course
of long term relationships are predictable as the lives of biological parents and
adopting parents diverge and as the child's needs change. There must be the option
of continued court involvement after the ink on an adoption decree has dried.
Part of the reason why family court judges relish uncontested adoptions,
preferring them to all other cases on their dockets, is their clean-cut finality.
Parties in dependency, delinquency, divorce custody and custody modification
cases are likely to return, demanding exercise of the court's continuing jurisdiction.
At the adoption decree hearing, only the well-dressed, doting adopting parents and
cuddly, bright-eyed child are present, eager for the modem miracle of legal re-birth
in a courtroom. The biological parents are gone, relieved of appearance,
responsibility, rights and presumably interests. The fiction is complete. Only if
adopted children subsequently fit into some other category ofjusticiability are their
needs later reviewed by courts. Their unique needs flowing from relinquishment
and adoption are treated as if they did not exist.
If agreements are to be enforced, modified or nullified, obviously the adoption
court must assume a limited form of continuing jurisdiction when mediation fails
to resolve a dispute. As long as adoption practitioners offer the option of
cooperative adoption, we will never learn about the scope and nature of the parties'
disputes and the ultimate social utility of post-adoption contact agreements unless
court review is ensured. Under our model statute, if the dispute cannot be resolved
and the child has not developed even limited bonds with the biological parent, the
court should bow to the needs and wishes of the adopting parents. If on the other
hand, the child appears to greatly benefit from the contact and has developed
expectations of its continuance, only then might the court consider imposing
continued contact over the objections of his caretakers. In most instances, we
believe that the court will and should defer to the adopting parents and the primacy
of their relationship with the child.
Although review of post-adoption contact agreements will be a delicate task,
the special needs of the adopted child and his extended family should no longer be
treated as if they were nonexistent, left to the exclusive province of mental health
professionals. Courts have a continuing responsibility to oversee, when needed,
a relationship which the law has created.
319. Grotevant et al., supra note 185, at 145.
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